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This book stands on its own as an argument about the interna­
tional division of labor and the method of economics. The reader 
should nevertheless know that the argument forms part of a larger 
intellectual program. The program rebels against the tendencies 
now prevailing in the social sciences and humanities. It seeks alter­
natives to the arrangements and the assumptions of contemporary 
societies. It tries to give new meaning to the revolutionary ideas of 
human liberation and empowerment that, for the last few cen­
turies, have aroused the whole world. It turns thought against fate. 
False Necessity (Verso, 2001), Social Theory: Its Situation and Its 
Task (Verso, 2004), and Plasticity into Power (Verso, 2004) carry 
this program forward as a social theory. What Should Legal Analy­
sis Become? (Verso, 1996) advances it in the discipline that, to­
gether with political economy, provides the most promising tools 
with which to reimagine the organization of social life. Democracy 
Realized:  The Progressive Alternative (Verso, 1998) and What 
Should the Left Propose? (Verso, 2005) develop it as an institu­
tional proposal. Passion (Free Press, 1984) and The Self Awakened: 
Pragmatism Unbound (Harvard University Press, 2007) deepen 
and generalize it as a philosophical conception.* 
*For further texts from this intellectual program, see www 
.robertounger.net. Free Trade Reimagined 
●❍● Themes and Scope of this Book 
●❍● 
The idea of free trade combines theoretical interest with practical 
signiﬁcance. It takes us into the heart of economic theory and 
into the midst of contemporary debates about the world econ­
omy. It has become much more than a slogan to conjure with; it 
has turned into a promise or a menace, a nearly self-evident truth 
or a source of bafﬂement, the pride of the hardest of the hard so­
cial sciences and the bugbear of those who resist its conclusions. 
If countries specialize in what they produce, the whole world 
can reap the beneﬁts. It is a simple message of enormous power, 
promising both greater riches and more freedom. 
As a subject of theoretical concern, free trade leads into the 
inner sanctum of economic theorizing. Belief in the gains to be 
secured through free trade, on the basis of established or con­
structed comparative advantage, has long been recognized as one 
of the most counterintuitive and characteristic of the notions of 
economics. It is a conception embodying the most pervasive 
theme in economic analysis: the idea of exchange, for reciprocal 
beneﬁt, among specialized producers in a division of labor and of 
the market as a form of cooperation among strangers who are 
neither friends nor enemies and who need only the cold calculus 
of interest to establish a common practical bond. The deepest 
source of the appeal of free trade arises from the conviction that it 
is not a device but rather, as Alfred Marshall claimed, “the absence 
of any device.” 
As an issue of practical signiﬁcance, free trade stands in the mid­
dle of contemporary debates about globalization: the emergent 
world trading system is as much the centerpiece of the present 2  ❍  themes and scope 
regime of globalization as the doctrine of free trade is the simplest 
and sharpest expression of economic analysis put to practical use. 
If we can change what free trade means and how it is organized, we 
can do the same, more generally, to globalization. And if we can 
have globalization on our terms, rather than on those of the sup­
posedly irresistible forces that its contemporary form is claimed to 
represent, all bets are off: we are freer than we suppose to rethink 
and to reconstruct. 
The doctrine of free trade, as it has been understood, is funda­
mentally defective. Its ﬂaws cannot be remedied by a series of 
localized qualiﬁcations of analysis and policy. The alternative is 
not to embrace a theory justifying protectionism but rather to re­
ject and to revise the terms on which the debate between free 
trade and protectionism has long taken place. Such a revision has 
implications for the method of economics. 
The point of largest theoretical signiﬁcance to emerge from my 
argument is that a system of free trade will be the more advanta­
geous to those who engage in it (whether or not they are sovereign 
countries) if it allows them the greatest possible experimental 
freedom to change their practices and institutions of production. 
This freedom of revision, however, may conﬂict with what free 
trade has traditionally been understood to be and to require. 
The point of greatest practical relevance, intimately related 
to that theoretical conception, is that it makes no sense to orga­
nize the world trading system around the goal of maximizing 
free trade, in the sense in which we are used to deﬁning free trade. 
A single-minded insistence on the maximization of free trade gives 
too little weight to an imperative that turns out to be of vital, in­
deed of increasing signiﬁcance: the need of every country, richer 
or poorer, to avoid lasting conﬁnement to a particular place in the 
international division of labor and to the styles of production, the 
strategies of development, and the sets of institutions that may 
exert this conﬁning inﬂuence. 
If the immediate topic of this book is the contest over free trade 
and over the form of an open international economy, its ultimate 
subjects are the world division of labor and the method of eco­
nomics. We cannot escape the conﬁnes of the traditional debate themes and scope  ❍  3 
about free trade and protection and do justice to the possibilities of 
globalization without changing some of our most fundamental as­
sumptions about market economies and the division of labor. That 
the future of economic growth lies with permanent innovation 
rather than with the coercive extraction of a social surplus, that 
freedom experimentally to combine people, ideas, and things must 
therefore be liberated from all unnecessary institutional restraints 
and dogmas, that the best market economy is the one that gives the 
greatest opportunity to the most people in the most ways, that a 
free economic system must be based on free labor, and that the ca­
pacity to use governmental power for the purpose of broadening 
opportunity can be exercised to advantage only insofar as the state 
ceases to be in the pocket of privileged and moneyed interests—all 
these are platitudes of contemporary discourse, embraced with the 
greatest enthusiasm by those who collaborate with the dictatorship 
of no alternatives under which the world is now bent. 
The words of this litany, however, belong in the mouths of rev­
olutionaries. To think these words through is to revise our ideas 
concerning what is most important about market economies and 
the division of labor in the workplace, the national economy, or 
the whole world. To make these words real is to rebel against the 
institutions in which market economies and the division of labor 
remain embodied. 
It is an intellectual task for which the present methods of eco­
nomics are inadequate. It would be tempting to adopt a strategy 
of caution, insisting that economics, purged of abusive applica­
tions and restored to analytic purity, provides help, and imposes 
no obstacles, to such a campaign. In this book I reject that claim: 
its modesty does not make up for its falsehood. The practice of 
economic analysis inaugurated in the late nineteenth century by 
Walras, Jevons, and Menger, which came to be labeled “marginal­
ism” and which guided the mainstream of subsequent economic 
theory and culminated in the theory of general equilibirum, is 
not only insufﬁcient to the execution of the task. It is also, in cer­
tain decisive respects, incompatible with it. 
If  economics continues to swing between purity of analysis, 
retreating from all controversial explanatory and prescriptive 4  ❍  themes and scope 
ideas, and abuse of application, unjustiﬁably equating abstract 
conceptions like the idea of a market economy with particular 
contingent sets of economic arrangements, it will not open the 
way. It will stand in the way. There are many past and present va­
rieties of economic analysis, from the old institutional economics 
to the new behavioral economics, that suggest different methods 
and directions. However, they have not developed—and maybe 
they cannot develop—into ways of dealing with the problems 
that are central to the argument of this book. Their characteristic 
inability to imagine the possible forms of economic life cramps 
their insight into its actual forms.* For these reasons, the attempt 
here to revise the terms of the traditional controversy about free 
trade and protection and to reconsider the nature and prospects 
of the world division of labor leads as well into an argument 
about the method of economics. 
Chapter One explains why there is intellectual as well as practical 
trouble with the doctrine of free trade. It begins by enumerating a 
series of puzzles about the nature and beneﬁts of free trade that 
the development of economic ideas has deepened rather than 
solved. It goes on to discuss the failure of history to conﬁrm doc­
trine: never has a practical program enjoyed so much prestige with 
so little justiﬁcation in historical experience. It ends by discussing 
*The “new institutional economics” of the late twentieth century, un­
like the German institutional economics or the American institutional 
economics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is not an 
example of such an arrested departure from the mainstream of think­
ing. Wedded to ideas of institutional convergence and functionalist de­
terminism, it explains the institutional framework of economic activity, 
including the institutions of the existing market economies, in a way 
that makes these arrangements seem the natural or necessary setting of 
the advanced economies. As a result, it squanders the intellectual op­
portunity presented by the study of institutions and comes to represent 
an anti-institutional economics. There are few more striking instances 
of the right-wing Hegelianism—the real is rational—that pervades the 
social sciences today. themes and scope  ❍  5 
why a doctrine with feet of clay has been able to cut so imposing a 
ﬁgure in the debates of the modern world. 
Chapter Two addresses the intellectual core of the argument for 
trade: the doctrine of comparative advantage. This doctrine turns 
out to be incomplete in a series of connected ways. To interpret 
correctly what it says, we have to combine it with much that it 
fails to say. The meaning of the part that we have, however, de­
pends on the missing part. Criticism of the theory of comparative 
advantage leads directly into criticism of the dominant style of 
economic analysis; latter-day statements of that theory are among 
the most characteristic expressions of this style. 
Chapter Three responds to the incompleteness of the doctrine of 
comparative advantage. It does so by presenting ideas—about in­
ternational trade and, more generally, about the market economy 
and the division of labor—that can do justice to the puzzles and the 
facts explored in the ﬁrst two chapters. In particular, these ideas 
provide building blocks for an approach to free trade. We cannot 
develop a better approach to free trade—one capable of transcend­
ing the conventional terms of the debate between free traders and 
protectionists—without questioning and revising the premises on 
which the traditional doctrine relied. 
Such  assumptions concern some of the most fundamental 
ideas in economics: the nature of a market economy and of the 
alternative institutional forms it can take; the reasons why some 
of the central problems of an economy must be solved outside the 
economy, in politics, and why the organization of politics is there­
fore decisive for the character of economic life; the features of a 
division of labor—in the workplace, in a country, or in the whole 
world—that are most important to innovation and growth; and 
the way we should think about the division of labor once we rid 
ourselves of the tyranny of the ideas for which Adam Smith’s pin 
factory and Henry Ford’s assembly line have been made to stand. 
Rethinking free trade turns out to depend on much more than 
ideas about commerce. 
These views form the backdrop to the development and defense 
of three theses about free trade advanced in Chapter Four: ﬁrst, 
about the economic circumstances in which free trade is likely to 6  ❍  themes and scope 
be most beneﬁcial or most dangerous; second, about the political 
circumstances in which restraints on trade are likely to serve 
broader or narrower interests; and third, about the paradoxical 
and misunderstood relation among the different ways in which 
free trade—or, more generally, a free economy—can be free. Taken 
together, these theses form the elements of a way of thinking about 
free trade. They also provide the rudiments of an approach to the 
building of an open world economy. It is a way of thinking that 
neither reafﬁrms nor repudiates the traditional commitment to 
free trade as an indispensable part of the road to global progress. 
What it has to say cannot be adequately captured within the terms 
of the familiar disputes between free traders and protectionists. 
Chapter Five explores the programmatic implications of the 
analysis, its consequences for the reformation of the world trading 
system as well as for the redirection of national development 
strategies. Free trade forms the kernel of the theory and practice of 
globalization. We have become accustomed to the idea that all we 
can do with globalization is to have either more or less of it, or to 
have it either more slowly or more quickly. The argument of this 
book leads to the conclusion that we can and should have free 
trade and globalization on terms different from those in which we 
now encounter them. We need not merely dose them or pace 
them; we can rethink and remake them. Ideas alone are powerless 
to  produce such a reorientation. However, we cannot bring it 
about without ideas. Chapter 1 
Troubles: The Enigmas of Free Trade 
●❍● 
Familiar Problems, Disturbing Solutions 
I begin by enumerating some familiar problems in the doctrine of 
free trade conducted on the basis of specialized lines of production 
within an international division of labor, particularly when such 
national specializations are motivated by comparative advantage.* 
These problems—and the solutions that have been proposed for 
*A country is said to enjoy an absolute advantage over another coun­
try in the production of a good if it can produce the good more efﬁ­
ciently, that is, at lower cost, than the other country. It is said to enjoy a 
comparative advantage over another country in the production of a 
good if it can produce that good at lower opportunity cost than the 
other country, that is, with relatively less opportunity to commit the 
resources it devotes to the production of that good to a more efﬁcient 
use. A country that fails to have an absolute advantage in the produc­
tion of a good may nevertheless possess a comparative advantage in it. 
Comparative advantage vastly expands the basis for international spe­
cialization of production. For this reason, and because it is both coun­
terintuitive in its claims and far-reaching in its implications, it has been, 
ever since its formulation by David Ricardo almost two hundred years 
ago, the cornerstone of thinking about international trade. The next 
chapter deals at length with the doctrine of comparative advantage. The 
distinction between absolute and comparative advantage is largely irrel­
evant to the puzzles listed immediately below, although comparative 
rather than absolute advantage would ordinarily be regarded as the 
main ﬁeld for their application. Thus, I use in the following list the sim­
ple term “advantage.” 8  ❍  chapter one 
them—have not been thought to discredit either the central in­
sight of the doctrine or its programmatic consequence, the beneﬁ­
cence of free trade. Indeed, they do not. They nevertheless pose a 
challenge that contemporary thinking about trade and free trade 
has yet adequately to meet. How, why, and with what result the 
force of this challenge has continued to be evaded is a matter re­
quiring further reﬂection. Consider a brief, nonexhaustive list of 
these long-recognized objections and complications. 
1. The assumption of a uniquely efﬁcient assignment of pro­
ductive specializations among countries in an international divi­
sion of labor: who is to produce what. Even if we assume that 
comparative advantage is a given rather than a construction (see 
the next proposition on this list), it is more realistic to suppose 
that there are alternative sets of efﬁcient assignments of advan­
tage among economies, just as there are multiple ways any econ­
omy can be in equilibrium, each with different consequences for 
national welfare and growth. The less that advantage is deter­
mined by nature, the greater is likely to be the signiﬁcance of the 
problem of multiple efﬁcient solutions to the allocation of spe­
cialized national roles in world trade. Each such allocation will 
have distinct results for both welfare and growth. 
2. The assumption that advantage is given rather than made. 
This assumption becomes less tenable as we move away from nat­
ural advantage. The most tangible example of made advantage is 
the development of economies of scale and scope, as well as of 
concentrations of skill, in a line of business in which a country 
may have had no natural advantage. However, once the principle 
is admitted that advantage can be deliberately created by govern­
mental initiative and collective action, it applies to every reason 
for a country’s practical success or failure, including its institu­
tions and practices, social and political as well as economic. Trade 
theory has had difﬁculty coming to terms with how the construc­
tion of advantage occurs, for the same reason that economics in 
general has had trouble dealing with how the institutional and 
psychological assumptions of maximizing behavior in a market 
economy are established and modiﬁed. the enigmas of free trade  ❍  9 
3. The assumption that it is tenable to foreclose the two previous 
sets of concerns by saying that either advantage, when not given by 
nature, will be generated by market activity itself or that it will be 
produced by governmental intervention, with all its attendant 
risks (playing favorites, riding hobbyhorses). In fact, advantage has 
always been shaped by a combination of private enterprise and 
public action. As soon as we acknowledge this fact, however, we re­
alize that there is no closed set of possible institutional forms of 
such a combination. Indeed, there is no single and uncontroversial 
institutional achievement of worldwide free trade. 
The concept of a market economy is institutionally indetermi­
nate. That is to say, it is capable of being realized in different legal 
and institutional directions, each with dramatic consequences for 
every aspect of social life, including the class structure of society 
and the distribution of wealth and power. The idea of a universal 
regime of free trade is institutionally indeterminate in the same 
sense and for the same reasons. Which of its institutional realiza­
tions prevails has immense importance for the future of humanity. 
These debates cannot be captured within the categories of long-
standing controversies about free trade and protection. 
4. The assumption that so long as we correct market imperfec­
tions (according to the formula of ﬁrst, ﬁx them; if not, compen­
sate for them by a domestic initiative; only as a ﬁnal resort, impose 
a restraint on trade), we can move from the static efﬁciency of free 
trade to its intertemporal efﬁciency and from its intertemporal ef­
ﬁciency to its beneﬁcial effect on economic growth. In fact, the 
ﬁrst link holds only if intertemporal efﬁciency is deﬁned so nar­
rowly as to deprive it of theoretical or practical interest, and the 
second link (as the later observations about historical experience 
conﬁrm) is nonexistent. 
Moreover, the language of market imperfections, as applied to 
the “infant industry” and “monopoly power in trade” arguments 
for protection, trivializes the central point: not how to reestablish 
the market or what to do when the market fails, but what kind of 
market—on the basis of what institutions and practices—to 
establish in the ﬁrst place. We cannot reach this point by focusing 
solely on advantage, whether given or made; on the contrary, the 10  ❍  chapter one 
analysis of advantage presupposes that we have already disposed 
of this issue to our satisfaction. We have not. 
5. The assumption that a country’s trade policy should not be 
inﬂuenced by the willingness of its trading partners to abolish or 
to  diminish restraints on trade. The traditional view (against 
which strategic trade theory staged a limited revolt) has been that 
although real-world departures from this assumption may justify 
circumstantial resort to reciprocity and retaliation, they do not 
compromise the case for a trade regime that is as universal and as 
free as possible. 
6. If, however, the whole system of world trade and all the insti­
tutions and practices by which it is realized in any given historical 
circumstance are both particular and contingent, if they are inca­
pable of being inferred by pure analysis from the idea of free trade, 
if they are the products of shifting conﬂicts of interest and vision 
on the world stage, if they therefore deeply bear the imprint of 
everyone’s strategies, and if the strategies of a few preponderant 
economic powers are likely to be decisive in determining their 
content, then the assumption that a country’s trade policy should 
be independent of the trade concessions it wins from the countries 
with which it trades makes little sense. Strategic trade theory failed 
to go far enough in resisting it. 
A puzzle will occur to any reader of this book who has studied the 
history of debates about free trade and protection. Everything in 
this short list of ambiguities and ﬂaws in the traditional doctrine 
of free trade based on comparative or absolute advantage is well 
known. The interest of the list lies in combining the ideas that 
constitute the list, in deepening and generalizing them, and in 
grasping their unrecognized implications. The student of the con­
troversy about free trade, however, will object that the history of 
this debate has been largely preoccupied with beliefs of an entirely 
different order. To these beliefs the propositions in the short list 
bear no self-evident relation. 
Traditional objections to free trade can be broadly placed into 
two categories. In one category are the arguments concerning 
the special instances in which restraints on trade may be justiﬁed the enigmas of free trade  ❍  11 
because of the failure to solve what today we would describe as a 
collective-action problem in the development of a regime of uni­
versal free trade. If markets are not universally open, it may not, 
under certain conditions, be in the interest of every trading party 
to act as if they were; that is, it may not be in its interest to offer 
its trading partners a unilateral and unreciprocated abolition of 
restraints on trade. This claim was the nub of Robert Torrens’s 
“terms of trade” argument. 
It is an argument that has always invited a twofold response 
from the defenders of free trade as it is conventionally under­
stood. One response emphasizes how special are the conditions 
under which restraint may be more advantageous than unrecip­
rocated protection. The other response insists that the actual 
practice of protection is likely to squander its theoretical beneﬁts 
by lending itself to the service of powerful interests and fashion­
able dogmas. 
In a second category are the arguments dealing with the per­
verse distributive effects of free trade in a particular situation, 
including both distribution among sectors of the economy and 
distribution among classes of society. In this second category fall 
Frank Graham’s “increasing returns argument” (according to 
which if manufacturing is subject to increasing returns to scale 
and agriculture to decreasing returns to scale, a country importing 
manufactured goods and specializing in agriculture may have rea­
son to impose a tariff on manufactures in order to encourage a 
shift to the higher-productivity sector, with its increasing returns 
to scale), Mihail Manoïlescu’s related “wage differential argument” 
(according to which developing countries might be justiﬁed in im­
posing restraints on trade to encourage the movement of labor 
from low-wage, low-productivity agriculture to high-wage, high-
productivity industry), James Bristock Bridgen’s so-called Aus­
tralian argument (according to which restraints on trade might be 
justiﬁed for countries whose factor endowments were such that, 
although facing diminishing returns in agriculture, they continued 
to specialize in the world economy as agricultural exporters), and 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (according to which an import 
tariff may raise the real income of labor and reduce the real 12  ❍  chapter one 
income of capital when the import-substituting sector produces a 
labor-intensive good). 
The common element in these arguments of the second cate­
gory is the claim that, under the special conditions each of them 
stipulates, free trade may produce a redistribution of gains among 
sectors of production or among classes of society that is economi­
cally inconvenient as well as socially undesirable because it inhibits 
a national economy from climbing the ladder of productivity 
more quickly. 
Both sets of arguments address circumstances in which, for 
particular reasons, the case for free trade may fail to persuade. 
They provide no basis for resisting trade beyond those circum­
stances or for revising our view of its beneﬁts. They thus reinforce 
John Stuart Mill’s contention that “the protectionist doctrine 
ﬁnds support in some particular cases”—and only in such cases. 
The result is to provoke from the defenders of the doctrine of 
free trade a response that has succeeded in robbing these objec­
tions from the competitive assumptions or the distributive effects 
of freer trade of much of their theoretical and practical force. The 
response comes in two parts. The ﬁrst part is to interpret each of 
the arguments as the description of a low-productivity trap. The 
way out of the trap, the votaries of free trade say, is not to restrict 
openness in the global market; it is to radicalize openness—com­
petition, ﬂexibility, and capability through education, training, 
and benchmarking—in the domestic market. The second part is 
to suggest that so long as market failure persists, the short-term 
antidote to its perverse distributive consequences should be a cor­
rective or compensatory transfer of resources. Restraint on trade 
should be a last resort; it is likely to be the most costly solution, 
and its costs are likely to be magniﬁed by the foothold it provides 
for the ravages of favoritism and dogmatism. 
So it is that the two familiar sets of objections to the doctrine of 
free trade conducted on the basis of comparative advantage can 
be quickly and effectively circumscribed. The doctrine is general; 
the objections are particular. Because they are particular, they in­
vite particular responses that leave the essentials of the doctrine 
untouched. the enigmas of free trade  ❍  13 
Now return to the earlier summary list of analytical conun­
drums. They are not particular; they are general. They reveal dif­
ﬁculties or ambiguities in the conception itself, not just in its 
application to speciﬁc circumstances. They suggest that free trade— 
the international division of labor, the global trading regime— 
might have different meanings and be organized in different ways, 
with different consequences. They imply that instead of choosing 
more or less free trade, we might think of free trade in a different 
manner and organize it accordingly. 
The problems on the short list therefore enjoy a conceptual pri­
ority to the two families of practical arguments—about collective 
action and about distribution—that have occupied so much of 
the historical controversy about free trade and protection. Until 
we have solved these problems, we cannot know with assurance 
what to make of those well-known arguments. Is there a way of 
conceiving, developing, and organizing an open world economy 
that prevents countries from falling into low-productivity traps 
like those described by Graham, Manoïlescu, and Bridgen? Can 
the problem of collective action in the construction of such an 
open world economy be solved in a way that enables countries to 
diverge, even increasingly, in their forms of economic organiza­
tion as well as in their lines of business? 
A central theme runs through the preceding discussion of the co­
nundrums latent in the conception of free trade and of the mat­
ters left unresolved by the historical debates about protectionism. 
The theme is the need for a contest among ways of imagining and 
of organizing worldwide free trade. The signiﬁcance of the co­
nundrums is to suggest that there is room to rethink international 
free trade and therefore also room to reorganize it. The meaning 
of the history of the debates is that until we determine what our 
intellectual and practical alternatives are in that larger struggle, 
we cannot bring those debates to a close, or even assign them a 
deﬁnitive meaning. 
There is no single uncontroversial realization of the idea of a 
universal regime of free trade. To take a simple example, will it be 
free trade of goods with mobility of labor or free trade of goods 14  ❍  chapter one 
without mobility of labor? So long as there are different possible 
futures, including different possible futures of free trade itself, 
there will be different strategies among its participants, commit­
ted by reason of interest and vision to one such future against 
others. Strategizing is not what takes place when free trade ends. 
A regime of free trade is not a perpetual-motion machine that, 
once established, absolves us of further institutional choices and 
strategic conﬂicts. 
The common and combined effect of these problems is to 
require the qualiﬁcation and the expansion of traditional free 
trade doctrine. The movement to save the doctrine from the ob­
jections will not be persuasive and successful unless it goes in a 
particular direction. This direction emphasizes the multiplicity 
of possible successful assignments of productive specializations 
among countries. It also underlines the role of governments and 
ﬁrms in making new comparative advantage. Multiplicity rather 
than singularity of opportunity and response; advantage and ca­
pability as achieved rather than as given, as goals rather than as 
guides—these are the characteristic themes of plausible answers to 
those objections. 
What emerges from such answers is a way of responding to the 
ﬁve problems I have just enumerated that disposes of them by 
doing just the opposite of what has been the main tendency of eco­
nomic theorizing for the last hundred and twenty years. The re­
sponse disposes of these problems only by undermining the idea 
of the market (in this case the world market realized through uni­
versal trade) as a perpetual-motion machine that can deﬁne its 
own presuppositions and pick out uniquely efﬁcient solutions to 
the problems of resource allocation. It disposes of them only by 
weakening the contrast between the effort to ﬁnd the most efﬁ­
cient (or even Pareto-improving, that is to say better for everyone) 
solution within the given framework and then by reinventing the 
framework. And it therefore disposes of them only by connecting 
economics and politics rather than by keeping them carefully and 
anxiously apart. 
Consider, for example, the substitution of the idea of construc­
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advantage. Once we acknowledge that comparative advantage can 
be, and always has been, shaped by governmental initiative and 
collective action as well as by private enterprise, we have to ask 
which features of a trading system may either encourage or inhibit 
such restless tilting of the scales. Once we combine the idea of con­
structed comparative advantage with the idea of multiple answers 
to the question of who may be the most efﬁcient producer of what 
in the world economy, we begin to tear down the wall between the 
debate about how to understand and how to organize universal 
free trade and the struggle over the content of the development 
strategies different countries should embrace. And once we admit 
that the institutional indeterminacy of the market concept—our 
inability to infer a particular legal and institutional organization 
of the market from the abstract idea of a market—is aggravated by 
the institutional indeterminacy of the idea of global free trade— 
the possibility of interpreting the legal and institutional implica­
tions of this idea in sharply divergent ways—we begin to wonder 
what it is that we embrace when we commit to free trade. 
So each of the well-known objections I have listed yields to an­
swers that are almost as familiar. However, the cumulative effect 
of these answers is to make the theoretical meaning and the prac­
tical signiﬁcance of the doctrine of free trade depend on ideas 
about much more. My argument expands into empirical and nor­
mative controversy rather than retreating from it. In this sense, it 
devalues the autonomy of economic analysis rather than enhance 
it. It goes in a direction opposite to the direction that economic 
theory has on the whole taken. It uses trouble to create, through 
more trouble, insight. 




There has never been a more astonishing contrast between the in­
tellectual prestige of a social or economic doctrine and the weak­
ness of its vindication by historical experience than the inﬂuence 16  ❍  chapter one 
enjoyed by the idea of the advantages of universal free trade, in 
the face of facts that seem to contradict this idea. 
Any fair-minded reading of the historical record shows that 
there is no evidence for a consistent or general positive relation 
between free trade and economic growth. There is more than a 
little evidence for the supposition that they have often been nega­
tively related. I do not take this evidence to justify a systematic 
bias toward trade protection; indeed, it is a central tenet of the ar­
gument of this essay that the terms of the traditional debate about 
free trade and protection are and continue to be ill-conceived. It is 
impossible to achieve intellectual clarity so long as we stubbornly 
rely on misreadings of the historical record. The facts at issue are 
not obscure; they do not depend on research into as yet unvisited 
archives or on convoluted interpretations of hermetic texts. They 
are as simple and straightforward as we can ever expect a set of 
complex historical events, over extended time, to be. 
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—until the 
present episode of globalization began in earnest in the closing 
decades of the last century—the rich countries of the North 
Atlantic world were a stronghold of protectionism. The most no­
table exception was the pioneering industrial power, Great Britain. 
By contrast, free trade, based on established comparative advan­
tage, prevailed, by a combination of political imposition and ideo­
logical submission, in much of the poorer rest of the world. 
In continental Europe, a protectionist bias prevailed for most 
of the nineteenth century. It became strongest in the period from 
1892 to 1914. This was the heyday of the previous episode of 
globalization—the one that came before the globalizing impulse 
of the late twentieth and the early twenty-ﬁrst centuries. The 
most notable movement toward free trade took place in the years 
following the Anglo-French trade treaty of 1861. It is striking that 
this turn to free trade persisted during the period of the great 
European depression of the 1870s, an economic downturn in 
some respects more severe than the depression of the 1930s. 
No Western country professed a more long-standing and radi­
cal devotion to protectionism than the one that was destined to 
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States. The sole consistent opposition to this bias came from the 
slaveholding South. The doctrinal formulation of the protection­
ist bias in Henry Carey’s “American System” predated the formu­
lation of the ideas of Friedrich List. 
The periods of moderation of protectionism—the years after 
the Democrat Party came to power in 1844 and after the Under­
wood Tariff of 1913—were brief in duration and limited in 
reach. It is especially interesting that the protectionist impulse 
strengthened rather than waned after the United States had al­
ready achieved its status as a leading industrial economy in the 
late nineteenth century. The emphasis of argument shifted from 
infant industries to wage protection and aggressive national 
strategy. 
Some may conjecture that the United States and continental 
Europe would have done even better had they taken the path 
urged on them by the English proponents of free trade and com­
parative advantage and by their liberal disciples abroad. Such a 
counterfactual conjecture, however, would amount to sheer dog­
matic fantasy; it lies beyond the reach of proof or falsiﬁcation. 
In most of what was later to be described as the third world, es­
pecially the countries under the outright control or the economic 
and political inﬂuence of the North Atlantic powers, free trade, 
justiﬁed by a simpliﬁed liberal and Ricardian discourse, reigned 
supreme. Two very clear examples of its application were to be 
found in some of the major countries of Latin America (especially 
Brazil) and the Ottoman Empire. On the whole and for most of 
time, these same regions of the world grew very slowly under the 
long dominion of the free-trading doctrine. 
There is no basis to infer from these facts, in which so many 
other circumstances intervened, a simple inverse relation between 
free trade and economic growth. They nevertheless cast doubt on 
the thesis of a positive relation of economic growth to free trade. 
Not only can no negative relation between economic growth and 
restraints on trade be established, for much of modern history it 
is hard even to demonstrate a negative relation between protec­
tion and an increase in trade ﬂows. Many countries expanded 
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ﬂows relative to their own GDP, during those times when they in­
creased trade protection. 
Let us stand back for a moment from the narrower controversy 
about free trade and protection and consider the lessons of the 
equivocal historical experience. These lessons will help inform a 
view outreaching the terms of that debate. 
A ﬁrst lesson is that the lowering of trade barriers has ordinarily 
followed rather than preceded the achievement of high and sus­
tained growth. Ascendant countries have characteristically joined 
the trading system and then lowered their defenses, in stepwise 
fashion and on terms compatible with a particular strategy and 
vision. They have practiced, avant la lettre,a ctive rather than pas­
sive engagement with the world economy. 
A second lesson is that even before they achieved high and 
sustained growth the countries most resolute and successful in 
practicing relatively unrestricted free trade have often been small 
commercial entrepots. They have drawn their economic lifeblood 
from privileged relations to a much larger—and much more trade-
protected—economy. A contemporary example is Hong Kong. A 
historical instance is provided by the Hanseatic free cities. Their 
established comparative advantage was geography, combined with 
created institutional arrangements and cultural predispositions 
that helped them make best use of their geographic setting. 
A third lesson is that many countries successful in a niche—a 
line of specialized production within the world economy—have 
then failed to reinvent themselves when circumstances required 
them to do so. The institutions, practices, and beliefs fostering this 
capacity for continued reinvention turn out to be more important 
than any particular success or niche. A particular and elusive di­
alectic between protection and free trade has played an important 
role in sustaining these conditions of the collective capacity for 
self-reinvention. 
A fourth lesson is that the most successful countries, regions, 
and networks of ﬁrms have ordinarily been those that are able to 
pillage the world for resources, technologies, and ideas while 
maintaining independent centers of decision. Such economies 
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their way. The particular level of free trade and protection they 
practiced may often have been much less important than the way 
in which each of them understood and implemented free trade 
and protection, such as by providing for protection but with mas­
sive use of foreign capital to develop the national infrastructure 
(as in mid-nineteenth-century United States) or by increasing 
free trade but with avoidance of foreign control of major enter­
prises (as in mid-twentieth-century Japan, Korea, and Taiwan). 
The division of the world into sovereign nation-states has 
proved to be one way of creating a basis for such fertile diver­
gence. If there were a truly global economy, with borderless trade, 
we would have reason to ﬁnd a functional substitute for what sov­
ereign states, deploying selective free trade and selective protec­
tion, have achieved. 
Contemporary experience suggests one major addition to these 
historical inferences. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the record 
of success and failure in national development in the twentieth cen­
tury, it is a conclusion that may at ﬁrst appear to be paradoxical. 
The apparent paradox comes in two parts. 
The turn to the market—to a national market economy and to 
the world market—has indeed worked. However, it has worked 
best when countries and their governments and thinkers have 
been bold in organizing a market economy and in providing for 
national engagement in the world economy on their own terms, 
often through unfamiliar institutions or unfamiliar combinations 
of familiar arrangements. 
What has counted in the turn to the national and world market 
has never been acquiescence in a dogmatic institutional formula 
about the proper form of a market economy. It has never been ac­
ceptance of the simple-minded promises made by the doctrine of 
free trade on the basis of given comparative advantage. It has been 
some measure of success in an effort to reconcile two commitments. 
One commitment has been to decentralize economic power and 
opportunity and to expand the scale and scope of markets. The 
other commitment has been actively to reshape established com­
parative advantage through governmental initiative and collective 
action as well as through private enterprise, thus preserving the 20  ❍  chapter one 
vital capacity for national deﬁance and divergence. So it is, for ex­
ample, that China has advanced, even in the midst of unbroken 
despotism and mounting inequality, while Latin America, the 
most obedient of all contemporary regions of the world to the 
pseudo-orthodoxy of the market turn, has suffered a catastrophic 
decline in its relative position in the global economy. 




How could a conception such as the traditional teaching of free 
trade, compromised by such serious and numerous fallacies and 
contradicted by so much historical experience, enjoy such daunt­
ing intellectual authority? The answers to this question are of more 
than intellectual-historical interest. They allow us to understand 
what is at stake in the debate about free trade and comparative ad­
vantage and to escape the conﬁnes of the traditional discussion. 
Here are four reasons why that doctrine has commanded so much 
authority on so little basis. 
A ﬁrst source of the appeal of the doctrine is its intimate but 
equivocal relation to the idea of efﬁcient resource allocation 
within a market. The notion of the Pareto-improving character of 
an international division of labor (that is, a division of labor cre­
ating more gains for all trading partners than would some preex­
isting assignment of productive specializations among countries), 
organized according to given comparative advantage and realized 
through free trade, may seem at ﬁrst uncontroversial. It appears 
simply to work out, in international trade, the general idea of 
market-oriented exchange. Yet, from such a seemingly uncontro­
versial starting point, it generates results that have been described 
as among the most unexpected in social science. It combines a 
commitment to a widely accepted, even venerable postulate and a 
power to upset prejudice and to cause surprise. This combination 
lends to free trade doctrine a seductive aura reminiscent of the 
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The translation of the general idea of market-based allocation 
into the doctrine of free trade on the basis of established or con­
structed comparative advantage reveals a general feature of the 
style of economic theorizing that has come to prevail since the 
rise of marginalism. The idea of the market as a perpetual-motion 
machine, able to allocate resources to their most efﬁcient uses, re­
mains immune to empirical or normative attack only so long as it 
also remains empty of explanatory or prescriptive consequence. 
The greater its analytic purity, the weaker is its power to explain 
or to guide. It achieves its power by its admixture with causal 
ideas and normative assumptions that it must borrow from other 
bodies of thought. 
The workings of free trade doctrine illustrate this dilemma of 
purity and sterility. The idea of market allocation through an in­
ternational division of labor acquires deﬁnite meaning and force 
only by relying on controversial assumptions that are crucially in­
complete. The more we come to see comparative advantage as 
made rather than given—made by political initiative and collec­
tive action outside the market, as well as by the standard forms of 
market behavior—the less the doctrine, in its narrow and conven­
tional form, makes sense. If comparative advantage becomes the 
standard by which to assess the merits of any given assignment of 
productive specializations among countries, we cannot know for 
sure to what alternative assignments we should compare the ex­
isting assignment. 
Another example is the view of the alternative institutional 
forms that a market economy may take. The assumptions about 
property and contract, or about the relative cross-border mobility 
of different factors of production, or about the ways in which 
governmental initiative and private enterprise may interact are 
not minor details; they go to the heart of the free trade program. 
We  cannot infer answers to the questions they pose from the ab­
stract concepts of the market or of free trade. We must ground 
those answers in contentious causal or normative views. 
A second source of the prestige of the free trade teaching has to 
do with the relation among intellectual life, power politics, and 
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enjoyed its greatest inﬂuence have been those in which intellectu­
als in the leading powers of the day have felt greatest conﬁdence in 
the world order those powers sponsored. Free trade has been 
merely an aspect, if an important one, of those cosmopolitan 
projects. It has promised to give the cosmopolitanism of the mo­
ment support and consequence in the hard, tangible realities of 
commerce. 
Conversely, the times in which the hold of free trade doctrine 
has weakened have been those in which intellectuals in the lead­
ing powers have lost conﬁdence in the ability of those powers to 
shape the world order. It was in such a situation that Keynes in the 
1920s underwent his apostasy from the liberal and Ricardian 
teaching about free trade. In the course of modern history, mo­
ments of loss of faith in the power of the hegemons to consum­
mate the marriage of hegemony and cosmopolitanism have been 
uncommon. 
A different and more persistent, but less audible and less presti­
gious, resistance has emerged from two other quarters. It has 
come from practical economists and publicists in emerging 
but still peripheral powers in the imperial order, for example, 
Henry Carey in mid-nineteenth-century America and Friedrich 
List in mid-nineteenth-century Germany. It has come as well 
from the thinkers of backward countries still far removed from 
the prospect of achieving rich country and world power status, 
such as the dependency theorists of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin 
America. 
However, these seats of resistance were no match for the teach­
ings of respected intellectual authorities in the imperial centers of 
the world. The ﬁrst group of potential resisters were in the process 
of acquiring a share in the imperial mantle. The second group 
found themselves relegated for an indeﬁnite time to the outer cir­
cles of an intellectual and political purgatory. 
A third source of the inﬂuence of free trade ideas is the familiar 
association between selectivity in trade policy, or indeed in any 
branch of policy, and the capture of governmental power by pri­
vate interests. We have been repeatedly taught that although gov­
ernments cannot choose winners, losers can choose governments. the enigmas of free trade  ❍  23 
The champions of free trade ideas have been able to claim that 
rent-seeking behavior feasts on protectionism. 
Their claim is not unfounded. Any form of selectivity in the de­
sign of law and policy, including trade law and policy, can provide 
opportunities for the extraction from the state of favors that 
wound the public interest. In so doing, it may limit economic 
growth and redistribute to successful rent seekers whatever 
growth occurs. However, this undisputed fact is not the end of a 
story; it is only the beginning of a story, as later parts of the argu­
ment of this essay seek to establish. 
The extent to which governmental power is susceptible to cap­
ture by private interests—or to seduction by untested and un­
founded dogma—is not a constant, an eternal law of the relations 
between the government and the economy. It is a variable, shaped 
by the organization of politics. It is a variable in the same sense 
that the distortion of markets by asymmetries of power and in­
formation is a variable; the former variable is at least as pliant as 
the latter to conscious institutional design and policy experiment, 
or simply to the variations of historical experience. If we could 
have a state less vulnerable to manipulation by powerful special 
interests and a policymaking practice less inclined to suppress 
decentralized experiments in the name of imposed schemes, we 
might have more selectivity in trade policy with less danger. The 
nature and transformation of politics help determine the limits of 
the possible in the economy. 
A fourth source of the magnetism of free trade doctrine is the 
power of the political hopes concealed within its prosaic frame. 
Remember the political emphasis in David Ricardo’s canonical 
statement of the theory of free trade and comparative advantage: 
“Under a system of perfectly free commerce each country natu­
rally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most 
beneﬁcial to each. By stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenu­
ity, and by using efﬁcaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by na­
ture, it distributes labor most effectively and economically; while, 
by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses beneﬁt, 
and binds together, by one common interest and intercourse, 
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(On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,C hapter VII, 
“On Foreign Trade”). 
The theme of trade as a union of interests capable of smother­
ing or diluting the passions of national glory and power had been 
a familiar idea for at least several generations before Ricardo 
wrote. The Ricardian conception of open commerce on the basis 
of comparative advantage added a vital twist: common sense and 
material interest, although relatively uncontroversial, would lend 
support to a project of untrammeled commercial intercourse 
among nations that was much contested. Once the controversial 
implications of free trade acquired the authority and the solidity 
of the much less controversial premises, we would all ﬁnd a way of 
buying and selling instead of making war or lighting ideological 
ﬁres. 
Free trade liberalism not only seemed less dangerous than pre-
liberal mercantilism, it also held out the prospect of helping to get 
beyond the savage and inconclusive contest of national rivalries, 
further aroused and poisoned by wars of religion and of ideology. 
Commercial interest would do more than foster economic growth, 
it would serve civilization. It would help establish intercourse and 
peace on a basis more solid than philosophy, fear, and fellow feel­
ing. Free trade among nations would be a way of agreeing to dis­
agree. It is impossible to contemplate the contemporary rhetorical 
expressions and political uses of the doctrine I study here without 
concluding that this view still lives. 
The truth, however, is that the organization of an open world 
economy is not a way of getting beyond the controversies of mod­
ern politics. It is just one more theater in which to express and de­
velop them. The attempt to claim for a particular system of free 
trade a neutrality it does not deserve makes no contribution to 
world peace and reconciliation. On the contrary, disguising a con­
tentious global project as simple common sense is asking for 
trouble. Chapter 2 
Troubles: The Incompleteness 
of Comparative Advantage 
●❍● 
The Doctrine of Comparative Advantage 
We must go further into the core of the beliefs that have informed 
and guided the doctrine of free trade if we are to ﬁnd a point of 
departure for more reliable insight. This task provides an oppor­
tunity to reconsider, through an analysis of this doctrine, both 
our ideas about the world division of labor and our assumptions 
about the method of economics. To radicalize the organized anar­
chy and the restless experimentalism that have played so large 
a part in the ideal of market economy, rendered worldwide 
through free trade—at the cost of overturning the institutional 
and conceptual obstacles that continue to circumscribe them—is 
the impulse animating my argument. 
David Ricardo’s idea of comparative advantage—reﬁned, am­
pliﬁed, and qualiﬁed by subsequent thinking—stands at the cen­
ter of those market-respecting beliefs. Reassessing that idea and 
its theoretical sequels must form part of the effort to lay the 
groundwork for a different way of thinking. The idea of compar­
ative advantage has been rightly represented as a star example of 
the achievements of economic analysis; it is an idea that has 
proved to be at once fertile and counterintuitive. 
The reassessment I propose does not deny the power of the 
concept of comparative advantage and of the tradition of theory 
that has developed it. It does nevertheless suggest a change of its 
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the doctrine of comparative advantage leaves unsaid, and more 
generally in what remains beyond the reach of established eco­
nomic analysis. The problem lies as well in the surprising results 
to which we are driven when we try to combine the truth this doc­
trine reveals with the equally important truths left unexplored. 
The incompleteness of the doctrine will turn out to be a more for­
midable obstacle to understanding than is often supposed, and 
the attempt to redress it will require us to confront and revise 
much else in our inherited ideas. 
“If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper 
than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some 
part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in 
which we have some advantage.” So wrote Adam Smith (The 
Wealth of Nations, book IV, section ii, 12), stating the mild and rel­
atively uncontroversial concept of absolute advantage. Ricardo’s 
disturbing innovation was to show that the logic of national spe­
cialization of production applied far beyond the terrain of this 
simple contrast. Comparative advantage, he argued, is enough to 
justify specialization in production. In our present-day vocabulary 
we say that a country enjoys comparative advantage in the produc­
tion of a good if it is able to produce that good at a lower opportu­
nity cost than another country. 
Suppose, in Ricardo’s canonical example, the presence of only 
two countries, England and Portugal, and only two goods, wine and 
cloth, with labor as the sole input in the production of each. Imag­
ine further that Portugal can produce both cloth and wine more 
efﬁciently—at lower cost in terms of labor input—than England, 
but it can produce wine even more efﬁciently—at lower cost in 
terms of labor input, relative to England, than it can produce cloth. 
At ﬁrst, on principles of absolute advantage, it may seem that Por­
tugal should trade with England in neither wine nor cloth. 
Ricardo showed, against the bias of our intuitions, that under 
the highly restrictive but nevertheless illuminating assumptions of 
his argument, trade in both wine and cloth, on the basis of special­
ized production in England and Portugal, would be beneﬁcial to 
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gain from trade, Portugal should produce only what it is relatively 
most efﬁcient at producing, wine, and England should produce 
only what it is relatively least inefﬁcient in producing, cloth. Pro­
ducing only cloth, England should buy all its wine from Portugal. 
Both England and Portugal would end up better off than they 
would otherwise be. 
The opportunity cost in Ricardo’s example is the amount of 
wine that must be given up to produce one more unit of cloth. If 
England must give up less wine to produce another unit of cloth 
than Portugal must give up cloth to produce another unit of wine, 
England will enjoy comparative advantage in the production of 
cloth. Let England produce only cloth, as Portugal produces only 
wine. By the alchemy of free trade, both will end up with the po­
tential to consume both more cloth and more wine than they 
would otherwise consume, implementing a “Pareto-optimal im­
provement,” which makes both countries better off than they 
would otherwise be. Both trading partners stand to improve the 
situation they would face if either trading partner had rejected or 
qualiﬁed this course of specialization. 
Generalized, and enhanced by the reﬁnements and debates of 
subsequent theorizing, the idea of comparative advantage sup­
plies the kernel of a justiﬁcation for universal free trade on the 
basis of productive specialization. Of course, it may be conceded 
that this justiﬁcation is incomplete: its force depends, as always 
in practical economic analysis, on the limiting assumptions on 
which it relies. It depends as well on the ways in which we choose 
to compensate, conceptually and practically, for the failure of any 
or all of these assumptions to hold in fact. However, everything in 
thought is incomplete; our task, the friends of the doctrine will 
insist, is to contend with the implications of the incompleteness 
without betraying the central insight or the path to the enrich­
ment of mankind that this insight opens up. It is a justiﬁcation 
that remains plausible until we begin to look further into the 
consequences of any attempt to combine what the doctrine of 
comparative advantage says with what it leaves unsaid. 
It  is true that the theory of comparative advantage and the 
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not, narrowly considered, incompatible with any of the ideas 
about trade developed in this essay. Nor do they conﬂict with the 
broader project of explanation, criticism, and proposal that these 
ideas exemplify. However, the conclusion that there is no conﬂict 
depends on interpreting the doctrine of comparative advantage 
with sufﬁcient analytic purity and austerity. When the doctrine is 
interpreted in the larger and looser sense in which it has been 
generally understood and deployed (and on which its worldly 
value depends), a conﬂict emerges. The conﬂict joined on this 
wider ground has much to tell us about the character and limita­
tions of postmarginalist economics as a whole, as well as about 
the insights and illusions of the teaching of free trade in particu­
lar. This teaching has often been seen as the crown jewel of eco­
nomics and as the most persuasive example of its capacity for 
practical application. 
Incompleteness: Indeterminacy Resulting from Failure to 
Justify Unique Assignments of Comparative Advantage* 
The doctrine of comparative advantage is incomplete in three dis­
tinct but connected ways. We cannot properly reckon with the in­
tellectual implications of this incompleteness without changing 
how we think about international trade and ultimately about 
market-based exchange and the division of labor—primary con­
cerns of economic analysis. 
The ﬁrst species of incompleteness is incompleteness as a result 
of the failure to arrive at a single, market-clearing solution to the 
problem of how to organize productive specialization among par­
ticular trading partners. Once we go beyond the simple stipula­
tions of Ricardo’s famous example, with two commodities and 
two countries, with homogeneous technology and labor, or be­
yond the assumptions of the classic form of the more recent 
*I thank Sanjay Reddy for criticism and suggestions in the improve­
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Heckscher-Ohlin model, with two commodities, two countries, 
two inputs to production (such as capital and labor), and knowl­
edge freely shared throughout the world, we shall often ﬁnd that 
there are multiple solutions, or inﬁnite solutions, or no solutions 
at all to the assignment of comparative advantage, that is, the dis­
tribution among countries of specializations in production that 
maximizes each country’s gains from trade. (Ricardo’s original ar­
gument, unlike much subsequent theorizing, depends crucially 
on differences in the production technologies available to differ­
ent countries and, as a consequence, on the productivity of their 
workers.) Moreover, even when there is a unique solution, it often 
will not be possible to characterize this solution in a straightfor­
ward way; it may, for instance, entail that the basket of exports of 
a country contain a certain average content with respect to the 
inputs of the production process but tell us little about how that 
average content is to be achieved. 
Whether we fail to reach a unique solution, and in which way, 
will depend on the manner in which we relax the restrictive as­
sumptions of Ricardo’s case in acknowledgment of the complica­
tions of reality. The failure of models of international trade always 
to  entail unique, informative market-clearing solutions limits 
their explanatory power. Further, whether or not a unique mar­
ket-clearing solution exists, we may be unable to guarantee that 
the outcomes resulting from international trade belong to a spe­
cial class of such solutions, those that are described as Pareto-
improving because they make all the trading partners they touch 
better off than the partners would otherwise be. In some in­
stances there may be multiple (or inﬁnite) solutions but the entire 
“solution set” may consist of possible international production al­
locations that generate gains of trade for all parties, although 
varying from solution to solution in the extent and distribution of 
the gains among the parties. In other instances, most notably 
when there are increasing returns to scale, some possible produc­
tion allocations among countries may entail losses from trade, 
not just for particular ﬁrms but also for entire economies. 
This problem (of the potential instability of the core results of 
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tions) is no novelty; how to deal with it has been the staple of trade 
theory, in the tradition of more or less canonical thinking about 
comparative advantage, for close to a hundred years. Although 
mainstream theory has been chieﬂy accustomed to marvel at the 
supposed robustness of the tenets of one or another model of 
thinking about comparative advantage under circumstances more 
complicated than those envisaged by the standard models, the in­
formal objections have origins in the nineteenth century. 
The trouble begins immediately with the very ﬁrst signs of 
complication. It has long been recognized that as soon as there are 
more than two countries or two commodities, as, of course, there 
always will be, there may be multiple solutions (on some further 
assumptions about the facts), or inﬁnite solutions (on other as­
sumptions), or no solutions (on still other assumptions). When 
there are multiple or inﬁnite solutions, it will not always be possi­
ble to rank them in relation to each other on the basis of criteria 
supplied to us by the world of ideas within which the doctrine 
of comparative advantage moves. These criteria are in any event 
inadequate. 
Comparative advantage deals in the coin of static efﬁciency. It 
tells us nothing about the adjacent possible in the history of techno­
logical and organizational innovation or of economic growth—the 
next steps we are able to take, in a given time and place, with the ma­
terials at hand. What new products and ways of producing them are 
feasible? Which of the possibilities of specialization suggested by the 
multiple solutions are more fertile in the opening up of next steps in 
growth and innovation? Which encourage linkages or analogies to 
form among whole sets of lines of production or of the technologies 
and practices they employ? Which, by making demands on the na­
tional economy that lie beyond, but not too far beyond, the horizon 
of present capabilities, destabilize and incite without frustrating? 
Which most decisively shift the focus of time, energy, and attention 
away from the productive activities that we already know how to 
repeat, and therefore also know how to embody in formulas and 
machines, toward those that we are not yet capable of repeating? 
Until we vastly enrich the line of reasoning in which we deploy 
the idea of comparative advantage, we shall lack any basis on 
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productive specialization. We shall ﬁnd ourselves confronted with 
the task not simply to know more, but to know something of a 
different order. 
We  may well suspect that new information and insight, al­
though acquired for the sake of choosing among the solutions 
suggested by the unenriched analysis of comparative advantage, 
might soon lead us to identify available or accessible comparative 
advantages of which we had been unaware. The distinction be­
tween choosing among the identiﬁed solutions to the assignment 
of productive specialization among economies and identifying 
new solutions to that problem would then begin to collapse. 
Also known but less often remarked and yet more disconcerting 
is the indeterminacy that may result from any shift in the relative 
costs of the necessary inputs to the production of a good or service 
that is a candidate to enjoy comparative advantage, or in the rela­
tion between the value of the inputs and the value of the output. 
Labor—the sole factor of production in Ricardo’s example—will 
be combined with other factors of production to make things— 
call them inputs—that are then used to produce other things—call 
them outputs. Small shifts in the values of these inputs relative to 
one another or to the values of the outputs may have radical effects 
on comparative advantage. Such effects will often seem dispropor­
tionate to their causes, like the small ﬂaws of a hero in a Greek 
tragedy leading relentlessly to catastrophe. They may be difﬁcult 
to  assess and to contain. The consequence may be something 
between multiplicity and chaos (mathematically speaking) in the 
analysis of comparative advantage. The multiplication of possible 
solutions to the problem of identifying comparative advantage 
will then recur with a vengeance, and the knowledge needed to 
choose among these solutions will once again be likely to reshape 
our understanding of what the choices are as well as of their re­
lative merits. 
Consider now a series of objections to this complaint of in­
completeness of the doctrine of comparative advantage by reason 
of indeterminacy. Each objection requires a qualiﬁcation of the 
doctrine that also deepens it. The outcome is not to withdraw the 
complaint but to press it yet further. 
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fails properly to distinguish between the external and the internal 
indeterminacy of thinking about comparative advantage. Exter­
nal indeterminacy is the embarrassing surfeit of different models 
for the analysis of comparative advantage, each of them making 
very different and even incompatible assumptions (for example, 
about the worldwide availability of the same technologies of pro­
duction) yet all marshaled to the justiﬁcation of the same practi­
cal goal—the advancement of free trade. Internal indeterminacy 
is the existence, within each of these models, of multiple solutions 
to the assignment of comparative advantage among countries. 
The immediate focus of the complaint is internal indetermi­
nacy in all the most inﬂuential models of international trade. 
However,  internal and external indeterminacy are connected. 
Later in this chapter I discuss the peculiar and sterilizing relation 
between formal analysis and causal conjecture that has come to 
characterize economics since the time of marginalism and that 
was already foreshadowed in Ricardo’s thought experiment about 
comparative advantage as the proximate source of external inde­
terminacy: the facts are kept far away and only selectively ap­
proached. This relation is also the ultimate source of the internal 
indeterminacy. 
There are any number of models that make contradictory stip­
ulations in the hope of justifying, by different routes, the same 
program of free trade conducted on the basis of comparative ad­
vantage. At the same time, for the same reasons that there are so 
many and such contradictory models, each of them generates too 
many alternative answers to the question, in the production of 
what should a given country specialize? Or else it narrows the an­
swers down only by making its factual stipulations ever more sim­
plistic and unreal and its analytic implications ever less revealing. 
A second objection, coming from those who would restrict the 
application of the doctrine of comparative advantage rather than 
from those who would extend it, is that under certain all too plau­
sible assumptions, comparative advantage gives way to absolute 
advantage. If one factor of production (for example, capital) is 
mobile, rates of return to the mobile factor will be equalized 
across countries. Absolute advantage, in Adam Smith’s old sense, incompleteness of comparative advantage  ❍  33 
then accrues to the country with the lowest costs of the immobile 
factors (for example, labor) incurred per production unit, as de­
termined by the costs of the immobile factors in combination 
with their productivity.* 
Advocates of free trade will ﬁnd little comfort in this collapse; a 
generalized prescription of free trade that has ceased to rest on the 
foundation of comparative advantage cannot be reliably rebuilt on 
the basis of absolute advantage. It is true that under the case of ab­
solute advantage and disadvantage that I have described, of mobile 
capital and immobile labor, increased trade may nevertheless ex­
pand the consumption possibilities of each trading country. It will 
do so, however, in the company of important and conﬂict-ridden 
distributional consequences. For example, as capital leaves a coun­
try (to reap the rewards of its mobility), labor income will fall 
(whether through employment or wage adjustment), and capital 
income will increase. (It is a result described in the technical liter­
ature as the Stolper-Samuelson effect, within the framework of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, which I later discuss. However, here this 
result is produced for an entirely different reason.) Conﬂict over 
the distributive consequences of such a situation is likely to over­
shadow the gains from trade. At the limit, the country suffering 
from the absolute disadvantage may suffer a calamitous loss of 
productive activity and capacity while its rentier class proﬁts. 
*Some have contended that absolute advantage cannot exist given 
certain assumptions, even the assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, which has been the most inﬂuential version of the doctrine of 
comparative advantage (and which is discussed in the note at the end of 
this chapter). They are right, but not in the sense that they mean. Their 
conclusion sounds as the thirteenth chime of a clock, casting doubt not 
only on itself but also on the previous twelve chimes and on the clock it­
self. Absolute advantage may be impossible in certain theories, but it is 
realized in fact. In many circumstances—especially in the circumstance 
described above, characteristic and revealing of present globalization— 
absolute advantage may overpower comparative advantage in signiﬁ­
cance. It has been said that an economist is someone who, on seeing 
that something works in practice, tries to discover if it also works in the­
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A third objection is that a vast literature on trade “in higher di­
mensions,” that is, with more than two countries, commodities, 
and factors, shows that the results of the doctrine of comparative 
advantage—particularly those that follow from or are related to 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model—remain in great part robust even 
when applied in the complicating circumstances of the higher 
dimensions. We may still, for example, be able to predict uniquely 
the factor content of a country’s trade even when we cannot pre­
dict its commodity composition. The argument from indetermi­
nacy would, according to this objection, fail to do justice to the 
supposed success of established theory in meeting this test. 
In fact it is striking how much the higher dimensions theoriz­
ing remains ﬁxated on the factor composition of the product and 
of exports. (Ricardo’s original statement of the doctrine, although 
less elaborate, was both deeper and more comprehensive, not 
least because it reached beyond the analysis of comparative static 
efﬁciencies to a theory of growth relating growth to distributive 
conﬂict.) The core issue in the argument from indeterminacy is 
the availability of determinate allocations of comparative advan­
tage given certain premises. Analysis of the consequences for the 
average composition of output and traded goods of the relative 
scarcity of different factors of production is simply an aspect of 
this problem. What we need to know—and what received think­
ing fails to provide—is an adequate view of the relation between 
this aspect of the problem and the other aspects. 
On one side are the relative scarcities of the factors. On the other 
side are the distinct technological and organizational capabilities of 
the trading partners. (The importance of national differences in the 
possession of these capabilities was central to Ricardo’s analysis of 
comparative advantage. It was, however, disregarded by much of 
the subsequent theory of international trade, including the inﬂuen­
tial Heckscher-Ohlin model, which assumed universal access to the 
same pool of technologies of production.) 
The decisive issue, and the one addressed by the argument 
from indeterminacy, is not how the relative scarcities of the factors 
play out in different product and export proﬁles, as much of the 
contemporary discussion seems to suppose; it is what happens 
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distinct technological and organizational capabilities of the trading 
partners, especially if we admit, as we must, that these capabilities 
are open to improvement and diversiﬁcation. 
When we perform this indispensable exercise, the difﬁculty of 
obtaining unique or even determinate solutions to the identiﬁca­
tion or assignment of comparative advantage, as a guide to spe­
cialization within the world economy, vastly increases. Instead of 
enlightenment about what matters most, we are left by the litera­
ture on trade in higher dimensions with ideas about what matters 
less. We are left with predictions of the likely factor content of an 
average basket of exports or products of a country, given a battery 
of assumptions and stipulations. We are left as well with require­
ments, given such stipulations and assumptions, of what the aver­
age factor content of relations among trading countries would 
need to be like for there to be an efﬁcient global allocation of 
resources. We remain uninformed about how the acquisition of 
new capabilities and technologies by some countries, and the fail­
ure of others to acquire them, would modify these conclusions. 
As a result, we are not provided with at least half of the basis on 
which to predict or to propose that a particular economy develop 
distinctive specializations within the world economy. Without the 
missing half, we cannot know for sure what to make of the half 
with which we are presented. In this way, indeterminacy is evaded 
by triviality, and triviality concealed by evasion. 
A fourth objection is that the argument from indeterminacy 
fails to do justice to the proven ability of the theory of interna­
tional trade to make sense of many of the facts about the composi­
tion of trade ﬂows. The opposite, however, is the case. Established 
theory has been unsuccessful in accounting for the actual content 
of the worldwide division of labor. Even when we consider what 
should be regarded as its strong suit—explaining and predicting 
the factor composition of the exports of different countries— 
the record of the tradition of ideas that developed Ricardo’s doc­
trine of comparative advantage is notable mainly for its revealing 
failures. 
The Leontief paradox supplies a useful wedge into the inter­
pretation of these failures. Leontief found that, contrary to 
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weighted toward labor-intensive products, although the Ameri­
can economy was relatively scarce in labor and abundant in capi­
tal. In elucidating this apparent paradox, many have remarked 
that its meaning is the conﬁrmation of the thesis that greatest 
comparative advantage of any advanced economy lies in the ideas 
and capabilities that are embodied in the goods and services it 
produces. This source of wealth overwhelms in signiﬁcance the 
effects of relative factor scarcities. 
It is impossible to make sense of the facts about international 
trade without giving a major role to idea-laden skills and technolo­
gies. However, as the response to the previous objection suggested, 
the attempt to accommodate, following Ricardo’s cue, differences 
of capability in our thinking about comparative advantage greatly 
aggravates the difﬁculty of arriving at unique, or even multiple but 
determinate, answers to the question, what specializations within 
the world economy should a particular country develop or main­
tain? The difﬁculties of reckoning with the facts and of thinking 
conclusively in theory have the same root. 
In dealing with this ﬁrst species of incompleteness of the doc­
trine of comparative advantage, we ﬁnd ourselves forced to look 
beyond the imaginary, timeless world of static efﬁciency to the 
real, time-drenched world of transformative opportunity. The 
static analysis of efﬁciencies, with its multiple, inﬁnite, or absent 
solutions, teaches us something. But how exactly we should un­
derstand the practical meaning of this teaching, when we trans­
port it from its conceptual empyrean to our sublunary, historical 
existence, remains unclear. The sense of the truth that we know 
depends on the sense of truths that we are missing. 
Incompleteness: Confusion Resulting from Uncertainty 
about the Limits of Our Power Collectively to Shape 
Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage can be created as well as discovered; that 
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advantage itself. This tenet has been reinforced by some of the in­
tellectual developments discussed in the note at the end of this 
chapter, including those that explore the implications for trade of 
the idea that there may be increasing rather than constant returns 
to scale in production. 
When, however, we try to understand the forms and limits of 
the power of countries, of their ﬁrms and governments, to make 
or reshape comparative advantage, we soon run into trouble: 
problems with which our received ways of thinking about eco­
nomic activity are unable adequately to deal. This trouble com­
bines within itself a theoretical conundrum and a programmatic 
task. The theoretical conundrum is how to dissociate the idea that 
comparative advantage can be made from the idea that it can be 
made according to blueprint, top down. The programmatic task is 
how to imagine the institutions and practices by which a society 
can create comparative advantage. 
Begin with a terminological clariﬁcation. Natural comparative 
advantage has often been contrasted to acquired comparative ad­
vantage. The more fundamental and useful distinction, however, 
is between established comparative advantage, whether or not af­
forded by natural circumstance, and constructed comparative ad­
vantage. This second, more basic distinction contrasts taking the 
present comparative advantages as given to the development of 
new comparative advantages: fate to will. 
Consider in its most general form the problem presented by the 
construction of comparative advantage: who can and should serve 
as the agent of this construction? There are two main candidates, 
the market and the government. It has been conventional to treat 
their agency as inversely related: more power to one supposedly 
means less power to the other. An analogous difﬁculty arises in 
making use of either the market or the government as an agent for 
making new comparative advantage. The problem is the inade­
quacy of the present forms of economic and political life in the 
work of creating comparative advantage. It is necessary to experi­
ment, and then to move forward in the light of the insight won 
through experimentation, rather than advance through a blue­
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politics as they are now organized provides an adequate vehicle for 
the needed experimentation. 
The world, you may think, is always organized to reproduce it­
self, not to revise itself by eliciting insight to inform change. If you 
think so, however, you are mistaken: the world, or any part of it, 
can be so organized as to have a greater or lesser bias to the per­
petuation of its own arrangements and of the productive special­
izations that have been established on their basis. 
Every real market economy is organized to distribute access to 
the resources and opportunities of production unequally. How­
ever, some market economies, according to the character of the 
economic, social, and political arrangements, distribute it much 
more unequally than others. Every attempt to expand access to 
such resources and opportunities (for example, the democra­
tization of both agriculture and ﬁnance in nineteenth-century 
America) results in reconstructing some of the institutions and 
practices that deﬁne what the market economy is. This observa­
tion gives rise to an empirical proposition bridging the internal 
and external organization of economies and one that can be justi­
ﬁed on the basis of historical example and comparative study: the 
less opportunity a market economy provides (the more people 
it either excludes altogether or includes on terms of unequal ac­
cess), the more defective a device it becomes for experimentation 
with arrangements that sustain new comparative advantage and 
that justify, on the basis of such arrangements, new productive 
specializations within the world economy. 
Every particular market order is organized in a particular way. 
There is a distance of uncertain length between the abstract idea 
of a market economy and its realization in particular institutions 
and arrangements. Every decisive expansion of opportunity to 
and through a market economy requires innovation in its institu­
tional forms. Some institutionalized expressions of the market 
will be more socially inclusive than others. They will be more 
likely to afford to more people and more ﬁrms access to the key 
resources of work and production. 
At this point in the argument, we come to a matter of major po­
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power to expand opportunity, they may differ as well in the extent 
to which they establish in the country a single version of them­
selves: a single regime of contract and property, a single set of rules 
governing production and exchange, saving and investment. 
The idea that the market can assume alternative institutional 
forms, although acknowledged in principle, is granted so little 
force in either theoretical speculation or practical policy that we 
rarely notice one of its corollaries: if there are alternative institu­
tional variants of a market economy, there is no reason why some 
such alternatives should not be allowed to coexist within the same 
national economy. Instead of a single property regime, for exam­
ple, there could be alternative regimes of private or social prop­
erty. These alternative regimes might be assigned to different 
sectors or scales of production, or they might, to some extent, 
be a matter for choice among the economic agents who would 
participate in them. 
Such an advance toward institutional plurality is not only com­
patible with the idea of a market economy, it is also faithful to its 
animating impulse. Why should we prize the greatest possible free­
dom to combine factors of production while denying ourselves the 
power to experiment, not just in moments of crisis but all the time 
and in small steps, with the elements composing the institutional 
setting of production and exchange? There may be obstacles to the 
coexistence, within the same economic order, of alternative ver­
sions of the market economy. However, these practical problems 
are likely to have practical solutions and to inﬂuence the pace and 
form rather than the direction and goal of the change. The ad­
vance toward institutional plurality can be justiﬁed in part on the 
basis of its role in fostering productive potential, manifested in in­
ternational trade as constructed comparative advantage. 
Just as we cannot infer from the abstract idea of a market econ­
omy how inclusive it will be in practice, so we cannot infer from 
that idea the particular institutions and practices deﬁning its con­
tent. The general equilibrium analysis that was the consummate 
product of the marginalist tradition in economics has obscured 
this truth. An economy can be “in equilibrium” with greater or 
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under one or another set of institutional arrangements and legal 
rules. 
Restraints on economic opportunity may appear in the form of 
“rigidities” imposing obstacles on market-clearing behavior and 
allowing certain favored parties to extract rents from other, disfa­
vored ones. However, they may also (and very often will also) be 
invisible, hidden in presuppositions to which no one has imag­
ined an alternative. To return to the nineteenth-century American 
example, the way in which the “English” path of agrarian concen­
tration denied opportunity to family farmers, able to proﬁt from 
cooperative competition with one another as well as from strate­
gic cooperation with national and local government, did not be­
come evident until this American alternative (or its counterparts 
in continental Europe) had developed. Similarly, the way in which 
a system of ﬁnancial concentration under the control of national 
banks, dazzled by the prospects of proﬁting from easy gain from 
the public debt, denied ﬁnancial opportunity to producers and 
consumers could not be clearly recognized until a far more decen­
tralized credit system had been created. The ﬁnding of denied 
opportunity is retrospective rather than antecedent: it character­
istically depends on the discovery of other ways of organizing 
economic activity and on the harsh conﬂicts among real interests 
in which this discovery is unavoidably entangled. 
The market economy that is best able to exploit opportunities 
for the creation of comparative advantage will be—the demo­
crat wagers, on the basis of historical experience and empirical 
judgment—the one that can most readily correct itself in the 
two related ways I have described: by giving more access to more 
economic agents in more ways and by freeing itself as much as 
possible from any single, dogmatic, entrenched expression of it­
self. The broadening of access will characteristically require in­
novation in the institutional arrangements for production and 
exchange. Which innovations they will require, however, is not 
something that can be established by general and prior formula. 
There is no blueprint. 
Revision of the institutional framework of economic activity 
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as it did in nineteenth-century American agriculture and ﬁnance, 
even when the superstitious confusion of the idea of a market 
economy with a particular, contingent set of economic arrange­
ments continues to reign. However, the prospects for such revi­
sion will be strengthened immensely once that superstition is 
overthrown in practice as well as in thought. 
To  overthrow it in thought means to recognize that a market 
economy can adopt radically divergent institutional forms, includ­
ing different regimes of property and contract and different ways 
of relating government and private producers. The forms now es­
tablished in the leading economies represent the fragment of a 
larger and open-ended ﬁeld of possibilities. 
To  overthrow it in practice means to organize a market econ­
omy so that it already contains different versions of itself within 
the same economic order, each of these versions a starting point 
for further institutional experiments. These different versions will 
include different regimes of private or social property and differ­
ent combinations of private, social, and governmental initiative. 
The different regimes and combinations may coexist experi­
mentally within the same national or regional market economy, 
whether assigned to different sectors and scales of production or 
chosen by the economic agents. 
A market economy cannot create its own institutional presup­
positions. Such presuppositions come from outside, from politics. 
The existing social world, with its structure of stronger and 
weaker interests, will work to reproduce itself. It will ﬁnd an ally 
in prestigious superstitions, such as the belief that the market 
order has a single natural and necessary institutional form or that 
the different countries of the world converge, by evolutionary de­
cantation, to a single set of best practices and arrangements. This 
struggle for self-reproduction will limit the chances for experi­
mental innovation in the development of new market organiza­
tion and new comparative advantage. The present, acting through 
the logic of established interests and the tools of power at their 
disposal, will hold the future ransom. 
There are, in the end, only two directions in which this depen­
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social experience—can be weakened. One is to create a hard 
power that seeks to lift itself over the particular interests of soci­
ety. The other is to radicalize democratic experimentalism in 
culture as well as in politics. The ﬁrst direction hits against in­
tractable limits. No such hard power can be sustained that fails to 
have real ties to the real interests of society or that forgets to sub­
ordinate its experiments in policy to its stake in self-preservation. 
The second direction has no limits in principle. However, it has 
neither a self-evident institutional content nor a foreordained so­
cial constituency. Like the concept of a market economy, the idea 
of democracy lacks any natural and necessary institutional form. 
Moreover, the radicalization of democracy is feasible only if it is 
shown to offer a combination of powerful interests a way to 
achieve what the established order denies them. The content has 
to be supplied by a political imagination working with the institu­
tional materials at hand. The constituency has to be produced to­
gether with the program. 
Consider the argument in retrospect. Our confusion about the 
nature and limits of our ability to produce and reshape compara­
tive advantage cannot be dispelled by any set of moves within 
economic analysis as narrowly understood. We are forced to cross 
another boundary to the thinking about static efﬁciency within 
which our inherited views of comparative advantage have been 
formed: the false belief that the idea of a market economy has a 
single, natural expression. The best institutional expression of the 
idea, and the one that offers the most promising template for the 
making of comparative advantage, will be the one that affords 
more access to more economic agents on more terms and that 
least entrenches any particular species of itself, either throughout 
the economy or for good. No institutional formula can guarantee 
this result. The problem will be how to arrange things so that the 
formulas can be sacriﬁced to the goal. 
Here is another way of stating the same idea. The market is the 
best mechanism to assign and create comparative advantage, but 
not any actual market, only the idea of the market. Any actual 
market economy is a more or less unreliable expression of the 
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because it entrenches a limited and limiting version of the idea of a 
market economy. The existing market economy will never be fully 
self-correcting, although some versions of the market economy 
will have greater powers of self-correction than others. These are 
the versions that are most prodigal in broadening opportunity. 
They will also be the versions that are most pluralistic in providing 
within the same economic order for different variants of market 
order, including alternative regimes of property and contract. 
These two attributes, of inclusiveness and pluralism, are likely to 
be associated. A decisive advance in the inclusiveness of a market 
economy—in its ability to offer access to more economic agents 
on more terms—characteristically requires innovation in its insti­
tutional forms, in just the way that the examples from nineteenth-
century American history illustrate. However, the barrier will be 
less restrictive, and the resources for further innovation richer and 
less dependent on crisis and conﬂict, if the established arrange­
ments already incorporate alternative institutional interpretations 
of a market economy. 
Because no market economy creates its own institutional pre­
suppositions or can fully correct its own failures of inclusiveness 
and pluralism, it is necessary to go outside the market to politics. 
We may then succumb to the search for a blueprint. The most ag­
gressive version of such a blueprint will be some type of govern­
mental direction of the economy. The blueprint, however, may 
also take the form of a strategy handed, top down, by the govern­
ment and its bureaucratic apparatus about which comparative 
advantages to create. Or it may even take the form of a novel but 
nevertheless dogmatic conception of how a market economy 
should be organized. The whole problem consists in this: to ques­
tion, in practice as well as in thought, the credentials of the actual 
market to represent the idea of the market—in particular, its cre­
dentials to serve as the setting for the construction as well as for 
the utilization of comparative advantage—but to do so without 
embracing a blueprint. 
This is not merely a puzzle in theory. It is also a problem in the 
reimagination and the remaking of the institutional forms of 
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about comparative advantage, and about the limits to its con­
struction, with the program of democratic experimentalism. 
Thus, in addressing this second aspect of the incompleteness of 
comparative advantage, we must go beyond a world of static efﬁ­
ciency, in which markets are either perfect, and therefore reliable 
discoverers and creators of comparative advantage, or imperfect, 
and therefore needful of localized regulatory correction, to an­
other world, in which the institutional content of both market 
economies and democratic politics is at issue. In that new world 
we ﬁnd that we are not entitled to trust either the market econ­
omy or democratic politics, as they are now organized, to reveal 
and to produce comparative advantage. 
Incompleteness: Embarrassment Resulting 
from the Assumption that the World Is Divided 
into Sovereign States 
The third species of the incompleteness of the doctrine of com­
parative advantage is the least remarked. It is, however, both the 
most obvious and the one with the most subversive implications 
for the way we are accustomed to think about free trade. 
What distinguishes the special case of trade from the general 
case of market-based exchange is simply the political division of 
humanity, and all that we associate with this division. We suppose 
the world to be divided into sovereign states or into other supra­
national or subnational entities with some of the attributes of 
sovereignty. What is the relation of that division to our idea of the 
nature and beneﬁts of free trade? Is the division an obstacle to or 
an opportunity for realizing those beneﬁts? And what is the rela­
tion between the interests and ideals inspiring the division and 
the ideals and interests that ought to drive the cause of free trade? 
You might think that these questions would be among the ﬁrst 
addressed in any discussion of free trade. On the contrary, they go 
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being in proportion to their near complete absence from the 
theoretical elaboration of comparative advantage. The setting of 
political division on the basis of which trade is to take place ap­
pears as an adventitious fact, what in natural science we are accus­
tomed to label a boundary condition. 
It is not a natural fact; it is a construction of our wills and imag­
inations. Its future lies within the collective power of mankind to 
change. We shall never grasp what free trade is or could become 
until we understand better than we do now the relation between 
the partition of the world into states or statelike entities and the 
forms of economic exchange crossing the boundaries established 
by this partition. We shall never make the right sense of the idea of 
comparative advantage until we disentangle that idea from what­
ever adheres to it by virtue of unreasoning and unacknowledged 
acceptance of the factitious political background in which trade, 
free or unfree, takes place. 
Of all the traits we habitually associate with the present exis­
tence of states as the natural setting of trade, none stands in 
greater apparent tension with the impulses that are supposed to 
justify market-based exchange in general and free trade in partic­
ular, none exercises a more decisive inﬂuence over the circum­
stances of mankind today, than the limitation of the right of labor 
to cross national boundaries. No particular degree of restraint on 
the international mobility of labor is an inherent feature of the 
existence of states, for states, being contingent human artifacts, 
can have no essential attributes. Constraint on the movement of 
people across state boundaries is nevertheless so regularly associ­
ated with the types of states that exist today, and exercises such 
far-reaching effects on every aspect of social life, that the granting 
of a universal right to live and work abroad would radically alter 
both what the political divisions within humanity mean and what 
they cause to happen. 
From the standpoint of the efﬁciency concerns lying at the cen­
ter of our conventional beliefs about trade on the basis of estab­
lished or constructed comparative advantage, as they have been 
narrowly and traditionally interpreted, it would be better that 
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such divisions, the chief historical basis for restraints on trade 
would disappear. The special category of trade would lose its 
identity, submerged in the general category of market-based ex­
change, conducted on the ground of productive specialization or 
a division of labor. 
From the perspective of those same efﬁciency concerns, broadly 
deﬁned to include the greatest possible freedom to deploy and 
recombine factors of production, all limits to the mobility of labor 
represent an evil. To the extent that such limits result from the ex­
istence of sovereign states, the champion of efﬁciency, as efﬁciency 
has been conventionally understood, would have reason to deplore 
the existence of such states. If, however, sovereign states can recon­
cile themselves to far-reaching freedom of movement for labor, 
their existence will be less objectionable, at least according to the 
traditional view of efﬁciency gains, achieved through market ex­
change and specialized production. 
To  say so is not to deny the formidable difﬁculties and the vast 
dangers that would attend any attempt to introduce, even by 
steps, a universal right of labor to cross national frontiers. It is, 
however, to indicate the direction of any policy that remains 
faithful to the professed gospel of efﬁciency through an enlarged 
freedom to trade and to combine factors of production. The 
direction should matter more than the length of any particular 
step taken in treading the path it marks out. 
No sooner do we begin to recover from our surprise at the ease 
with which the political background of state division and immo­
bile labor is accepted by those who have reason to oppose it than 
we notice that something else is missing. An interest of fundamen­
tal importance to economic activity is absent from this account of 
the economic signiﬁcance of political division. It can be brought 
under the heading of a single word: diversity. The political parti­
tion of humanity provides a partial functional equivalent to the 
existence of distinct species as protagonists of natural evolution. 
The political divisions within mankind, of which the existence 
of sovereign states is merely a special case, immensely expand in­
citements to diversity of experience, vision, organization, and ac­
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political organization of nations, or they have created nations 
after the fact. The most compelling justiﬁcation of their separate 
existence is that they can represent a form of moral specialization 
within humanity, embodying and developing distinct forms of 
life and of consciousness. Humanity is so constituted, by its tran­
scendence over all the particular structures of society and of cul­
ture it builds and inhabits, that it can develop its powers only by 
developing them in different directions. Distinct forms of con­
sciousness will remain evanescent and insecure so long as they fail 
to be expressed in the practical arrangements of society, including 
its economic arrangements. Bereft of such expression, they risk 
being reduced to the role of folklore or escapism. 
The existence of separate states—or of the other political divi­
sions within humanity that may take their place—is a permanent 
inducement to diversity of economic arrangements as well as of 
all other institutions and practices. Political separation supports 
substantive difference: differences in ways of organizing work and 
whole economies as well as differences in the range and nature of 
what is produced. To the question, diversity of what?, the answer 
then is, diversity of every aspect of economic life, from the most 
basic and invisible to the most particular and tangible. The diver­
sity encouraged by the political division of the world into separate 
states may include, at the most fundamental level, a greater op­
portunity to develop new and original institutional arrange­
ments, including the regimes of property and contract and the 
relation between governmental power and private enterprise that 
give a market economy its distinctive shape. It may relate to ways 
of organizing work, developing and imparting skills, and combin­
ing people, ideas, and machines. It may therefore touch as well 
on the design and application of the technologies of production. 
At the surface of economic activity it may apply to the range of 
goods and services and to the composition of desires for con­
sumption. Every one of these features of an economy may take an 
original turn as a result of the place it occupies within the life of a 
people that, by virtue of its separate existence in a separate state, 
can more easily develop characteristic experiences and adopt dis­
tinctive arrangements. 48  ❍  chapter two 
This boost to diversity seems too obvious to deserve mention. 
Astonishingly, however, the all-important relation of diversity to 
efﬁciency (efﬁciency narrowly understood) plays no part in clas­
sical conceptions of comparative advantage. 
In thinking about trade, it is not enough to seek the most efﬁ­
cient uses of established or constructed comparative advantage, 
including those (labeled Pareto-improving) that are said to better 
the situation of all the trading partners. It is vital to do so within a 
framework of institutions and assumptions that supplies, to great 
and ever increasing extent, the precious raw material of diversity. 
Our understanding of efﬁciency is likely to be transformed, in 
theory and in practice, by its combination with this separate goal. 
The partition of the world into separate states or state like enti­
ties (even if they are no more than the member states of a federal 
union) is—I have pointed out—the deﬁning premise of the the­
ory of international trade. Without it, trade would collapse into 
market-based exchange, and the theory applicable to the latter 
would apply to the former.* 
Yet, paradoxically, from the perspective of a view content with 
traditional notions of efﬁciency and comparative advantage, the 
survival of separate states and, with them, of powerful restraints 
on the international mobility of labor must be regarded as an ob­
stacle. It may be an obstacle to which we must resign ourselves, 
but it is an obstacle nevertheless. 
*That such a collapse would occur is made explicit in the idea of “in­
tegrated world equilibrium,” or IWE, associated with Paul Samuelson 
and then with Avinash Dixit and Victor Norman. An IWE is the equilib­
rium that would result if the world were a single country, with free mo­
bility of factors of production. Under the assumptions that give rise to 
factor price equalization in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative 
advantage, discussed in the note at the end of this chapter, the equalized 
factor rewards are the same in a world divided into separate states as in 
the IWE. Of course, where goods and services are produced and to 
nationals of which country the factor rewards accrue will depend on 
exactly what the political partition is and to whom ownership of the 
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The economic value of the political division within humanity 
lies in its contribution to all the interests that, in contrast to the 
criterion of static efﬁciency, we can put under the heading of di­
versity. That this division should be regarded by standard eco­
nomic and trade theory as an accidental boundary condition and 
even as an arbitrary and costly burden (although without it all dis­
tinction between trade and market-based exchange would cease) 
conﬁrms a striking inﬁrmity of that theory: its failure to give di­
versity its due and to rank it as an economic goal of stature equal 
to efﬁciency, both necessary and insufﬁcient conditions for the 
attainment of our higher ends. In this respect, it provides a coun­
terpart to the most inﬂuential forms of contemporary (Anglo-
American) liberal philosophy, with their insistence on treating 
diversity as what we want to master rather than, as Mill, Toc­
queville, Herzen, and Humboldt held, what we want to produce. 
What would an economic theory look like that treated the 
deepening of diversity, including diversity of the institutional 
arrangements deﬁning a market economy, as an intermediate goal 
equal in importance to the achievement of efﬁcient resource allo­
cation on the basis of established institutional arrangements? 
Such a theory might deviate in method, character, and direction 
from many established tenets of economics. There is no better 
way to foreshadow its work than to rethink the doctrine of free 
trade, conducted on the basis of established or constructed com­
parative advantage. 
The existence of separate states or statelike entities has ordinar­
ily been accompanied by the imposition of forceful restraints on 
the movement of labor across national frontiers. However, the as­
sociation between the political partition of the globe and the im­
prisonment of labor within the separate territories of the partition 
is contingent and revisable. Much more freedom of movement 
than now exists could in fact be reconciled, and in the earlier 
nineteenth-century episode of globalization was in fact reconciled, 
with the reality and the principle of the partition. 
The simple logic of maximum liberty to combine factors of 
production suggests the greatest possible freedom, prudently 
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The salient qualiﬁcation is that the ﬂow of people must not be so 
massive, so sudden, and so unbalanced by compensating initia­
tives that it threaten to trigger popular and political reactions 
dangerous to the diversity of states and to the distinct forms of 
life, consciousness, and organization that ﬂourish within their 
boundaries. 
By the same token, political division will be less likely to support 
diversity of experience and of experiment if the power of the sepa­
rate entities of the world to deviate and to rebel is diminished. 
That power may be compromised indirectly by international eco­
nomic regimes, like the nineteenth-century gold standard or its 
contemporary functional equivalent (the strategy of acquiescing 
in low levels of domestic saving and weak links between saving and 
production as well of depending on foreign capital and of letting it 
come and go freely) that tie the hands of national governments 
and give ﬁnancial markets the power to veto their would-be here­
sies and adventures. It may also be weakened directly by the politi­
cal and economic subjection of one state to another. 
When David Ricardo offered his famous example of cloth and 
wine, England and Portugal, Portugal was little more than a pro­
tectorate of Britain. The Portuguese wine trade was increasingly to 
come under English ownership; its power to serve as a stepping 
stone to other lines of production and trade was limited by its as­
signed place in the economic designs of foreigners. Yet there was no 
room in the truncated doctrine of comparative advantage for such 
an observation because there was no opportunity in the mode of 
thought of which that doctrine formed a part to consider the re­
quirements of efﬁciency and diversity in relation to each other. 
Suppose that humanity were not so divided; that there were a 
world state, not admitting of any substantial political divisions 
within itself, not even those characteristic of a federal or confederal 
union; and that the concept of trade therefore ceased to have any 
meaning distinct from the general meaning of market exchange 
among specialized producers. The burden of creating diversity 
could no longer fall, as it has so heavily fallen, on the separate sov­
ereign states of the world. It would have to be supported by the 
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ence, especially difference of legal regime and economic organiza­
tion, within itself. 
There would be all the more reason to favor an economic order 
allowing different legal realizations of the idea of a market econ­
omy, including different regimes of private and social property 
and contract, to coexist experimentally—for example, in different 
sectors of the economy or at different scales of production. Diver­
siﬁcation, from having been delegated to distinct political entities, 
would have to be made internal, as indeed it should be for the 
sake of our emancipation as well of our enrichment, so long as 
separate states continue to exist. 
In addressing this third species of incompleteness of the doc­
trine of comparative advantage, we move beyond static efﬁciency 
to deal with the creation and diversiﬁcation of the stuff on which 
comparative advantage can do its selective work. If we have, in the 
form of the doctrine of comparative advantage, the theory of se­
lective work without the theory of the diversiﬁcation of the mate­
rial, we have only half of the theory that we need. Once again, we 
ﬁnd that we cannot address the problem of the allocation of tasks 
across economies without confronting that of the multiplication 
of possibilities within them. We dare not be conﬁdent of knowing 
the meaning of the part we think we master, until we come into 
possession of the part we miss. By a remarkable paradox, the po­
litical division of humanity is both the premise of trade theory 
and a fact to whose signiﬁcance, transmutations, and possible 
functional equivalents—from the standpoint of the interest in di­
versity of stuff—the theory is, and has always been, blind. 
Beyond Incompleteness: The Sham Similarity between 
Postmarginalist Economics and Physics 
The theory of comparative advantage, still the centerpiece of estab­
lished thinking about free trade, is and remains radically incom­
plete in each of the three ways I have described. The point is not just 
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to policy as well as to understanding. The point is that we cannot 
know the theoretical and practical value of the part we have until 
we combine it with the part we lack.The established practice of eco­
nomic analysis is not only unable to provide the missing part, it is 
also incapable of grasping the nature and implications of the 
incompleteness. 
One way to advance in understanding the implications of this 
situation is to compare economics as it has taken shape in the tra­
dition begun by nineteenth-century marginalism with physics, 
and especially to compare the relation between causal explanation 
and mathematical representation in each of them. The relation 
is fundamentally different, and the difference sheds light on the 
incompleteness of the doctrine of comparative advantage (as well 
as of established economic ideas in general) and on the way to 
overcome it. 
As the hardest of the social sciences and the one that has estab­
lished the most intimate association with mathematics, econom­
ics seems to follow in the footsteps of physics. And so it has been 
seen by many of its leading practitioners. Schumpeter remarked 
that the marginalist revolution could be compared with Newton’s 
revolution only in the sense that the Haitian revolution could be 
compared with the French. However, in ﬂaunting the European 
prejudice, he was accepting the claim of economics to resemble 
physics while depreciating the magnitude of the intellectual inno­
vations that marginalism had produced. 
Newton had intuited the substance of his laws of motion before 
he had found in the calculus that he (and Leibniz) invented the 
great mathematical instrument in which to express them, with its 
characteristic power to generate dynamical equations suited to 
the representation of change within time. The partnership of the 
physical intuition with the mathematical expression turned out to 
be exemplary as well as seminal in the history of the alliance be­
tween science and mathematics. It also drew attention to an 
enigma that has continued to haunt that alliance. 
The “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” for physics is 
nowhere more disconcerting than in the bond it implies between 
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tween a cause and its effect takes place in time; the cause precedes 
the effect. If time were unreal, causation would be illusory as well. 
The relation between a mathematical or logic premise and its 
conclusion, however, lies outside time, although it is within time 
and through time-bound processes of reasoning that we reason 
about this relation, undergoing it as a mental event. This timeless 
character of mathematical or logical propositions—the senseless­
ness of saying that they are time-bound—holds even when the 
mathematics describes, as the calculus does, changes that must be 
time-drenched if they are to be real. 
The use of mathematics in this scientiﬁc tradition looks out 
from the internal operations of thought to the riddles of nature. 
Mathematical ideas may be invented after the fact to expound and 
develop a physical intuition about the workings of nature (as in 
the example of Newton’s laws of motion) or they may help sug­
gest a physical intuition yet unformed (as in the instance of con­
temporary string theory). In either situation, however, the subject 
matter remains some part of the natural world: capable of defying 
our causal conjectures and of outreaching the mathematical in­
struments by which we are able to formulate and develop them. 
Newton provided science with the supreme model of a deter­
ministic physics, a system of connected causal propositions exhaus­
tively determining all events under their sway and fully expressed in 
the equations in which it was stated. Yet one should consider what 
happened when Poincaré had to confront, over the course of the 
1890s, the conundrum in Newton’s celestial mechanics that came 
to be known as the three-body problem. A large and a small planet 
gravitate around a star. The big planet is big enough to remain in­
sensitive to the gravitational force of the small one. According to 
the laws established by Kepler and Newton, the large planet will 
move around the star in predictable elliptical orbit. However, under 
this seemingly modest degree of complication, we are unable, with 
the aid of Newton’s laws of motion, to predict the movement of the 
small planet. 
At ﬁrst the problem may seem analogous to the difﬁculties aris­
ing for the theory of comparative advantage when we complicate 
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take account of more than two commodities and more than two 
countries. Depending on our stipulations about these more com­
plicated circumstances, and our judgments about what constitutes 
a solution, there may be multiple solutions for the assignment of 
comparative advantage, or inﬁnite solutions, or no solutions. The 
subsequent history of the three-body problem, however, shows 
just how deep-cutting is the difference between the dominant ex­
planatory practices in physics and in economics. 
Mittag-Lefﬂer’s discovery of an error in Poincaré’s proof of a 
supposed solution to the three-body problem within the limits of 
Newtonian physics eventually prompted Poincaré to develop the 
ideas published, between 1892 and 1899, as “New Methods of 
Celestial Mechanics.” Poincaré had to grasp the more complicated 
situation as a “nonintegrable system,” for the analysis of which 
Newton’s differential equations turned out to inadequate. To un­
derstand the long-term behavior of such a system, he chose to 
focus on the few of its motions that were periodic, seizing on them 
as the “only opening” by which to enter the “hitherto inaccessible 
fortress” of its nonperiodic motions. In the end, he had to inaugu­
rate a wholly new branch of mathematics, chaos theory, suitable to 
the mathematical representation and analysis of systems hyper­
sensitive to even modest changes in their initial conditions. The 
resulting ideas did not deny the possibility of calculating the mo­
tions of the third body in the three-body problem, so long as one 
could rely on enough computational power to work through the 
consequences of different initial conditions. However, they exem­
pliﬁed a form of statistical or probabilistic determination that was 
alien both to Newton’s physics and to his mathematics. 
That this event was characteristic rather than atypical of the his­
tory of modern physics can be shown by its similarities to Mikhail 
Gromov’s discovery almost a hundred years later, in 1980, of an un­
certainty result or principle in classical mechanics having to do with 
the difﬁculty, within the systems Gromov studied, of either creating 
or transferring information. Once again, it was mysterious nature 
that knocked at the door. Once again, an intuition about the work­
ings of nature had to be developed through mathematical innova­
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The history of theorizing about comparative advantage offers— 
and, within the boundaries of the analytic tradition of which it later 
became a part, it can offer—no true parallel to this remarkable di­
alectic of empirical study, causal conjecture, and mathematical dis­
covery.The contrasting mathematical expressions provide a clue to 
the source of the problem. The equations of comparative advantage 
for which we hope to ﬁnd solutions are devoted to the service of a 
static comparative analysis; they contain no true dynamics. Ri­
cardo’s initial conclusions followed by inexorable logic from the 
stipulations of his example, although their charm lay in reaching by 
these means conclusions that were felt to be counterintuitive. The 
stark simpliﬁcations on which his thought experiment drew were 
analogous in character to the simpliﬁcations of later theories al­
though different in content from them. (Of these theories, the most 
inﬂuential, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, is discussed in a note at the 
end of this chapter.) The subsequent trajectory of economics from 
marginalism on to general-equilibrium analysis conﬁrmed this an­
alytic practice, ﬁxing its personality and giving it a program. 
Newton’s image of the workings of nature looked outward to 
the real world of time and causation, proposing a view that no tri­
umph of logic could have derived from a set of premises. Ricardo’s 
thought experiment looked inward, using pure logic to reveal the 
surprising implications of a few stipulated facts. The experiment 
was motivated by the hope, ever since nourished by economics, that 
the imaginary world of the stipulations would help us understand 
better the real world of causal processes. Newton’s laws of motion 
required a mathematics capable of describing the movement of en­
tire dynamical systems in time. Ricardo’s idea of comparative ad­
vantage needed no more than a formalism suited to discovering 
logical implication, the better to serve a comparative static analysis. 
(There is, however, reason to think that Ricardo, unlike the theo­
rists of comparative advantage who came to stand on his shoulders, 
used his thought experiment about England and Portugal, as he 
had his campaign against the corn laws, to serve a theory of growth 
more than an analysis of static efﬁciencies. The theory of growth 
implicit in his reasoning has been seen, in the spirit of Sraffa, as in­
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savers, for example, owners of industry, putative agents of growth, 
and nonsavers, for example, landlords and workers, sacriﬁcial vic­
tims to the impersonal requirements of economic development. 
For the would-be scientists of trade “in higher dimensions,” no jus­
tiﬁcation could be more embarrassing.) Newton’s orientation out­
ward made it inevitable that, once his physics and his mathematics 
were  found to be incapable of accommodating the three-body 
problem, a novel set of physical and mathematical ideas would 
have to be developed to accommodate them. The outcome was 
Poincaré’s “new laws of celestial mechanics” and his mathematical 
theory of chaos, and the substitution of one type of causal determi­
nation for another. Ricardo’s thought experiment was meant from 
the outset to be incomplete, making violently simplifying assump­
tions intended to shed light sideways on an unaccountably messy 
world. No particular discovery of incompleteness (such as the 
forms of incompleteness discussed in the preceding pages) would 
be certain to disturb its conclusions, for it would remain unclear 
whether the incompleteness was the problem or the point. There 
could be no Poincaré for such Newtons. 
Instead, with the rise of marginalist economics, the distinction 
between these two intellectual orientations became more self-
conscious and more radical. From having been an occasional 
device, Ricardo’s strategy began to seem like the proper fate of 
economics: the way in which economics could best become a seri­
ous science. In retrospect, the doctrine of comparative advantage 
turned out to be the most characteristic teaching of economics in 
method as well as in substance. The larger intellectual stake in this 
contrast of ways of relating causal explanation to mathematical 
analysis at last became clear. 
Condemned to Eternal Infancy: Implications of the 
Method Inaugurated by Marginalism 
The tradition of economic analysis pioneered in the late nineteenth 
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their students is conventionally labeled marginalism. The supreme 
intellectual achievement to which it later gave rise was the theory of 
general equilibrium. I now focus on an aspect of this limited but 
fateful reorientation that is crucial to understanding the character 
of the economics that grew out of it. It is therefore also of vital im­
portance to anyone who seeks to understand and to overcome the 
characteristic incompleteness of the explanations that this style of 
economics offers, as exempliﬁed by the three species of incom­
pleteness of the doctrine of comparative advantage. A continuing 
theme in this book is the impossibility of attaining deeper insight 
into the problems of trade and of the global division of labor, and 
of dispelling the superstitions that burden the doctrine of free 
trade, within the constraints of this tradition of economic ideas. 
The classical English political economists, from Adam Smith to 
Thomas Malthus, had developed ways of thinking about economic 
life that combined logical analysis, causal explanation, and norma­
tive argument. Notwithstanding the restrictive character of his 
analysis of comparative advantage and of the thought experiments 
through which he formulated it, David Ricardo himself had con­
tributed to this tradition. It was an intellectual practice rich in 
claims about the causes and effects of different economic phenom­
ena. It did not borrow these claims from any other discipline; it ad­
vanced them on its own motion and to its own risk. By the same 
token, it did not hesitate, in the work of Smith, to associate its causal 
science with a vision of unrealized collective possibility, grounded 
in a view of human nature and of its development in history. 
Karl Marx and others attacked this tradition. The keynote of 
Marx’s attack was his thesis that the English economists had pre­
sented as universal and timeless laws of economic life what were 
in fact merely the regularities of a particular, time-bound eco­
nomic order, “capitalism.”* This impulse toward false universali­
*I use the terms “capitalism” and “capitalist economy” in this book as 
a handy, conventional reference to the particular form of a market 
economy that took hold in the North Atlantic countries over the last 
few centuries and that has since become the exemplary form of such an 
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zation of the particular and of the transitory resulted not only in 
a lack of imagination about alternative possibilities and transfor­
mative opportunity, it also misrepresented the workings of the 
capitalist order. 
Marx subsumed many of the ideas of classical economics, in­
cluding Ricardo’s labor theory of value, under a larger historical 
narrative, designed both to explain capitalism and to reveal the 
mechanism by which it was bound to be changed and replaced. 
One of the many ways in which Marx resembled the economists 
he criticized was in his bold commitment to offering causal expla­
nations. The interpretations of historical experience informing 
these causal claims as well as the claims themselves lay at the heart 
of his argument in Capital. 
His system of causal propositions focused on a deep structure 
of formative arrangements and assumptions shaping the routine 
practices of exchange and production, of work and life, that took 
place on the basis they provided. This distinction between the 
hidden formative structure and the visible formed routines was a 
conception he shared with many other inﬂuential social theorists 
of nineteenth-century Europe. For him as for them, a system of 
causal explanation forged on the anvil of a distinction between 
the depth and the surface was accompanied by a series of con­
nected necessitarian assumptions. 
nomic institutions have often agreed with Karl Marx and his followers 
in representing them as a more or less indivisible system, with a prede­
termined content and detailed requirements. Those who profess disbe­
lief in the assumptions of such a view continue to use the term in a way 
that suggests failure to grasp the implications of their own disbelief. As 
a result, the idea of capitalism has fallen into a degree of confusion from 
which it no longer seems worthwhile or even feasible to rescue it. See 
the discussion, under the heading “the troubles of the concept of capi­
talism,” in my book Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task, Verso, 2004, 
pp. 101–109. Here, I make use of the word to refer to a predominant but 
contingent way of organizing market-based exchange. It is the very way 
of organizing such exchange that the emerging world trade regime 
threatens to help impose on humanity as the universal background to 
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The ﬁrst such assumption, of indivisibility, was that each eco­
nomic and social system—Marx’s mode of production—was an 
indivisible system: all of its parts would stand or fall together. The 
second assumption, of closure, was that humanity was conﬁned 
to  a short list of indivisible institutional alternatives, moving 
through the list according to a foreordained evolutionary succes­
sion. The third assumption, of lawlike progression, was that law­
like forces ruled over this advance. The attempt to rescue the 
central insight into the discontinuity of formative institutional 
and ideological contexts, underlying the routines of conﬂict, pro­
duction, and belief, from the necessitarian baggage of these as­
sumptions has to this day not been fully accomplished in the 
work of the social sciences and humanities. 
Marx’s criticism and his construction formed part of a wide-
ranging struggle in nineteenth-century thought. In this struggle, 
Marx offered a wealth of causal explanations while dispensing 
with explicitly prescriptive proposals. What need was there of a 
program when history had one in store for humanity? Others pre­
ferred to attack the established tradition of political economy on 
avowedly normative grounds. 
The response of the analytic tradition inaugurated by Walras, 
Menger, and Jevons to this conﬂict was remarkable. It has no par­
allel in the history of modern thought (save for Hans Kelsen’s 
“pure theory of law” and other rigorous forms of twentieth-
century legal positivism), although the fears and ambitions that 
help explain it have set their mark on countless episodes in the 
history of ideas. 
Instead of joining as partisans the causal and normative fray 
and of continuing, in this respect, the tradition of the classical En­
glish political economists, the marginalists contrived to establish 
an analytic practice that would purify itself as much as possible of 
all controversial causal and normative claims. It would be pure 
analysis. It would soar above the ﬁeld of battle, bringing light 
without heat. Its explanatory uses would rely on the combination 
of its analytic moves with descriptive stipulations and causal con­
jectures supplied from outside the analytic apparatus, by other 
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depend on normative points of departure, externally provided by 
reason, ideology, or faith. Everything controversial, whether as 
causal account or as normative commitment, would be treated as 
exogenous. The combination of the analysis with the external 
stipulations would in every instance account for the explanatory 
or programmatic results. 
Noli me tangere was the watchword, and immunity the prom­
ise. The principle was analytic power without explanatory or pro­
grammatic liability. A side beneﬁt of extraordinary importance 
was to turn the pure practice of economic analysis into a branch 
of logic and therefore to prepare it for its marriage with mathe­
matics. The spirit preﬁgured in Ricardo’s thought experiment 
about comparative advantage (although not in many other parts 
of his thought) had thus been rendered explicit and general. 
At no moment has economics ever been completely dominated 
by this orientation. When marginalism ﬁrst appeared, German 
historical and American institutional economics offered a very 
different intellectual practice. The seeming inability of these intel­
lectual alternatives to generate distinctive and powerful claims 
and to provide a basis for a different connection between causal 
conjecture and mathematical analysis compromised their author­
ity. Today, new versions of institutional and behavioral economics 
look to such claims and to such a connection. All along the way, 
from then to now, the retreat into a citadel of immunity, with its 
characteristic separation of analysis from explanation and pre­
scription, has existed in an intellectual climate to which this pro­
cedure remained alien. No wonder contrasting ways of relating 
analysis to explanation and prescription have always penetrated 
the way economics is done. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose that my criticism 
is directed against either the professional culture of economics (as 
distinguished from its characteristic methods, assumptions, and 
proposals) or its marriage to mathematics. It is addressed instead 
to the most distinctive element within the dominant tradition of 
economic thinking for the last hundred years, the element distin­
guishing this intellectual practice from all others and accounting 
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Under the aegis of this intellectual practice, economics has 
never ceased to move among three strategies, sometimes imple­
mented by different economists and sometimes present in the 
work of the same economists. The oscillation has served to up­
hold the basic analytic orientation while both obfuscating its na­
ture and mitigating its costs. 
The strategy of purism is to insist on the full rigor of the dis­
tinction between the analytic operations of economics and the 
empirical or prescriptive starting points that must be supplied to 
it from outside. The empirical in turn includes both descriptive 
stipulation and causal explanation. Restrained within this rigor, 
economic analysis can explain or prescribe only through the bor­
rowed power of such external provisions. It is powerful to amplify 
but impotent to penetrate. It shines with reﬂected light. In its an­
alytical core, it is as innocent as Pontius Pilate. 
This is the version of economics that we see most insistently 
practiced by general equilibrium theorists like Gerard Debreu. 
Taken to the hilt, its result is to turn economics into the logical 
tool of alien knowledge, argument, or commitment. The particu­
lar cognitive by-products of this intellectual activity will be ﬁnd­
ings of constraint and clariﬁcations of trade-offs, inferred, by 
force of analysis, from someone else’s stipulations. Tell me the 
facts about society and about your preferences, and I shall make 
you think clearly and face the implications of your own supposi­
tions, says the hard-headed analyst. 
The strategy of pretension sacriﬁces purism for the sake of 
programmatic potency. However, it rarely acknowledges this sac­
riﬁce. It is economics as a partisan in the ideological and institu­
tional disputes of the contemporary world. It characteristically 
urges the beneﬁts of markets, of capitalism, of globalization, and 
above all of free trade. The excellences of free trade, conducted 
on the basis of comparative advantage, has been its most charac­
teristic if not its most general teaching. Relying on these doc­
trines, it does not hesitate to make a host of particular policy 
recommendations. It is exempliﬁed by the overtly programmatic 
arguments of economists from Ludwig von Mises to Milton 
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Two controversial intellectual linkages are crucial to the strategy 
of pretension. The ﬁrst linkage, widely discussed and relatively 
less important, is the identiﬁcation of a model of maximizing, 
self-interested behavior, of the principle of marginal utility, and 
of the concept of allocational efﬁciency with the workings of a 
market economy: the market economy as the superior, even as the 
natural and necessary, institutional vehicle of those ideas and 
orientations. This association was the subject matter of the con­
troversy in the 1930s about the reconciliation of marginalist eco­
nomics with state planning in which Oskar Lange and other 
socialist economists played a major part. The outcome was to 
demonstrate that there was no strictly analytical obstacle to the 
deployment of marginalist concepts and techniques by state plan­
ners. The practical costs of dirigisme might be formidable and 
even overwhelming, but they could not be deduced from the 
analysis of marginal utility, maximizing behavior, and static efﬁ­
ciency. Argument about them had to go forward on a different 
plane, sunk in disputes about what caused what in present-day 
economies and what alternatives to present arrangements were 
feasible and accessible. 
The second linkage, much less remarked and far more signiﬁ­
cant, is the identiﬁcation of the abstract idea of a market econ­
omy with a particular, historically contingent set of economic 
institutions and practices, including a particular regime of prop­
erty and contract. The point is to represent these arrangements 
as the constant and inseparable expression of the great ideas 
standing behind them. Bereft of detailed institutional content, 
the abstractions are insufﬁcient to support policy prescriptions 
and criticisms. Equipped with such content, they mark a distinc­
tive path in the ideological conﬂicts of the day; they allow the 
particular to speak with the authority of the general. 
It was and is an impulse premised on disregard for a truth with 
which economics to this day has failed fully to reckon: that the de­
tailed legal and institutional content of a market economy cannot 
be inferred from the concept of such an economy any more than 
the detailed legal and institutional content of democracy can be 
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be organized in ways very different from those that have come to 
prevail in the recent history of the North Atlantic societies; that 
the potential for difference extends to rules and arrangements for 
property and contract as well as to the relations between eco­
nomic agents and the state; and that these large and forceful dif­
ferences cannot be judged except by those who are willing to enter 
the open ﬁeld of controversy about social reality and possibility 
in which the ideas of maximizing behavior and marginal utility 
have, unless further accompanied and equipped, little or nothing 
to say. 
The strategy of equivocation departs from purism in the inter­
est of explanatory force and of the power to recommend policy 
that such force may support. It incurs, but only half-heartedly and 
with mental reservation, the fault of which Marx accused the En­
glish political economists: the unwarranted generalization of the 
local and the transitory. It seeks to establish regularities among 
lawlike macroeconomic aggregates such as the levels of savings, 
investment, and employment. Under challenge, it acknowledges 
that these regularities depend for their force on a host of particu­
lar institutional arrangements far more detailed and distinctive 
than those deﬁning our general idea of capitalism or the market 
economy—for example, the precise way in which labor is orga­
nized and empowered in its dealings with capital, or the scope of 
unemployment insurance, or the powers enjoyed by the central 
bank. Were any of these many loosely connected background facts 
to  change, they concede, so would the supposed regularities. 
Thus, they decline to make in strong form the universalizing 
claim that laid the English political economists open to Marx’s at­
tack: the confusion of the “laws” of all economies with the “laws” 
of a particular economy. 
So long, however, as a society lies in the grip of relative institu­
tional and ideological stagnation, so long as its formative arrange­
ments and beliefs come under little effective challenge, so long as 
the trauma of war or ruin fails to jeopardize what the disarmed 
imagination leaves untouched, the concession of principle can be 
disregarded in the practice of argument. The relations among 
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quiescent background, will then take on a mendacious semblance 
of lawlike regularity. 
If the concession that the relation between, say, inﬂation and 
unemployment depends on the particulars of the institutional 
and ideological context were made in earnest, the subject of in­
quiry would be the relation of those phenomena to this context, 
the nature of this context, and its prospects of transformation, 
rather than the relations among the phenomena against their sta­
ble and shadowy background. However, the concession is not for 
real. It is a ploy, denying in practice what it admits in principle. 
Such was the strategy pursued, for example, by the American 
followers of Keynes, who, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, developed a “macroeconomics.” They turned a theory 
of permanent disequilibrium into a theory of rigidities either 
preventing equilibrium or allowing for multiple equilibriums at 
higher and lower levels of employment. They made Keynes polit­
ically palatable by depoliticizing him, and formulated an agenda 
that took the mid-twentieth-century institutional and ideologi­
cal settlement as the natural template of a modern regulated 
market economy. Their method of equivocating with the relation 
between economic phenomena and their institutional and ideo­
logical setting was then taken over by others antipathetic to the 
teachings of the master. 
The internal life of the central tradition of economics has been 
a perpetual alternation between the strategy of purism on the one 
hand and the strategies of pretension and equivocation on the 
other hand. The impure explanatory and prescriptive power of 
the second and third strategies compensates for the radical inhi­
bitions of the ﬁrst. When pretension and equivocation are chal­
lenged for their compromises, it is always possible to retreat into 
purism. 
The implications for any attempt to redress the three species of 
incompleteness in the doctrine of comparative advantage are un­
mistakable. We cannot redress them within the boundaries of a 
style of economic analysis insisting on such a separation of analysis 
from explanation and prescription. Now we can see why the thesis 
that the argument about free trade developed in this book can 
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in letter (if one has in mind the purest, most self-denying practice 
of economic analysis), is false in spirit. To address the three forms 
of incompleteness is, inevitably, to struggle with the intellectual 
practice that produces them. 
The consequences of this way of relating analysis to causality 
and policy have been decisive for economics. They have allowed it 
to claim a rigor unparalleled among the social sciences but ac­
quired at fatal cost. The cost has been to condemn economics—at 
least the versions of economics remaining under the sway of these 
ideas—to eternal infancy. The votaries of this science were mis­
taken to see analytic immunity to causal and normative contro­
versy as a beneﬁt. They committed a sin for which in thought, as in 
life, there is no forgiveness: they failed to cast down their shields. 
A Note Relating Ideas in this Book to the Dominant 
Tradition of Thinking about Comparative Advantage 
The history of the doctrine of comparative advantage can be pre­
sented schematically as a story in three chapters. The addition of 
the missing, fourth chapter reveals the hidden meaning of the 
previous three. I now submit this story to radical compression 
and nonformal, intuitive exposition, disengaging the main narra­
tive line from all technical complication, the better to help us 
combine the insight provided by the standard analysis of compar­
ative advantages with insights that this analysis denies us. 
The ﬁrst stage is Ricardo (stated in 1817), with its prehistory 
in intuitive ideas about absolute advantage, as in Adam Smith. 
Ricardo took account of a single factor of production, labor. He 
allowed for technological differences between countries and, on 
that basis, for differences in the productivity of their labor forces. 
Without such differences in technology and productivity, the case 
for free trade in his analysis would collapse. Autarky would prevail. 
The second stage is the Heckscher-Ohlin model (ﬁrst presented 
in 1933) and all its many sequels in subsequent economic analy­
sis. This model made do without the differences in technology 
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inequalities in capital endowments, thus reestablishing on an­
other basis national differences in the productivity of labor. For 
Ricardo, these differences had, like technology itself, been exoge­
nous. They now became endogenous to the model. 
Differences in national capital endowments (for example, in 
investment in infrastructure) require different factor proportions. 
The right factor proportions for each national setting are estab­
lished through the proﬁt-maximizing decisions of the capitalist. 
The picture is that of a system of world trade organized along 
the axis of trade between capital-abundant and labor-abundant 
countries. 
A central prediction, in manifest conﬂict with experience, is 
factor-price equalization: factor prices will converge, thanks to 
free trade, with traded goods prices. Among the many assump­
tions, all of them indispensable to the argument, are constant re­
turns to scale and immobility of capital as well as of labor among 
countries (but their complete mobility within them). If capital 
were mobile, forming a single worldwide pool for investment, the 
labor-capital ratio would soon be the same all over the globe. Dif­
ferences in the relative abundance of labor would no longer result 
in the imbalances of productivity vital to the argument. Trade in 
goods would collapse, and autarky predominate, as they would in 
Ricardo’s world if countries had the same technological capabili­
ties. In this way of thinking, different countries do have those 
same capabilities: the “production functions,” deﬁning the con­
version of inputs into outputs, are identical and homogeneous 
throughout the world. 
Within this realm of ideas, trade in goods can produce the ef­
fects of movement of capital and people. Factor price equalization 
is simply the expression of this fundamental equivalence. We can 
credit failure to achieve this result to some localized rigidity in 
markets or to a particular deviation from the assumptions deﬁn­
ing the model without jeopardy to the central insight or to its use 
in understanding an unruly world, bound to transgress some of 
its strictures. 
Many  of the most inﬂuential ideas in trade theory are best 
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czynski theorem translates the static language of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model into faintly dynamic idiom, without, however, sug­
gesting even the beginnings of a standard of choice among multiple 
solutions to the problem of productive specialization based on 
comparative advantage: a shift in relative factor endowments will 
result in a change in the relative prominence of labor-intensive and 
capital-intensive production. According to the Stolper-Samuelson 
result, relative changes in the prices of goods will cause changes in 
the prices of the factors used to produce them. If the price of capi­
tal-intensive goods increases relative to the price of labor-intensive 
goods, the rental rate of capital will increase relative to the wage, the 
return to labor. 
The third and last completed stage of the story develops out of 
the attempt to relax the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
By allowing for increasing returns to scale, for the possibility of 
achieving a “critical mass” in particular sectors and a combination 
of skills and efﬁciencies at which a set of national ﬁrms can then 
not easily be bested, we not only draw closer to actual experience; 
we also show why trade fails to collapse into autarky, as implied by 
Ricardo (if technological capabilities were diffused and shared) or 
by Heckscher-Ohlin (if capital were mobile among countries or if 
any other number of highly restrictive and seemingly counterfac­
tual assumptions failed to hold). Here is the line of analysis that 
goes from the “strategic trade theory” of the 1970s and 1980s to 
more recent writings.* By acquiring entrenched niches in the 
global division of labor, trading countries—or, more precisely, the 
network of ﬁrms acting under their aegis—are able to entrench 
their specializations, not forever or against anything but for a 
while and against emerging efforts to do what they do better and 
more cheaply somewhere else. 
However,  the same argument showing why autarky need not 
and will not return also suggests that the gains of trade may not, in 
every circumstance, be universally shared. Not only ﬁrms but 
whole sectors of production, segments of workers, and even entire 
*See, for example, Ralph E. Gomory and William J. Baumol, Global 
Trade and Conﬂicting National Interests, MIT Press, 2000. 68  ❍  chapter two 
national economies and their populations may stand to lose. 
Moreover, we may be unable to infer the choice of which strategic 
path to entrench, and of how best to open up such a path, from the 
static analysis of comparative advantage. At issue is the construc­
tion of comparative advantage. Firms, sectors, and governments 
may ﬁnd themselves compelled to guess and to gamble about the 
direction to take. The price signals transmitted by the markets are 
neither determinate nor reliable enough to answer the questions of 
direction and method, for each of the real markets bears the mark 
of cumulative and conﬂicting attempts to construct comparative 
advantage rather than merely to reveal it. 
The corrosive effect of this analysis on the classic teaching of 
free trade is mufﬂed by the twin fears of dogmatism and fa­
voritism: the anxiety that those who would strategize and select 
will be the knowing servants of factional interest, determined to 
convert public power to private advantage, when they are not the 
unwitting victims of prejudice and dogma. Free trade, robbed of 
some of its exaggerated claims and unkeepable promises, will 
now reappear as the instrument of experimentalism and equality 
against voluntarism and pillage. 
The fourth chapter of this story remains largely unwritten. 
However, we must anticipate its content if we are to understand 
more fully the meaning of the three earlier chapters. A simple way 
to understand its main point is to say that it consists in the com­
bination of two moves. 
The ﬁrst move is to maintain the full force of the idea presented 
in the third chapter of the story—that increasing returns to scale, 
as well as other supports to the entrenchment of comparative ad­
vantage, may prevent gains from trade from being universally or 
equally shared by the trading partners. We shall now not allow the 
lesson of this turn in the plot to be dulled by despair about the 
ability to exercise selective and strategic judgment without seeing 
it perverted into an instrument of dogmatism and favoritism. In­
stead of retreating, we shall advance. We shall acknowledge that 
democracy, like the market economy itself, can take alternative in­
stitutional forms and that the forms now established in the rich 
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set of institutional possibilities. And we shall explore the conjec­
ture that some of these forms may be less susceptible to the evils 
of dogma and favor than others, thus allowing the strategic and 
selective judgments that may seem best in principle to become 
best as well in practice. Everything will depend on the actual orga­
nization of the market economy and of democratic politics as two 
connected sets of practices of collective experimentalism, includ­
ing experimentalism about the rules, institutions, and practices 
that shape the market economy. 
The second move is to reintroduce, in more complicated, inclu­
sive, and disturbing form, a major element of the ﬁrst chapter of 
the story: Ricardo’s assumption, indispensable within his analysis 
to the avoidance of autarky, of the differences between the pro­
ductivity of labor that result from the distinct and unequal tech­
nologies of production available to the trading partners. 
Let us now take Ricardo’s assumption of different national pro­
ductivities of labor based on different technological capabilities as 
a proxy for the different ways of organizing work among people 
and for combining people with machines. Let us deny that labor is 
homogeneous: the different forms of cooperation in a division of 
labor are the central and fateful part of any scheme of economic 
organization. Let us treat Adam Smith’s pin factory model of the 
division of labor, with its premium on specialization and hierar­
chy, as the limiting case of a broader spectrum of possibilities. Let 
us view labor and technology as if they were different aspects of 
the same thing: in one instance the social and in the other the 
physical expression of our imaginative activity. Let us recognize 
that of all distinctions among types of labor, the one that is laden 
with the greatest consequence is the distinction between the activ­
ities that do not yet lend themselves to formulaic repetition and 
the activities that we have already learned how to repeat, and 
therefore as well how to express in formulas and embody in ma­
chines. Let us recognize that a major element in the economic as­
cent of modern societies lies in the capacity, conditioned by the 
particular organization of work, of the economy, of politics, and of 
culture, of using machines and the repeatable to free our time for 
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organizing markets and trade—ways that cannot be tellingly de­
scribed or understood in the language of simple contrasts between 
free trade and protection—may either hinder or help this ascent. 
From the ideas making up this second move, listed in the pre­
ceding paragraph, there results, in combination with my earlier 
argument about the incompleteness of the doctrine of compara­
tive advantage, the way of thinking about trade that this book 
develops. 
It is useful to look back at the story I have told with its three 
written chapters, followed by its fourth, imagined chapter. Two 
features of this story deserve the closest attention; they have fun­
damental relevance to an understanding of the intellectual back­
ground from which the argument of this book arises and against 
which it is directed. 
The ﬁrst feature is the central paradox in the historical devel­
opment of ideas about comparative advantage and free trade. The 
case for free trade has often relied on assumptions that are so 
restrictive—and in such manifest conﬂict with past and present 
experience—that they make the impulse toward free trade seem 
all but miraculous. What should prevail, according to these ideas, 
given the failure of the restrictive assumptions, is autarky. 
On the other hand, the ideas, such as increasing returns to 
scale, that explain why the reversion to autarky fails to occur de­
spite the failure of the restrictive assumptions suggest that trade is 
more likely to be a terrain for winners and losers, among nations 
and classes as well as among ﬁrms, than for universal gains. The 
vindication of the possibility of trade comes together with the 
revelation of its contentiousness. 
However, the meaning of this contentiousness starts to change 
when we begin to understand that we need not be limited to 
choosing between more trade or less trade or to shifting, in one 
direction or another, the balance between free trade and restraint 
on trade. We can reimagine and reorganize the trade regime, 
globally or regionally. We can reimagine and reorganize the mar­
ket economy itself. 
A second feature of the story is the star role that it properly at­
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(that is to say, the wage rate) in explaining the character and his­
tory of the world trading system. Nothing less is at stake than the 
range of our productive powers considered in relation to the 
organization of society. Study of the differential productivity 
and reward of labor provides us with a wedge into this larger 
concern. 
To  acknowledge certain facts despite the prejudices of theory 
and ideology that prevent them from being seen for what they are 
is the beginning of insight into these matters. These facts are not 
only of immense interest in themselves, they also reveal the limi­
tations of the traditions of thought that have so completely failed 
to make sense of them. 
One such fact is that the reality of world trade is not now, if it 
ever was, captured by the image of labor-abundant countries trad­
ing with capital-rich countries, the cheaper labor of the former 
complementing, through the alchemy of productive specialization 
on the ground of comparative advantage, the higher productivity 
of the latter. This is the image at the center of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model and its variations, and one that is already foreshadowed in 
Ricardo’s founding argument and his example of trade between 
Portugal and England. It is an almost direct translation into the 
reality of trade of the most elementary model of the national econ­
omy as theorized by the English political economists and reinter­
preted by Karl Marx: the legally free but economically dependent 
worker sells his labor to the capitalist for a wage. 
Reality has departed from this image in several connected ways. 
The most advanced forms of production are established in ad­
vanced sectors of production or vanguards in the major develop­
ing economies as well as in the rich countries. The network of such 
vanguards, I later argue, has become the commanding force in the 
world economy, exchanging ideas, practices, and people, as well as 
goods and services and often only weakly linked to the remainder 
of their own national economies, rich or poor. The essence of this 
productive vanguardism is not abundance of capital or even of 
technology; it is a set of revolutionary practices changing the char­
acter of the division of labor (farther and farther away from Adam 
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good schools, and allowing production to share in the methods 
and spirit of science as well as in its discoveries. 
Abundant and cheaper labor may be associated with either 
lower or higher productivity. When labor is relatively cheap and 
productivity relatively high, unit-labor costs—the average labor 
compensation per unit of output, measuring both productivity 
and the cost of labor—may fall. At the end of the twentieth cen­
tury and the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst, the organized and ad­
vanced sectors of the Chinese and Indian economies beneﬁted 
from this situation. Relatively cheaper labor may, however, also be 
connected with low productivity: both low labor productivity and 
low total factor productivity. 
Thus, at the same time that China and India were said to beneﬁt 
from their comparatively low unit-labor costs, Mexico was said to 
suffer from a situation in which its unit-labor costs approximated 
those of the United States; the wage was almost a tenth of what it 
was in the United States, but so was average productivity. If the 
mode of thought implied in the Heckscher-Ohlin model were cor­
rect, Mexico would be, from the standpoint of its representative 
position in the international division of labor, half the world: the 
labor rich ready to trade with the capital rich. But it was not half 
the world. It was just a failure in a particular place: Mexico had 
failed to ﬁnd a way either to cheapen its labor or sufﬁciently to 
raise its labor productivity, as well as its total factor productivity. 
If the most advanced practices and technologies of production 
can be established anywhere, combined with either cheaper or 
dearer labor, the road is open to choose and to develop specialized 
positions within the world division of labor rather than to accept 
such positions as part of the destiny of established comparative 
advantage or as a rung in a ready-made ladder of economic ascent 
from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production. The hope of 
reaping the beneﬁts of increasing returns to scale will simply 
widen a margin of maneuver resulting from other causes. 
A second fact concerns the return to labor, its share in national 
income. The return to labor varies starkly among countries at 
comparable levels of economic development and average produc­
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applied economics than the idea that the real wage cannot over 
the long term be made to rise more quickly than labor productiv­
ity. All attempts to make it rise more quickly will fail; inﬂation will 
turn real gains into nominal ones. This belief comes from the 
same idea world as the gold standard and the pre-Keynesian 
“sound-ﬁnance doctrine” of the early twentieth century, yet it has 
mysteriously survived their downfall. It is in fundamental agree­
ment with a characteristic tenet of Marxist economic theory, ac­
cording to which the “rate of surplus value”—the part of value 
that the labor-buying capitalist can extract from the labor-selling 
worker and keep for himself—converges in capitalist economies. 
It is a belief enjoying such widespread acceptance and authority 
that it should come as no surprise to ﬁnd that it is false. The 
limited element of truth it contains helps conceal the falsehood of 
the rest. 
A close proxy for the Marxist concept of surplus value is the fa­
miliar statistical measure of the proportion of wages to value 
added in the industrial sector of a national economy. Countries at 
similar levels of economic and technological development, and 
therefore also of average total factor productivity as well as labor 
productivity, show striking differences in the wage take of value 
added in the industrial sector—the inverse of what Marx called 
“surplus value.” In a recent study, this percentage was 65 percent 
for Denmark (2003), 62 percent for Germany (2003), 57 percent 
for South Africa (2004), 50 percent for the United Kingdom 
(2003), 32 percent for the United States (2002), 27 percent for 
Japan (2002), 23 percent for India (2004), and 21 percent for Brazil 
(2004).* It was generally higher for developed and lower for devel­
oping countries. Striking differences emerge, however, between 
countries at similar levels of development and productivity. Some 
of these differences can be attributed to different scarcities of land, 
labor, and capital as well as to the relative importance of natural 
resource extraction to each national economy. Nevertheless, much 
*UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) 
Industrial Statistics online database on Employment, Wages, and Re­
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of the difference remains even after we have given these conditions 
their due. 
The rest is politics. The legal and institutional position of capi­
tal has, we may conjecture, a residual and substantial role in shap­
ing the relations among government, capital, and labor. The wide 
disparities in the part of national income enjoyed by labor could 
never have arisen in the ﬁrst place if the relation between the pro­
ductivity of labor and the return to labor had a natural history in­
dependent of collective action and political initiative, if, despite 
being a fact about society rather than about nature, this relation 
were beyond the reach of the will. 
The truth in the dogma that the real wage cannot outpace the 
rise in productivity is the futility of attempts to achieve by ﬁat 
rises in the real wage. A legislated rise in the proportion of na­
tional income won by labor can work. However, it can work only 
when sustained by rights and arrangements shifting power to­
ward workers while maintaining competitive pressure in product, 
capital, and labor markets. The falsehood in the dogma is the de­
nial of the power of change in institutions and policies to produce 
such an effect. 
The relation of these realities to the tradition of thought that 
arose out of Ricardo’s doctrine of comparative advantage and that 
found classic expression in the Heckscher-Ohlin model may be 
indirect. It is nevertheless of decisive importance. The direction of 
specialization within the world economy will be inﬂuenced by 
the rewards of labor as well as by its productivity. Contrary to the 
half-true dogma, each of these may vary independently of the 
other, and it may do so not just for a while and for a little bit but 
lastingly, cumulatively, and dramatically. 
The political construction of the relative status and reward of 
labor relative to capital conﬁrms what we already know from 
other observations and arguments: that to a much larger extent 
than the main line of thinking about comparative advantage 
would allow, the specialized place of a national economy within 
the world economy can be chosen rather than discovered. It is not 
a fate; it is a project, forged in the face of constraint and on the 
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A third large fact to be accommodated by a revised view of 
comparative advantage and productive specialization within the 
world economy is the open-ended and two-sided relation of in­
creases in the return of labor to the economic rise of nations. An 
increase in the real wage, pushed by politics and institutions be­
yond the limits of productivity gains, may form part of a narrative 
of economic regression. Thus, for example, the Mexico of today is 
a country that has failed to achieve sustained increases in either 
labor or total factor productivity but is unable or unwilling to 
cheapen its labor to Chinese or Indian levels. Its high unit-labor 
costs—with low productivity and a wage that is low but not low 
enough—falls as a dead hand on its economic future. 
Upward pressure on the returns to labor, even pressure to give 
labor proportionately more than prior advances in productivity 
justify, may, however, be part of a story of progressive economic 
revolution. It may help, and in many historical circumstances it 
has helped, accelerate inventions and innovations from which 
gains in productivity result. It may hasten the substitution of the 
activities we have already learned how to repeat by the machines 
that can repeat them, and save more of the time and talent of 
more people for the activities that we do not yet know how to re­
peat. Then the intrinsic attractions of increases in the returns to 
labor in rescuing more people from poverty and indignity will be 
magniﬁed by their place in a greater effort to lift from human life 
the burdens of drudgery and stupefaction. 
What way of organizing a national economy will make it more 
likely for the benign effect to prevail over the prejudicial conse­
quence? The relative enhancement of the position and of the re­
wards of labor must be part of a larger impulse, in the economy 
and in culture, in ﬁrms and in schools, to turn production into 
learning and cooperative work into collective experimentation. 
The experimentation must include experimentation with the 
forms of the market economy and of representative democracies 
as the two large sets of arrangements by which we can advance 
without blueprints. 
What approach to the organization of international commerce 
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which the reconciliation of alternative strategies and directions in 
the making of such experiments, rather than the simple maxi­
mization of free trade, becomes the commanding principle of the 
global trade regime. It must also be one in which the universaliza­
tion of ever more exacting labor standards generalizes upward 
pressure on returns to labor to the whole of the world. Chapter 3 
Ideas 
●❍● 
In Search of a Point of View 
To  ﬁnd an intellectual direction that can illuminate these historical 
experiences and clarify these conceptual problems, we must think 
beyond the boundaries of ideas that address free trade alone. We 
cannot do justice to the debate about free trade and protection 
from within the categories in which this debate has traditionally 
been framed. 
In this chapter I offer six ideas as starting points for a way of 
thinking, not just about international trade but also about eco­
nomic activity in general—building blocks for a different ap­
proach. Without a struggle to develop such an approach, my 
explanatory accounts and programmatic proposals about the 
world division of labor would be groundless and arbitrary, or 
they would be condemned to remain parasitic on the terms of a 
controversy that has long become sterile. 
Each of the ﬁrst three ideas informs one of the main theses 
Ip ut forward in the next chapter. The fourth idea makes explicit 
an assumption on which two of the ﬁrst three rely. The ﬁfth idea 
is the one that has the most far-reaching theoretical and practical 
implications for the debate about free trade, yet also has the least 
obvious connection with it. The sixth idea puts the previous ﬁve 
in the context of a broader view of mind and work. 78  ❍  chapter three 




The ﬁrst idea addresses the countervailing interests at stake in the 
debate about free trade. It is an idea about collective learning and 
about the difference between the circumstances in which uncon­
trolled competition with more advanced competitors encourages 
learning and the circumstances in which such competition pre­
vents learning. This ﬁrst idea amounts to an interpretation of what 
the classical quarrel over free trade was always about, restated in 
the language of concerns that contemporaries have come to view 
as paramount. 
To become specialized in particular lines of production, on the 
basis of natural or achieved comparative advantage, and yet to be 
goaded into improvement and innovation by continuing contact 
with more advanced producers—with those who produced more 
value with less labor—whether in those lines of production or in 
other lines requiring greater capital and knowledge: such was one 
of the essential beneﬁts of free trade, according to the classical 
doctrine. Under competitive pressure, you would learn, as a coun­
try, as a sector of the economy, or as ﬁrm, to do better what you 
already did, or to make something new that the world valued 
more. The daily realities of trade with those who produced differ­
ent things, as well as of competition with those who produced the 
same or similar things, would constantly present you with inspi­
rations and incentives to self-improvement. 
The efﬁciency that you achieve through specialization within an 
international division of labor will help you progress, both by im­
proving how you produce what you already produce and by show­
ing you how to move from one line of activity to another, more 
gainful and more demanding of capital and skill. 
The core of this ﬁrst idea is that there are certain recurrent sit­
uations in which this dream is likely to be realized and others in 
which it is just as likely to be frustrated. The difference between 
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among three conditions: the beneﬁt of becoming specialized, the 
value of being challenged, the danger of being overwhelmed. 
There are two polar situations in which the dream can be most 
readily realized: when your trading partners are much more ad­
vanced than you are and when they are more or less as advanced 
as you are. If they are much more advanced than you are, you 
can hope to become more efﬁcient and productive—especially 
by moving into more labor-saving lines of business or forms of 
production—without either threatening them or being threat­
ened by them. The constant example of their organizational and 
technological reﬁnement, made patent in the daily realities of 
trade, will hold before you a standard that, although it may be un­
reachable in the short term, will nevertheless mark the direction 
in which you should move. 
Now consider the situation when your trading partners are at a 
level of development—and especially of command over capital, 
knowledge, and the replacement of repetitive labor by machines— 
similar to your own. Once again, as in the circumstance of radical 
inequality with your trading partners, the beneﬁts of specialized 
production need not be enjoyed at the cost of the possibilities of 
self-improvement. You and your trading partners may at any mo­
ment enter into one another’s lines of business. This ceaseless 
competition will make its victims: the ﬁrms that stand to lose 
their lead, and all the workers they employ. Nevertheless, in the 
face of these localized, shifting, and ephemeral defeats, you and 
your trading partners alike will be able to draw on a common 
stock of resources: the capital, the machines, the skills, the prac­
tices, the organizational arrangements, and the enacted ideas that 
place you and them at a comparable level of development. 
But what if you and your trading partners are at unequal—but 
not very unequal—levels of development? In particular, what if 
you are the relatively more backward economy and your partners 
are the relatively more advanced ones? Your paths are then much 
more likely to cross theirs than they would be if the difference in 
development between you and them were stark. The situation will 
in this respect more closely resemble the circumstance of relative 80  ❍  chapter three 
equality: you will have the prospect of moving into lines of busi­
ness in which they hold strong, even entrenched places. 
However,  the situation will differ from that circumstance of 
relative equality in two important ways. For one thing, in the 
course of your advance you will have to cross a dangerous terrain 
of transition during which you may have to compete in certain 
ﬁelds of production without enjoying the same productivity of 
labor as your relatively more advanced competitors. You will con­
sequently be forced to rely on cheap labor. You will do so in the 
hope that this reliance will not prevent you from continuing to 
move up the ladder of labor-saving technology and organization. 
For another thing, you will be less able to draw on the resources 
that enable your partners, in their dealings with one another, 
quickly to replace failure in one domain with success in others. 
Your stock of resources and capabilities for such substitutions will 
be more restricted. You may be forced to fall back on the relative 
cheapness of your labor as your sole compensation. It will be a 
perilous reliance because it may tempt you to slow or to postpone 
the adoption of labor-saving technologies and practices. As a re­
sult, you may take longer to shift the focus of time and attention 
in your society away from the activities you know how to repeat, 
and therefore know how to embody in formulas and machines, 
toward those activities that you have not yet learned how to re­
peat. Yet it is precisely this shift, from repetition to novelty and to 
the power of creating it, that matters most to the ability of a soci­
ety to respond to the failure of an established line of production 
by replacing it with something else. 
Your relatively more advanced trading partners will also be 
threatened. Your forced reliance on cheaper and less productive 
labor will crack a whip usefully at their backs, forcing them to 
quicken the pace by which formulas and machines come to replace 
whatever part of labor and production they have learned how to 
model as a set of repetitious operations. However, the social cost of 
this acceleration will not be evenly distributed throughout their 
societies; it will fall most heavily on the part of the labor force doing 
the work that the catchers-up have now taken up as their own. If the 
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the shadow of increasing inequality and exclusion. If the victims do 
react, economic growth may be interrupted by social strife. 
What this thought experiment suggests is that the different 
elements of collective learning, in and through competitive spe­
cialization under an international division of labor, are not fore­
ordained to work with one another. They may work against one 
another. The likelihood of their working in one way rather than 
another will be shaped by the relative powers of whole national 
economies as well as by the relative capabilities of particular ﬁrms. 
The greatest tension—productive of an antagonism of interests 
that the dogmas of free trade may be unable to resolve—will arise 
when inequality among the partners is real but not radical: when 
the emergent face the established. 
Politics over Economics: When Restraints on Trade Imply 
No Surrender to Special Interests or Costly Dogmas 
A second idea concerns the relation between economics and poli­
tics. The range of alternative lines of response on which a society 
can draw when confronted by dilemmas such as those exposed 
by the ﬁrst idea is not determined within the economy itself. It 
is determined by politics. More precisely, it is formed by the com­
bination of two distinct but connected factors, both of them po­
litical in nature. 
One factor is the extent to which the state is able credibly to 
represent the wide interests of society at large rather than the nar­
row interests of a faction or a class with privileged inﬂuence on 
government. The second factor is the degree to which the prac­
tices of politics and of policy, giving content to the conception of 
the collective interests, are experimental in character, organizing a 
process of sustained social discovery of ends as well as of means, 
of values as well as of interests, of collective self-understandings 
as well as of national strategies. 
The creation of such a state and of such a practice of politics 
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humanity. Even the most vibrant democracies in the most egali­
tarian contemporary societies realize this ideal very imperfectly. 
At their most egalitarian, those societies continue to be shaped by 
a coexistence between class and meritocracy, with vast disparities 
between the power and inﬂuence of different groups. At their 
most vibrant, those democracies continue to rely on a narrow 
stock of institutional arrangements and ideas, limiting their abil­
ity to subject social privilege to popular pressure. 
Public administration continues to be organized on a model 
of command and control: the administrative equivalent to mass-
production industry, with its stark hierarchies of conception and 
execution, its rigid contrasts among specialized jobs, its trust in 
standardization as the condition of efﬁciency achieved through 
scale, its segregation of cooperation and competition into wholly 
separate domains of experience, and its treatment of innovation 
as episodic interruption rather than ongoing practice. It is as if 
warfare had continued to be dominated by the massed and brittle 
infantry formations of the eighteenth century. As a result, the 
making and implementation of policy cease to be sources of 
discovery, and become instruments for the imposition of dogma, 
top down. 
These constraints on democratic deepening and administrative 
practice radically limit the range of options with which a society 
can respond to problems and tensions like those that the ﬁrst idea 
identiﬁes in the relation between the beneﬁts of specialized pro­
duction and the requirements of economic self-improvement. 
They force a country to make a Hobson’s choice between relin­
quishing all restraints on free trade, even when relative advantage 
may justify such restraints, and imposing the restraints at the risk 
of allowing them to serve powerful interests and costly dogmas. 
The accumulation of such Hobson’s choices becomes a kind of 
fate, unconsciously accepted as the closed horizon within which 
practical argument about economic policy must move. Even if se­
lective and temporary restraints on trade may seem justiﬁable in 
theory, they will be denounced in practice as an invitation to the 
evils of playing favorites and of riding hobbyhorses instead of let­
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will be a utopian view of the market economy as a machine capable 
of discovering Pareto-improving solutions through decentralized 
experimentation, so long as it remains free of discrete instances of 
market failure. 
The counterpart to this utopian view of the market is a dys­
topian view of the state—and of all forms of collective action not 
governed by market forces, a view seeing government and collec­
tive organization undisciplined by the market as tools of special 
interest and factional prejudice. The utopian and the dystopian 
views work together, lending credence to the belief that the politi­
cal adjustments of economic forces that may seem best in theory 
will rarely be best in practice. In no ﬁeld is this lesson more insis­
tently urged than in debates about international trade. 
Consider now the relation of these background assumptions to 
the traditional debate about free trade and protection. Restraints 
on free trade, so the argument goes, may be justiﬁed in theory— 
for example, by considerations such as those that underlie the ﬁrst 
idea or by any of the traditional justiﬁcations of protection devel­
oped in the course of the long history of debates about free trade. 
However, all such restraints amount to exercises of political selec­
tion trumping a resource allocation generated by the market—the 
market as it is presently organized. Selective tariffs are, in one fun­
damental sense, like selective interest rates or selective exchange 
rates, or selective subsidies. They ordinarily serve a factional inter­
est: whatever interest, or combination of interests, succeeds in 
winning power or inﬂuencing government. They will give voice to 
dogma: whatever belief about national development enjoys the 
prestige of passing fashion. The factional interests and the presti­
gious dogmas are all too likely to converge—the former speaking 
in the language of the latter—to the detriment of the collective 
stake in unrestrained competition and surprising discovery. 
The extent to which selective policy, including selective protec­
tion, represents an invitation to the twin evils of favoritism and 
dogmatism is not, however, invariant. It is a variable. It varies ac­
cording to the institutional arrangements that organize govern­
ment and policy making. To gain an initial impression of the 
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alternative ways in which democratic politics, market economies, 
and free civil societies might be organized. All we need is an open-
minded appreciation of variations that already exist. 
For example, the northeast Asian economies of the latter part of 
the twentieth century were famously adept at the centralized for­
mulation of trade and industrial policy, for the most part top down, 
by a national bureaucracy. To a large extent, this approach to trade 
and industrial policy remained in the grip of dogma, immune to 
experimental challenge and revision and therefore susceptible to 
costly mistakes. However, even within this narrow historical sample 
the inﬁrmity was not uniform: it beset Korea, for instance, more 
than Taiwan because policy making in the latter engaged a wider 
circle of small and medium-sized ﬁrms than it did in the former. 
When we turn from the danger of riding hobbyhorses to its 
twin, the peril of playing favorites, we ﬁnd that a shared character­
istic of the northeast Asian “tiger economies” of the second half of 
the twentieth century was their half-conscious attachment to a 
particular way of weakening the inﬂuence of powerful factional in­
terests over public policy. The distinctive character of the approach 
they embraced stands out very clearly by comparison to the direc­
tion taken in most of the Latin American countries of the same his­
torical period. In those societies, the traditional forms of liberal 
democracy, imported from richer and less unequal societies, were 
unable effectively to channel the political energy of the people and 
consequently unable as well to prevent the periodic suppression of 
republican institutions. No independent bureaucracy with any 
substantial autonomy from the plutocracy, or from the other pow­
erful interests in societies, could form and gain strength in such an 
environment. Government was for the most part too “soft”, too pli­
ant to these interests, to subordinate them to a strategic vision. 
By contrast, the northeast Asian economies saw the implementa­
tion of trade and industrial policy on the basis of limited or guided 
democracy and more generally of a form of education, culture, and 
consciousness discouraging nonconformity. The state was relatively 
“hard.” Its hardness enabled it to limit its vulnerability to the evil of 
dogmatism, but at a mounting cost. Authoritarianism in politics 
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invent alternatives and to try them out, in the large and in the small, 
in trade as well as in every other domain of public policy and social 
life. These attributes, the conditions of temporary success, would in 
time become causes of failure. 
There was then, however, no easy way out: the struggle to de­
mocratize the state and to render culture more experimental 
would create strife and confusion before they could ensure, on a 
changed basis, new clarity and capability. Whether state, society, 
and culture could be more thoroughly opened to democratic ex­
perimentalism depended on the invention of political institutions 
and social practices that were not established even in the most 
successful and vibrant democracies of the day. What was missing 
was a state made less pliant to privilege by the radicalization 
rather than by the limitation of democracy. What was missing as 
well was a form of education connecting capability with resis­
tance and anchoring insight into the actual in the imagination of 
the possible. The conditions were lacking for administrative 
arrangements and practices of policy that could contain the twin 
evils of dogmatism and favoritism. 
A high-energy democracy favors a sustained and inclusive 
heightening of organized political mobilization. It provides for 
rapid resolution of impasse among the political branches of gov­
ernment. It encourages experimentation, in particular sectors and 
localities, with countermodels to the main line of law and policy. 
Such a state need not achieve resistance to capture by powerful in­
terests at the expense of rigidity in creating and confronting social 
and economic alternatives. Recalcitrance to favor in turn facili­
tates resistance to dogma. It then becomes easier to develop a 
practice of policy that is pluralistic rather than unitary, ready to 
propagate successful local practice rather than to impose a foreor­
dained blueprint, open to challenge and participation from below 
and outside, and determined to split the difference between delib­
eration and spontaneity. 
This thought experiment suggests the ﬂaw in the idea that what 
is best in theory—if it involves, as restraints on trade do, selection 
and direction—is unlikely to prove the best in practice, given the 
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and public blindness. The ﬂaw is that this view disregards or 
downplays existing as well as possible variation in ways of organ­
izing politics and policy. Whether a form of selective policy that 
may appear attractive in principle will also prove superior in ex­
perience may depend on where it ﬁts in a spectrum of alternative 
methods and arrangements—or on whether its architects succeed 
in broadening this spectrum. 
The theoretical and practical signiﬁcance of this point increases 
vastly when we connect it with a more general idea. The idea is that 
the forms of representative democracy, of the market economy, 
and of free civil society now established in the rich North Atlantic 
countries represent a subset of a larger and open-ended set of in­
stitutional possibilities. There is no direct or self-evident passage, 
by  way of either analytic inference or evolutionary constraint, 
from the abstract conception of a representative democracy, a mar­
ket economy, or a free civil society to any of the particular sets of 
contingent institutional arrangements with which such institu­
tional abstractions have been historically associated. The chance 
that a form of selectivity that appears to be best in theory may also 
be, or may become, best in practice now appears a corollary of this 
general proposition. 
However, the institutional arrangement of the market is not at 
the same level, or does not have as much importance, as the institu­
tional organization of democracy. The market cannot create its 
own presuppositions, including the institutions and practices by 
which it is organized and the endowments of the individuals who 
move within it. It is politics—in the large sense of the contest over 
the terms of social life as well as over the mastery and uses of gov­
ernmental power—that determines these presuppositions. Politics, 
by contrast to the market, does create its own presuppositions—it 
crowns itself—although it does so within the constraints imposed 
by the stock of available resources and ideas. 
From this line of reasoning, it follows that the extent to which 
what is best in theory can also be best in practice is set outside the 
economy. The contingent limitations of politics and policy making 
shape it. The deepening of democracy, through the renovation of 
its institutional forms, increases the likelihood that what is best in 
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in the circumstance of relative backwardness—may also be best in 
practice. 
A discussion of trade policy—or indeed any other branch of 
practical economic argument—that leaves politics out will not sim­
ply be incomplete. It will inevitably lead to misleading conclusions. 
However, we cannot ﬁll this gap by importing ideas from political 
science; the established political science is, for the most part, like 
the established economic analysis. It is deﬁcient in the quality that 
we now most require: the denial to the established ways of organiz­
ing markets and democracies of their mendacious semblance of 
naturalness and necessity. Unable to rely on a ready-made alterna­
tive intellectual practice, we must develop the practice we need as 
we go along, from the inside out and from the bottom up. 
Order and Revision: When Free Trade Strengthens 
the Capacity for Self-Transformation 
A third idea has to do with the relation between the way a trading 
regime develops and the ability of the participants in such a 
regime to change themselves. A remarkable feature of the estab­
lished way of thinking about free trade is that it treats these two 
processes as unconnected, except to the extent that more trade is 
supposed to bring about faster improvement under the prodding 
of specialization, competition, and emulation. 
Suppose, however, the following contrary hypothesis. For any 
given level of trade or free trade, the trading regime may be so de­
signed that it either strengthens or weakens the capacity of the trad­
ing partners to reorganize themselves, experimentally, as they go 
along. The constraint on self-transformation addressed by this hy­
pothesis is not the constraint resulting from a given degree of open­
ness to trade, as measured either by the level of protection or by the 
relation between a country’s aggregate trade ﬂows and its gross 
domestic product. It is the constraint resulting from the particular 
way a trading regime is organized, at whatever level of openness it 
may provide. What matters, from the standpoint of this hypothesis, 
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Consider a simple example, of great theoretical and practical 
importance. It rests on an assumption about the open-ended di­
versity of possible forms of a market economy. This assumption 
forms the core of one of the recurrent ideas in my argument. As a 
system of free trade develops, its rules may impose on the partici­
pants in the trading regime a particular version of the market 
economy: a deﬁnite approach to the content, sources, and scope 
of contract and property rights, a way to uphold the barrier sepa­
rating government from private enterprise, and even a certain 
treatment of the rights of investors and shareholders. 
The result will be to associate the advancement of free trade 
with a narrowing funnel of institutional convergence among 
the trading partners. It will be to restrict their capacity for self-
revision except insofar as self-revision results from greater free­
dom to trade. The evolution of a trading regime may also follow 
an opposite tack, putting institutional minimalism in the place of 
such an institutional maximalism; it may prefer arrangements 
that leave the greatest possible latitude open to the trading part­
ners in deciding what type of economy—indeed, what type of 
market economy—to establish. 
This room for institutional divergence among the trading part­
ners, built into the rules of the trading regime, will in turn in­
crease the likelihood that the trading system will itself require 
more complication and permit more revision: ongoing experi­
mentation with the rules of the worldwide trading system as well 
as with the institutional arrangements of each trading partner. In­
stead of organizing trade among trading partners that are more 
and more alike, it will have to organize trade among partners that 
are persistently or increasingly different, in their practices and in­
stitutions as well as in their endowments and specializations. 
The core of this third idea is that we should never think about 
free trade simply in the one dimension of relative freedom to 
trade and of restraint on trade. We should think of it as well in a 
second dimension: at whatever level of freedom or restraint, how 
much freedom for self-revision does the trade regime grant to the 
trading parties and how much restraint on self-revision does it 
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In principle, the best type of free trade will be the type associat­
ing more free trade with more opportunity for self-revision. The 
worst type will be the type connecting more free trade with less 
opportunity for self-revision. The ﬁrst type will promote the 
market-based logic of decentralized experimentalism in one di­
mension while undercutting it in another. The second type will 
express in both dimensions the same experimentalist impulse. 
Consider this notion in its most generalized form, as an idea 
about practices, institutions, and assumptions in general rather 
than merely about trade or even about the economy as a whole. 
We  can distinguish two classes of activities: the ordinary moves 
we make within a framework of assumptions and arrangements 
that we take as given, and the extraordinary moves by which we 
challenge and revise pieces of such a framework. 
The distance between these two classes of activities may be 
greater or smaller. The framework may be organized to resist crit­
icism and change and to win for itself a semblance of naturalness, 
necessity, and authority. It may begin to seem part of the furni­
ture of the world; the structures it establishes will then seem as if 
they were natural facts rather than the frozen ﬁghting and the 
petriﬁed inventions that all social structures really are. A social or 
natural calamity may be needed to change such an order and to 
rob it of its delusive semblance of naturalness. Catastrophe will 
become the requirement of transformation. 
By contrast, the framework may be organized to facilitate its re­
vision and diminish the dependence of change on crisis. The dis­
tance between our context-preserving and our context-changing 
moves will then shrink. Changing the context, step by step and 
piece by piece, will become part of our normal activity. 
Our stake in moving from the ﬁrst situation to the second, from 
the naturalization to the denaturalization of the institutional and 
cultural settings in which we think and move, is deep and per­
vasive. It touches on our most fundamental interests. It is causally 
related to our economic interest in being able more freely to re­
combine people and resources: our practical experimentalism re­
mains limited so long as we are prevented from experimenting 
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experiment. It has a causal connection to our social interest in the 
disentanglement of cooperation from social division and hierar­
chy: no system of social division and hierarchy can remain in place 
that fails to prevent the arrangements and presuppositions on 
which it depends from perpetual questioning, tinkering, and at­
tack. It directly expresses our spiritual interest in being able to par­
ticipate, wholeheartedly and even single-mindedly, in a social 
world without surrendering to it our powers of criticism, resis­
tance, and transcendence. 
When we understand and practice the freedom to recombine 
factors of production only within an institutional organization of 
production and exchange that we accept as the natural or neces­
sary form of a market economy, we impose on the exercise of this 
freedom an arbitrary and burdensome restraint. It remains caged 
within a structure that fails to bear the imprint of its spirit or 
to do justice to its potential. Once deepened or radicalized, free­
dom to recombine factors of production for the sake of greater 
efﬁciency or total factor productivity would come to include a 
freedom to rearrange and renovate the arrangements forming the 
institutional setting of production and exchange. Different 
regimes of private and social property might, for example, coexist 
experimentally within the same market economy. 
Translated into the conception of a regime of international 
trade, this approach to thinking about an economy results in the 
proposition with which I began the statement of this third idea. 
The best such regime will be the one that, at any level of the free­
dom to trade for which it provides, also imposes the least restraint 
on the ability of its participants—trading economies as well as in­
dividual ﬁrms—to reorganize themselves. 
Alternative Free Trade, Alternative Globalizations: The 
Market Liberated from the Doctrine of the Market 
A fourth idea concerns the relation between the concept of a mar­
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organized. More generally, it addresses the relation between ab­
stract institutional concepts, such as the market or democracy, 
and their tangible institutional expressions. This fourth idea is a 
presupposition of both the second and the third ideas; I have an­
ticipated it in the course of presenting them. Until we appreciate 
its force, we cannot hope to rid ourselves of the superstitions that 
confuse debates about free trade. 
The gist of this idea is that the market has no single natural and 
necessary form. No ideal limit exists to which market economies 
around the world must, should, or could converge. If convergence 
occurs in one historical period, it will be reversed in another; it 
will lack a basis in deep-seated and universal forces. 
The principle bears generalization: it applies, in a similar way, to 
all other abstract institutional ideas: for example, the idea of a rep­
resentative democracy. The meaning we habitually ascribe to any 
such institutional conception or ideal will be the product of a dou­
ble reference, to a set of interests, values, or aspirations—an un­
derstanding of our collective stake in the institutional project that 
the notion evokes—and to a set of concrete, contingent arrange­
ments with which we ordinarily associate the conception or ideal. 
So long as practical and ideological conﬂict fails to escalate, the 
two references will appear to form a seamless whole: the stake we 
have in the idea will seem naturally expressed in the particular 
arrangements with which we associate it. This impression of seam­
lessness, however, is only an illusion, made possible by relative 
stagnation. Under the pressure of escalating practical or ideologi­
cal strife and invention, we come to recognize that the familiar in­
stitutional vehicle could be stretched in different directions and 
changed in different ways. The changes in the institutional vehicle 
in turn make us aware of tensions and ambiguities in the interests 
and in the ideals that seemed naturally and necessarily realized in 
the established arrangements. What appeared to be a unity begins 
to unravel, in the mind and in reality. 
Not only is there no single natural and necessary way in which a 
market economy can be organized, there is also no closed list of 
possible types of a market economy, or of a representative democ­
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project. All such projects remain subject to the potential dishar­
monies and transformations of the double reference. What we face 
is a penumbra of possibility around present and past experience: 
getting to somewhere else from where we are now, by taking steps 
within our reach. 
The idea that the market economy has no single determinate 
expression in law or institutions is an old insight. In fact, it may 
have been the single most insistent revelation to have resulted 
from the evolution of legal thought in the West from the middle 
of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. Early 
nineteenth-century jurists had set out to demonstrate that a 
single coherent and gapless system of rules of private law, and 
of supporting public-law institutions, could be derived by quasi-
deductive inference from the abstract idea of a market or of a free 
society. 
However, in trying to conﬁrm this proposition, the jurists es­
tablished its opposite: their self-subversion was the badge of their 
seriousness. Contrary to their aims, they ended up showing that 
at each step toward greater institutional detail, the institutional 
abstractions whose supposedly predetermined content they had 
set out to reveal could take different turns. Each of these turns 
would have different consequences not only for the distribution 
of wealth, income, and opportunity but also for the organization 
of economic growth and popular government. Which turns were 
to be preferred was not something that could be established by 
analyzing the idea of a market or the concepts of property and 
contract; the choice depended on conjectures, informed by in­
conclusive experience. It had consequences for the struggle for 
wealth, income, and power. It required taking a position in a con­
test of visions of the possible and desirable forms of social order 
and experience. 
Insight into the institutional indeterminacy of the market econ­
omy formed a vital part of the conceptual background to a mo­
mentous turn in the legal thought and practice of the twentieth 
century. You could not have a free society by simply clinging to a 
foreordained system of private rights. It was necessary to ask who 
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The rights depended for their reality on conditions that might 
fail—indeed, regularly did fail—to be satisﬁed: the requirements 
for their practical enjoyment might be missing, or denied to large 
classes of people. Thus all law, including the law organizing the 
market economy, would have to be dialectically arranged into two 
parts. One part would consist of rules and arrangements organizing 
individual initiative. The other part would ensure that inequalities 
of power, of wealth, information, access and opportunity never 
became so extreme and entrenched as to turn the ﬁrst half of the 
law, the half shaping the exercise of individual self-determination, 
into a sham. 
This dialectical reorganization of the law came up against a 
limit, of efﬁcacy as well as of insight, that it has yet to overcome. A 
society can take different directions in identifying and overcom­
ing obstacles to the reality of the rights of economic freedom. By 
taking one direction rather than another it becomes one kind of 
society, one kind of economy, one kind of market order rather 
than another. 
The simple idea that the market economy can assume different 
legal and institutional forms, that it has no single natural and nec­
essary expression, has never fully penetrated, to this day, the prac­
tice of economic analysis and the course of policy debate. It is to 
be distinguished from the recognition of speciﬁc market failures 
resulting from inequalities of power and asymmetries of informa­
tion. Moreover, it leads directly to the conclusion that in dealing 
with a market economy we are not restricted to regulating it or to 
compensating for its inequalities, after the fact, through redistrib­
utive tax-and-transfer. We can reshape it, changing some of the 
rules and arrangements that make it what it is. 
Thus developed, awareness of the diversity of institutional 
forms of a market economy has two applications to the debate 
about free trade in a global economy. 
The ﬁrst application has as its subject the idea of the interna­
tional trading system as a regime of free trade among economies 
that are themselves free: that is to say, market economies. It is an 
application to which we come by combining two ideas. One is the 
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Another is that free trade regimes may differ in the freedom of 
self-revision that they allow to their participants. At any given level 
of openness to trade, the more freedom of self-revision, the better. 
No experiment with a particular line of production within a 
market economy is likely to be as important as experiments about 
the organization of a market economy. Instead of meaning ever 
fewer restraints on commerce among institutionally convergent 
market economies, free trade can come to mean less restrained 
commerce among institutionally divergent market economies. I 
have described the grounds for preferring this latter project to the 
former. 
The second application of the idea of the institutional indeter­
minacy and diversity of the market has as its subject the world 
trading system itself. If a market economy can be organized in dif­
ferent ways, so can a universal order of free trade among market 
economies. Under such a revised view of increasing economic 
openness in the world, countries do not undertake to obey an 
institutional formula, of either international trade or national eco­
nomic organization, simply because they have committed them­
selves to become and to remain market economies. 
The effort to develop an open world economy has the same 
characteristic with which the jurists of the nineteenth century had 
to contend in their own effort to translate the abstraction of a free 
economic order into legal and institutional detail: you cannot jus­
tify the choice of one route over another by claiming that it is the 
market route. There are too many market routes. You need a view 
of the relation of trade to growth, and of growth to other interests 
and values. You need such a view as much to work out the con­
ception of universal free trade as to deﬁne the organization of a 
market economy in any one country. 
We are not limited to having simply more market or more reg­
ulation and command, according to the simple hydraulic model 
that has been the obsessive theme of ideological debate for the 
past two hundred years. We can reimagine and remake the market 
economy. Similarly, globalization, which has free trade as its prac­
tical and conceptual core, is not there on a take-it-or-leave-it 
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it go faster or slower. We can have it on different terms, but only 
by changing how we understand and organize free trade. 
The Division of Labor Reimagined and Remade: From 
the Pin Factory to the Factory of Innovation 
A ﬁfth idea addresses the division of labor. It considers the division 
of labor at any scale and scope, all the way from the division 
of labor at a work station, in a factory, a shop, or an ofﬁce, to the 
division of labor in a global economy. Worldwide free trade among 
countries, on the basis of specialized production and natural or 
achieved comparative advantage, is, after all, a species of the divi­
sion of labor. Our assumptions about the division of labor in­
evitably inform our ideas about international trade. We need to 
correct some of those assumptions. 
The pin-factory model of the division of labor that we trace back 
to  Adam Smith and that found its most fulsome expression in 
Henry Ford’s assembly line no longer does justice to the realities and 
the possibilities of what is sometimes called the “technical” division 
of labor: the way work gets organized at the work station. We can 
best understand that model as the limiting case of a much broader 
range of ways of organizing work. Having wrested ourselves free of 
the stranglehold of that limiting picture, we can come to see the di­
vision of labor in a different light, and revise our view of what makes 
some of its forms more promising and productive than others. This 
insight in turn changes how we think about international trade. 
In Adam Smith’s fabled pin factory, the division of labor took 
the form of a rigid specialization of tasks, under stark hierarchical 
supervision. The counterpart to rigid contrasts among specialized 
tasks in the making of pins was the equally stark opposition 
between those who commanded or monitored, from on top, and 
those who obeyed, at the bottom,e ndlessly repeating their ap­
pointed rounds. 
Such a way of organizing work seemed justiﬁed by irresistible ad­
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than being indifferently skilled at many. That most valuable of re­
sources, time, could be saved by avoiding the need to move from 
one task to another. The point was to use repetition to save time. 
The pin-factory model of the division of labor gained much of 
its appeal from its implicit connection with a particular view of 
the constraints on economic growth. According to this view, 
widely shared up to the twentieth century, the most important of 
such constraints was the size of the surplus society extracted and 
reserved over current consumption. The surplus might well have 
to be extracted coercively; according to Karl Marx, the continuing 
need for coercive surplus extraction was one of the major justiﬁ­
cations not only of the capitalist mode of production but of all 
class society. The pin-factory approach to the organization of 
work has been seen as a tool of discipline and repression. It was 
supposedly needed to impose the sacriﬁce of present individual 
pleasures for the sake of future collective wealth. 
This view, however, was already anachronistic and misleading 
when it was ﬁrst proposed. We know now that the pioneering 
countries of the “industrial revolution” in late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century Europe were not distinguished from 
China at that same period by a higher level of saving; Europe’s 
saving level was lower than China’s. They differed by dint of a 
practice of intellectual, technological, and organizational innova­
tion, made possible by features of society and culture in which the 
great agrarian-bureaucratic empires ruling much of the rest of 
the world were deﬁcient. 
Consider an alternative view of the division of labor and of the 
path of its evolution. This view begins not in a distinctive under­
standing of production but in an idea about the mind. We know 
how to repeat some of our activities, and we do not know how to 
repeat others. As soon as we learn how to repeat an activity we can 
express our insight in a formula and embody the formula in a ma­
chine. Our machines can do for us whatever we know how to re­
peat. They can free our time, energy, and attention for what we 
have not yet learned how to repeat. In this way we make time 
count by devoting it, as much as we can, to what does not yet lend 
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The not yet repeatable part of our activities—the part for 
which we lack formulas and therefore also machines—is the 
realm of innovation, the front line of production. In this realm, 
production and discovery become much the same thing. We there 
seek to organize our productive activities so that they become a 
visible, collective image and instrument of our experimental 
thinking: our relations to one another in this forward edge of pro­
duction resemble the problem-solving work of an individual 
human intellect. 
To  understand a state of affairs, we must imagine it changed: 
we must form a view of what it could turn into under certain 
conditions and by certain interventions. The possible is the ad­
jacent: it is what can come next, as the result of some accessible 
transformation of a reality that is at hand. We can turn some of 
these possibilities into things, we can embody experimental con­
jecture in material production. Production then becomes more 
than a consequence of experimental thinking, it becomes its 
embodiment. 
The pin-factory model of production describes the organiza­
tion of work as if labor were a machine, meant to do the things for 
which we use machines, whatever we have learned how to repeat 
formulaically. We may have reason to organize work in such a 
way, but only if labor is abundant and cheap enough, capital is 
dear enough, machines are scarce and primitive enough, and our 
time is of little enough value—of so little value that we think we 
can afford to repeat ourselves. That may indeed be the past of the 
division of labor. It cannot be its future. 
As we begin to free ourselves from the multiple, combined con­
straints that make the pin-factory model of the organization of 
labor feasible, we move into another way of understanding and or­
ganizing the division of labor: the view of production as collective 
learning and permanent innovation. Its generative principle is a 
revolution in our beliefs about the relation of time to the division 
of labor. The point is no longer to save time by repeating ourselves; 
it is to save time by avoiding repetition. Standardization—of prod­
ucts and services as well as of productive processes and organiza­
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Under this new dispensation, the tendency of the division of 
labor will be to weaken rather than to strengthen the hierarchical 
discontinuities between jobs of supervision and of implementa­
tion. The plan of production will be revised in the course of its 
execution, with the help of all involved, in the light of obstacles 
and opportunities encountered along the way. Rigid specializa­
tions among the roles of the executants will become more ﬂuid, as 
will sharp contrasts between conception and execution. If the 
plan of production is revised experimentally on an ongoing basis, 
so must be the lines dividing different responsibilities in that 
process. As a result, mastery of a set of core generic and concep­
tual capabilities, empowering the maximum of resilience, will 
become more useful than any collection of job-speciﬁc, machine-
imitating skills. 
Such an approach to the division of labor is likely to be realized 
in broad areas of economic life only if two sets of requirements 
are met. The ﬁrst set of requirements is that labor not be so cheap 
and time so devalued that the pin-factory model of the division of 
labor remains plausible and attractive. The second set of require­
ments is that the state and the society support a climate in which 
innovation-friendly practices of cooperation can ﬂourish. 
The form of the division of labor here described as the succes­
sor and the antidote to the pin factory is a species of cooperation 
friendly to innovation; its success depends on a weakening of the 
tension that normally exists between the disposition to cooperate 
and the impulse to innovate. When I later return to the theme of 
innovation-friendly cooperation, I discuss the requirements for 
its advancement as a mainstay of economic growth and as a point 
at which our economic interests intersect our higher ends. 
This contrast between the two understandings of the division 
of labor provides an incomplete but powerful standard by which 
to judge a regime of global trade. Does that particular regime help 
countries—all countries—to begin, or to continue, the move be­
yond the pin factory? Or does it, on the contrary, help turn some 
countries into giant pin factories (or inﬂexible mass-production 
machines) while allowing others to specialize in production be­
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A regime of international trade may discourage the move be­
yond the pin-factory model by, for example, the way in which, 
under the label of “intellectual property,” it turns innovations, in­
cluding innovative processes and methods, into pieces of property. 
It may do so by inhibiting the worldwide movement of people 
across national frontiers to such an extent that it helps perpetuate 
vast disparities in the relative scarcities and price of labor and of 
capital, pushing some countries to specialize in pin factories while 
requiring others to do away with all their pin factories. And it may 
do so simply, and most deeply, by incorporating a particular ver­
sion of the market economy into the rules establishing universal 
free trade. Such an incorporation chills the institutional experi­
ments and the untried combinations of private enterprise and 
governmental initiative that the move from one type of the divi­
sion of labor to another may require. 
This standard of judgment would lose much of its pertinence if 
it lacked a foothold in a change that the world economy has already 
undergone. According to a familiar account of the global division of 
labor, more advanced capital-intensive, and technologically reﬁned 
production takes place in the core, rich economies. More rudimen­
tary, labor-intensive, and technologically primitive production goes 
on in the peripheral, developing economies. The hierarchical distri­
bution of production on a worldwide basis is, in this view, the heart 
and soul of the international division of labor. 
Now, however, we ﬁnd more advanced production established 
not only in the rich North Atlantic economies but also in the top 
tier of the developing economies, as much in China, India, and 
Russia as in the United States, Germany, and Japan. What has 
ﬂourished in particular sectors is not simply or primarily high-
technology, knowledge-intensive industrial production; it is the 
advanced way of understanding and organizing the division of 
labor that I earlier contrasted to Smith’s pin factory and Ford’s 
assembly line. 
These advanced sectors, established all over the world, are in 
communion with one another. They exchange ideas, practices, 
and people as well as technologies and services. Their network 
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the world economy. They are responsible for the creation of a 
growing part of national wealth in many countries, rich or poor. 
Nevertheless, these productive vanguards remain only weakly 
linked to the other parts of their national economies. The vast 
majority of the labor force in the richer as well as in the poorer 
countries has no chance of participating in them. The small van­
guards and the large rearguards, organized on the basis of con­
trasting understandings of the division of labor, have increasingly 
become different and unconnected worlds. The abyss between 
them has become the source of inequalities that are many-sided 
in expression and powerful in effect. Such inequalities cannot be 
adequately redressed by the two devices available in the world for 
the moderation of economic inequalities: compensatory redistri­
bution by government through tax-and-transfer and the politi­
cally supported diffusion of small-scale property. 
It is, therefore, not enough to ask of a world trading regime 
whether it helps each national economy to move beyond the pin 
factory and to enlarge the range of social and economic life open 
to innovation-friendly cooperation. It is also important to ask 
whether a system of trade helps engage the masses of ordinary 
men and women in the movement from the pin factory to the fac­
tory of innovation so that they can stop wasting their time by re­
peating themselves as if they were machines. 
A Central Conception: Mind against Context 
Take these ideas for what they are: pieces of an understanding of 
economic activity in general as well as of international trade in 
particular. A view of the mind, and thus of our humanity, informs 
this understanding.* 
This conception of the mind and of humanity is not at the same 
level as the other ideas discussed in this chapter. It penetrates and 
*For a development of this conception and of the broader philosoph­
ical view to which it belongs, see my book, The Self Awakened: Pragma­
tism Unbound,H arvard University Press, 2007. ideas  ❍  101 
envelops all of them. It is not so much their foundation as it is their 
common element. It becomes a little better stated and better 
grounded each time that one of them advances in reﬁnement and 
justiﬁcation. In the context of this conception, each of the ideas 
explored earlier in this chapter gains deeper meaning. 
The mind has two aspects. In one aspect, it is modular and for­
mulaic. The mind is modular in the sense that it consists in separate 
parts, deﬁned by their distinct functions and embodied in different 
regions of the brain. The expression of the parts of the mind in 
parts of the brain is subject to the qualiﬁcation of plasticity: within 
certain wide limits, one part of the brain can take on the habitual 
functions of another. The mind is formulaic (in this its modular 
aspect) in the sense that these parts act repetitiously according to 
formulas. It is in this aspect, and only in this aspect, that a mind em­
bodied in a brain is like a set of formulas embodied in a machine. 
In this modular and formulaic aspect, the mind is a zombie. It 
acts under the compulsion of orders. It exhausts its life in repeated 
moves. If, however, the mind were only a zombie, the characteristic 
experiences of consciousnessness would remain both inexplicable 
and impossible. Consciousness is totalizing: it envisages a ﬁeld of 
vision, action, and problem solving as a whole and interprets 
particular incidents in relation to that whole. Consciousness is 
surprising: it deﬁes containment by any closed system of presup­
positions, methods, and canons that can be antecedently stated. 
Consciousness is transformative: it grasps any particular state of 
affairs by exploring its transformative variations—what it can turn 
into under the pressure of certain interventions. 
A conscious mind therefore has a second aspect in which it ex­
hibits these totalizing, surprising, and transformative qualities. 
Here the mind has ceased to be zombie-like. It has become spirit, 
if by spirit we mean the experience of not being contained or con­
tainable by any particular context of life or of thought or by any 
enumerable list of such contexts. In this second aspect, the mind 
enjoys the characteristic powers of recursive inﬁnity, nonformu­
laic initiative, and negative capability. By its power of recursive 
inﬁnity, it uses ﬁnite elements (of language, of thought) to make 
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makes moves that it does not yet know how to repeat or to bring 
under a formula. By its power of negative capability, it gains in 
strength, and adds to insight, by doing more than the habitual, 
organized settings of its action and thought will countenance. It 
establishes new contexts for its thought and action. 
The consummate expression of this power is the establishment 
of settings for thought and action that invite this limit-breaking 
activity and turn it into a device for the ongoing revision of the 
setting. The result is to attenuate the contrast between being in­
side a context and being outside it, and to make change less 
dependent on crisis and the past less able to rule the future. 
The relative importance of the two aspects of the mind is not a 
natural fact that can be measured apart from the historical mo­
ment and the social situation. Suppose that society and culture 
are organized to present themselves as natural facts, entrenched 
against challenge and change. The distance between the ordinary 
moves we make within the settled contexts and the extraordinary, 
crisis-dependent moves by which we change them will widen. The 
second side of the mind—with its totalizing, surprising, and 
transformative qualities—will have fewer occasions to express it­
self. It will remain in the shadows or on the margin. It will depend 
on exceptional talent and extraordinary occasion. 
Now suppose that society and culture are arranged to denatu­
ralize themselves by making themselves more open to criticism 
and revision. The gap between the routine moves we make within 
the established settings and the exceptional moves by which we 
remake them will narrow. The second side of the mind will have 
more opportunity to manifest itself. It will never occupy the 
whole of mental life. Nevertheless, it will hold an important posi­
tion. The relation between the two aspects of the mind will be­
come a matter of paramount importance. It will even emerge as a 
theme in high culture. 
Thus, the relation between the two aspects of the mind is never 
conclusively determined by nature; it is ultimately determined by 
politics: by the arrangements of society and culture and, most es­
pecially, by the extent to which these arrangements either inhibit 
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The two-sidedness of the mind expresses and helps constitute a 
fundamental and pervasive attribute of our humanity, our tran­
scendence over context. To say that we are embodied and situated 
spirit is to recognize that we are never exhausted by the limited 
orderings of society and culture, of organization and belief, that 
we establish and inhabit. They, relative to us, are ﬁnite. We, rela­
tive to them, are inﬁnite. There is always more in us than there can 
ever be in them. 
We  can do more than rebel against the context and reach for 
the insight, the invention, or the experience that it fails to accom­
modate. We can create contexts that allow more fully for their 
own revision than the contexts now established: for example, 
ways of organizing a market economy or a trading regime that en­
able us to experiment, sequentially or simultaneously, with alter­
native regimes of contract and property. As a result, we can loosen 
the dependence of change on ruin and split the difference be­
tween being inside the context and being outside it. We can en­
gage in a particular world without surrendering to it our powers 
of resistance and reconstruction. 
This view of the two aspects of the mind, and the larger con­
ception of humanity with which it is connected, suggest a general 
approach to the understanding of economic activities and of the 
division of labor. A few connected and overlapping themes, cen­
tral to the argument of this book, deﬁne this approach. 
A ﬁrst theme is the notion of a contrast between the activities 
or the forms of labor that we have learned how to repeat and 
those that we have not. We can describe the repeatable activities 
in formulas and then embody the formulas in machines. We can 
use the repetitions, the formulas, and the machines to devote in­
creasing parts of our time and energy to the activities we do not 
yet know how to repeat. The dialectic between the repeatable 
and the not yet repeatable is central to our material progress, in­
cluding the rise of productivity: labor productivity in the ﬁrst 
instance, and total factor productivity through the chain of 
causal connections to which the rise of labor productivity be­
longs. And it is anchored in the relation between the two sides of 
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A second theme is the contrast between two directions in 
which to arrange the division of labor at work. One direction re­
duces most of work to the zombie-like activities of the ﬁrst aspect 
of the mind, and reserves the totalizing, surprising, and trans­
forming attributes of the second side of the mind to the supervi­
sor or power-holder on top. In this direction lies Adam Smith’s 
pin factory and Henry Ford’s assembly line: stark contrasts be­
tween supervisory and implementing jobs as well as among the 
tasks of implementation. 
The other direction, the factory of innovation, gives much 
greater place to the second aspect of the mind in the organization 
of the mind. It treats the implementation of tasks as an opportu­
nity for their revision, and softens the contrasts between concep­
tion and execution as well as among jobs of implementation. It 
uses our ability to repeat, expressed in formulas that are embod­
ied in machines, to shift more of our time and effort toward the 
frontier of those activities that we do not yet know how to repeat. 
In this way, it turns the workplace more nearly into a practical ex­
pression of the imagination. (Imagination is only another name 
for the second aspect of the mind.) In so doing, it also provides in 
microcosm a model for the remaking of all society. 
A third theme is the decisive importance to economic growth 
of a family of cooperative practices that I have called innovation-
friendly cooperation. All forms of material progress, including 
economic growth, depend on cooperation. A market economy 
itself, I later argue, is a form of simpliﬁed cooperation among 
strangers that depends on a modicum of trust; such an economy 
is impossible when there is no trust among the strangers and un­
necessary when there is high trust. 
However,  innovation is almost as important as cooperation. 
Innovation depends on cooperation: it is impossible to innovate, 
organizationally or technologically, without securing coopera­
tion. The imperatives of innovation and cooperation nevertheless 
regularly conﬂict because every innovation threatens to disturb 
the vested rights and settled expectations in which any coopera­
tive regime is entangled. A new technology, for example, is likely 
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emergent segment of the labor force while threatening the jobs of 
another segment. 
A beneﬁt of great value results when we succeed in designing 
regimes of cooperation that moderate the tension between coop­
eration and innovation. The form of the technical division of 
labor that I called the factory of innovation is itself an expression 
of such an advance. So, more generally, is any form of coopera­
tion, such as commando warfare, in which the deﬁnition of what 
to do is revised in the course of doing it: all responsible for exe­
cuting have some share in redeﬁning, and the participants refuse 
to allow preexisting hierarchies of advantage or allocations of role 
to restrict how they can work together. 
The family of innovation-friendly practices of cooperation 
depends on conditions that also help shape its character and mean­
ing. Basic educational and economic endowments, with their en­
abling effect on the individual, must be as universal as possible; they 
must not depend on holding any particular job. The society, al­
though unbound by any rigid commitment to equality of circum­
stance, must be relentless in pursuit of equality of opportunity. It 
must prefer practices and arrangements that destabilize entrenched 
divisions of role and hierarchies of advantage, whether or not the 
advantages at issue result from the hereditary transmission of prop­
erty or of access to high-quality education. The culture must be 
penetrated by an experimentalist impulse. This impulse must ﬁnd 
sustenance in a practice of teaching and learning that is problem­
atic and analytic rather than informational in its method, selective 
rather than encyclopedic in its scope, cooperative rather than indi­
vidualist or authoritarian in its social form, and dialectical rather 
than canonical in its orientation. 
Such conditions depend for their fulﬁllment on the public and 
private cultivation of the powers associated with the second side of 
the mind. They in turn help establish a setting in which this aspect 
of our mental life can become central to our individual and social 
experience rather than remaining in the shadows. 
A fourth theme is the need for a way of thinking about markets 
and market economies that judges any particular form of market 
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piecemeal reconstruction, as well as for the free combination of 
factors of production and the free exchange of what is produced. 
When we witness increasing freedom to exchange and trade and 
increasing freedom to combine factors of production, we may be 
tempted to say that the principal idea of a market economy has 
been realized. These twin freedoms, however, may be realized in 
an institutional context—a way of organizing market-oriented 
exchange and production—that remains largely immunized 
against challenge and change. 
Once we become aware of this hidden constraint, we ﬁnd our­
selves forced to direct our thoughts to a second, unfamiliar level of 
concern. We need to consider the range of freedom to renovate the 
institutional framework of market activity as well as to transact 
within that framework. Our assessment of whether the market 
principle has been radicalized will now depend on two sets of con­
siderations rather than on one. If advance in freedom at one level— 
freedom to transact and to combine factors of production—is 
bought at the cost of failure to advance at the second level— 
freedom to vary and to revise the transactional setting—we must 
judge ourselves unsuccessful. 
We do not arrive at this way of thinking about markets until we 
defy a prior premise of much conventional economic thinking: 
the notion, rarely acknowledged in theory but habitually honored 
in the practice of analysis and argument, that the market has a 
single natural and necessary institutional expression. Deﬁance of 
this notion may seem sterile. It provides support, however, to the 
way of thinking about markets I have just described. It becomes 
fertile through its marriage with the imagination of alternative 
institutional forms of a market economy. 
The two-level thinking about markets that results is incompat­
ible with much in our received assumptions about free trade. It 
will not be enough for an international trading regime to lower 
barriers to trade if, in so doing, it hinders experiment and diver­
sity in the way each of the trading partners arranges production 
and exchange and organizes its own market economy. 
The more we approach trade in particular and market-oriented 
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rather than just to one, the greater the likelihood that our propos­
als will make the world safer for the second side of the mind. The 
best framework—including the best framework for global trade— 
will be the one that is least a prison, even if this prison has graven 
over its entrance the word freedom. It will therefore also be the 
one that offers the most propitious home for our powers of recur­
sive inﬁnity, nonformulaic initiative, and negative capability. 
A ﬁfth theme is that, in the development of economies, the cre­
ation of difference is as important as the selection, from the 
diverse stuff, of the most efﬁcient solutions. As in biological evo­
lution, the results of natural selection depend on the range of 
variation in the material subject to selection, so in economic his­
tory competitive selection depends for its effect on the range and 
variety of the material to which it applies. 
What differences? To specify all the relevant forms of difference, 
we can begin backward from the output of economic activity, 
through the processes, practices, machines, and organizations 
that produce it, until we reach the institutional setting of produc­
tion and exchange: diversiﬁcation of goods and services; of ways 
to join people, ideas, and machines in production and trade; and, 
ﬁnally, of the basic institutional arrangements for market activity, 
including the regimes of property and contract. 
A way of thinking about economic activity that treats the diver­
siﬁcation of the material subject to competitive selection as equal 
in importance to the competitive selection of the most efﬁcient 
outcomes will differ in orientation and result from one that fo­
cuses solely on the latter and takes the former for granted. 
The translation of the idea into the practical agenda of devel­
opment economics helps reveal its intuitive core. Governmental 
initiative and collective action may be needed to counteract the 
inhibitions of relative backwardness: for example, the difﬁculty of 
using the skills development in one line of production to carry 
forward another. Not only may the net of productive activities be 
too thin, the activities by their very backwardness may refuse 
readily to yield a set of generic, context-transcending capabilities 
that can be extended to other, neighboring lines of production. 
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missing conditions and deliberately to arouse a fever of creative 
entrepreneurial activity. 
It then becomes all the more important to impose a rigorous 
selection, through domestic and foreign competition (subject to 
the qualiﬁcations I later explore), of the products of this activity. 
However,  the arousal is as important as the selection; the two 
must advance together, through a series of successive efforts at 
overcoming particular constraints on both the supply and the de­
mand sides of the economy. It is just such a coexistence between 
arousal and selection that this conception generalizes to the econ­
omy as a whole. This generalization enables us to treat diversity 
and efﬁciency as concerns of equivalent weight in economic 
thinking. 
Like the fourth theme, to which it bears a close relation, the 
ﬁfth one is connected to the image of the two-sided mind through 
a view about our relation to the institutional and conceptual con­
texts of our activity: the same view I invoked when ﬁrst present­
ing that image. The deep source of the importance of difference 
lies in our transcendence over all the particular contexts of our 
activity. There is always more in us, individually and collectively, 
than there can ever be in them. From this fact arises our inability 
ever to ﬁnd an absolute frame of reference in thought or in social 
life, one that can accommodate the full scope of our powers and 
the full range of the experiences that we may have reason to value. 
The next best thing to an absolute frame of reference is a frame 
that facilitates its own remaking and that allows us to engage, on 
the terms it speciﬁes, without surrendering our powers of criti­
cism, resistance, and revision. To engage without surrendering, 
and thus to be in the world without being entirely of it, is a fun­
damental species of freedom and power. The fourth theme, with 
its emphasis on freedom to change the transactional framework 
as well as freedom to transact, is directly related to this view. 
The ﬁfth theme—the theme of the central importance of the 
creation of difference in economic life—is connected with a fur­
ther implication of the same view. Because there is no deﬁnitive 
context for our humanity, including no context that can do justice 
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ger only by becoming different: by developing in different direc­
tions, by creating different forms of life, by making different 
things in different ways. A being that faced no such imperative 
would have no need and no basis for imagination, the second side 
of the mind. It would have a luxury that we lack: the opportunity 
to treat diversity—of result, process, and setting—as an assump­
tion rather than as a task. A practice of economic analysis that 
fails to recognize diversity and efﬁciency as concerns of equivalent 
weight misunderstands what economies are and what they can 
become. Chapter 4 
Theses 
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Nature of These Theses 
The criticisms and ideas explored in the preceding pages animate 
three theoretical conjectures. These three propositions supply a 
point of departure for another way of thinking about free trade. 
Ip r esent them informally as empirical speculations, neither con­
clusively validated by fact nor bereft of support in historical expe­
rience. Like any other proposal of an approach to understanding 
complex phenomena, they should be judged by their theoretical 
fecundity as well as by their success in illuminating the subject 
immediately at hand. All three theses have implications for the 
practice of economic analysis well beyond the scope of the theory 
of international trade. 
The Thesis of Relative Advantage 
Restraints on trade are most likely to be justiﬁed between trading 
partners that are neither at roughly equal nor at very unequal levels 
of development and productivity (total factor productivity as well 
as labor productivity). Free trade is likely to be most beneﬁcial 
when practiced between countries that are either at very different 
levels or at comparable levels of development and productivity. Its 
harms and dangers are likely to be greatest when it takes place 
between countries that are at unequal but not extremely unequal 
levels of development and productivity, such that the relatively 
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more advanced one. In such a circumstance, the burden will fall 
chieﬂy on the relatively more backward economy. I call such a cir­
cumstance of countries at different levels of development and pro­
ductivity, but not at levels so different that the more backward 
country is unable to move repeatedly into lines of business in which 
the more advanced one specializes, a situation of relative advantage. 
To  elaborate this proposition and to grasp the considerations 
supporting it, I begin by deploying the previously stated ideas 
about the countervailing relations between efﬁciency secured 
through specialization and division of labor on the basis of estab­
lished comparative advantage and development achieved through 
emulation, learning, and benchmarking, with the consequent 
reshaping of comparative advantage. 
Consider the pedagogical truism that learning requires pushing 
the limits of a learner but never overwhelming him by setting be­
fore him tasks that lie far beyond his capabilities. Translated into 
the daily realities of production and productive innovation, this 
truism points to the importance of what contemporary parlance 
calls benchmarking. A practice, technology, or arrangement estab­
lished somewhere else in the world demonstrates, in the course of 
national and international competition, its superiority to rivals. 
The question will immediately arise of the extent to which its suc­
cess depends on local economic conditions that cannot easily be 
reproduced elsewhere—for example, the cost of labor relative to 
the cost of other factors of production, in different regions of the 
world, or the relative proximity of the production process to the 
inputs it requires. Some of the pertinent favoring circumstances 
may transcend economics: established traditions of cooperation, 
craft labor, and education in school, in the family, and at work. 
The issue will then always be the same: how to catch up with 
this “best practice” and reshape it in the process of appropriating 
it. It is a goal that can be reached only by obeying Piaget’s maxim 
that “to imitate is to invent.” The new will have to be combined 
with the old, the foreign with the local. The localized innovations 
may turn out to be not so localized after all; the attempt to imple­
ment them will put pressure on other practices, interests, and at­
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There will be many costs, conﬂicts, and uncertainties of transi­
tion. Whitehead’s warning that “it is the business of the future to 
be dangerous” will apply even to the loveless chores of practical 
life. It will often be impossible for the imitators and innovators 
instantly to put the new practices, technologies, or arrangements 
to a use as efﬁcient as the use for the sake of which they inno­
vated. Things may become worse—that is to say, less efﬁcient and 
more strife-ridden—before they become better. 
The innovators may be able to mitigate the costs of transition by 
leaning on a crutch, some compensatory advantage to be found in 
their situation. Of such crutches, the most important—and the 
most perilous—is lower cost of labor. It is dangerous because the 
need to shift emphasis from saving of resources to saving of labor 
has never ceased to play a central part in the movement of innova­
tion and growth. 
Such considerations are unlikely to trump the case for free trade 
among countries that are either at radically different levels of eco­
nomic development or at comparable levels of economic develop­
ment. In both these circumstances the advantages of emulation, 
innovation, and benchmarking under a shield are unlikely to over­
ride the beneﬁts of specialized production predicated on estab­
lished comparative advantage. It is not that in these two contrasting 
circumstances emulation, innovation, and benchmarking are any 
less important. It is just that they are less likely to prove incompati­
ble with the countervailing advantages of free, or freer, trade. 
In the conditions of countries at radically different levels of 
economic development, the goods and services that can be pro­
duced through the adjacent available steps of innovation are un­
likely to come into direct competition with those of the much 
more advanced trading partner. If they do not differ in character 
and composition, they will differ radically in the relative cost of 
the labor required to produce them. 
In the circumstances of countries at comparable levels of eco­
nomic development, innovations, stimulated by emulation and by 
benchmarking, will normally be compatible with ﬁerce interna­
tional competition, just as they are compatible with strong domes­
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development will not be disabled from the requisite competitive 
initiatives by challenges lying beyond their grasp. Competition will 
encourage innovative practices. 
This principle will, however, be subject to a qualiﬁcation of great 
practical importance. Competitive advantage among economies at 
comparable levels of development and productivity may result 
from concentrations of scale and of skill. It may indeed be difﬁcult, 
costly, and dangerous to enter into a line of business without such 
preexisting advantages, even when the innovator is at a level of de­
velopment comparable to that of its trading partner. Here, how­
ever, the advocates of free trade have their strong suit. To support 
restraints on trade for the sake of facilitating the acquisition of new 
concentrations of scale and skill without the justiﬁcation of gener­
alized backwardness is to superimpose the dogmas of policy mak­
ers on the experiments of entrepreneurs. 
In both situations—that of countries at radically different lev­
els of development and that of countries at comparable levels of 
development—no intractable conﬂict will exist between compet­
itive advantage secured though international specialization and 
free trade, on the one hand, and innovation practiced under the 
spur of imitative benchmarking on the other hand. The trading 
partners will be able to continue reshaping established compara­
tive advantage through a mix of public action and private enter­
prise; they will not have to take the existing distribution of 
comparative advantage for granted. Free trade will be vindicated 
but on the foundation of a doctrine that treats comparative ad­
vantage as a construction: as the product, at once economic and 
political, of collective and individual genius and invention, not as 
the dictate of necessity and nature. 
By contrast, in the situation of relative advantage, the conﬂict 
between the gains of specialization under a regime of free trade 
and the beneﬁts of innovation under a trade shield are likely to 
prove most signiﬁcant and lasting. For it is in this circumstance 
that the innovators are most likely to face their more advanced 
competitors without being able or well advised to rely on much 
lower labor costs or other compensating advantages. Selective 
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reformers while they accomplish their work of inventing by imi­
tating. It may keep the challenge below the threshold beyond 
which it ceases to incite and begins to overwhelm. 
No simple metric exists by which to measure striking distance. 
The choice of phrase is meant to suggest the pragmatic, action-
oriented residue in the conception. The relatively backward coun­
try is within striking distance of its relatively more advanced 
trading partners when there is some set of discrete steps by which 
its production system can reach the level enjoyed by those more 
advanced partners. The distance is striking distance only if the 
will to achieve the level is accompanied by a workable under­
standing of how the goal can be reached. Such an understanding 
need not be consensual; it may be a source of conﬂict and contro­
versy. It must nevertheless ﬁnd at least partial validation in expe­
rience. Without the will, the understanding, and the validation, 
this reason to restrict free trade and qualify the doctrine of 
comparative advantage loses its force; no distance is a striking 
distance if there is no readily available and understood way of 
closing this distance. 
A particular combination of features of the world economy 
today drastically expands the range of circumstances in which a 
relatively more backward economy may be able to enter repeat­
edly into lines of business in which a relatively more advanced 
one specializes—the situation of relative advantage. Multina­
tional ﬁrms carry high-technology and avant-garde practices of 
production throughout the world, although they do so under the 
restraints imposed by the law of intellectual property. Govern­
ments in several major developing countries support advanced 
scientiﬁc and technological education and research. Yet the coun­
tries touched by such public and private initiatives often continue 
to sustain wage levels that are very low in comparison to those ex­
perienced in the richer economies. Wage levels may thus cease to 
be closely related to levels of labor productivity in the most ad­
vanced sectors of different national economies. In so doing, their 
power to inﬂuence the worldwide assignment of productive spe­
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The cumulative result may be drastically to expand the number 
of economies, or of sectors of production in those economies, that 
come within striking range of each other. In this way, the thesis of 
relative advantage becomes applicable to a far broader range of sit­
uations than may at ﬁrst have seemed to lie within its scope. From 
having seemed a marginal exception, the conjecture begins to look 
like an idea of wide if not pervasive relevance to the world economy. 
The further reaches of the spectrum at which it fails to apply— 
the circumstances of comparable or of very unequal levels of de­
velopment—might then just as well be treated as the exceptions. 
This thesis of relative advantage makes a prediction contrasting 
with many familiar arguments about the circumstances in which 
selective restraints on trade may be justiﬁed. The prediction is 
that in the condition of limited relative backwardness—the cir­
cumstance of the striking distance—it is the relatively backward 
rather than the relatively more advanced economy that will face 
the greatest dangers and have the strongest reason to impose such 
selective restraints. 
The traditional reason to suppose that the burden falls chieﬂy 
on the relatively more advanced economy is that this economy 
might be expected to suffer the greatest loss of jobs, in competi­
tive lines of business, to the economy that succeeds in making its 
cheaper labor in those same lines of business as productive as the 
labor of its relatively more advanced competitor. Within the way 
of thinking I here propose, this view requires two sets of correc­
tions. The combined effect of these corrections is to invert the 
prediction of where the main burden is likely to fall. 
The ﬁrst correction is to insist that the view I resist exaggerates 
the beneﬁts and underestimates the perils of reliance on cheaper 
labor. Upward pressure on returns to labor, and thus on the pro­
gressive replacement of resource-saving technologies and produc­
tion processes by labor-saving technologies and production 
process, has always exerted a vital inﬂuence on economic growth. 
It has done so at every turning in the economic history of the 
modern world. Indeed, it played a part in accounting for the rev­
olutionary economic advances that took place in the North At­
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The second correction is that the approach I reject fails to cap­
ture the task that is paramount in the circumstance of the striking 
distance: the need to experiment, and therefore to make mistakes 
and incur costs, in the early steps of action undertaken under the 
banner of the maxim that to imitate is to invent. 
Underlying both corrections is an idea of more general applica­
tion. To grasp a basic element in the dynamic of innovation and 
growth, think once again of a man and a machine. The man per­
forms some actions that he does not yet know how to repeat and 
others that he does. As soon as he learns to repeat them he em­
bodies the repetition in a formula, and the formula in a machine. 
His strategy is constantly to shift the focus of his attention and the 
use of his time from the repetitious to the not yet repeatable. 
Competitive pressure to replace the saving of resources by the 
saving of work will in time and overall be more of a boon than a 
bane because it will hasten this process. 
What will happen if practices of benchmarking, imitation, and 
innovation suffer chill or disruption under the shadow of the 
overwhelming advantages (save for more expensive labor) en­
joyed by a relatively more advanced trading partner? The result 
may be to interrupt, delay, or slow the changes (especially through 
the substitution of machines for repeatable labor and through the 
devotion of more time to the not yet formulaic) that make possi­
ble continuing rises in total factor productivity as well as in the 
productivity of labor. The prospect of such a misadventure sup­
plies a major reason to accept restraints on trade in the situation 
of relative advantage. 
The objection may be raised that under globalization, the dis­
couragement to imitative innovation in the situation of relative 
advantage will lose much of its force, thanks to the ubiquity of 
multinational ﬁrms. Like bees pollinating one plant after another, 
such ﬁrms may be readily attracted to produce in the relatively 
backward economy, bringing with them the more advanced tech­
nologies of which they are the masters. 
Three facts, however, combine greatly to diminish the value of 
this compensating consideration. The ﬁrst fact is that the multi­
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lower labor costs. The preference for labor-saving technologies 
and for an upward tilt to the wage is, however, one of the con­
cerns underlying the argument of this thesis. The second fact 
is that the multinationals have often preferred to produce, in 
such circumstances of cheaper labor, with relatively more back­
ward technologies and more rigid production processes. More­
over, they have decomposed the process of production, locating 
the production of each input where it suits them. In both ways 
they have revealed their lack of a stake in the advance of the 
relatively more backward economy, through emulation and inno­
vation, to the front line of world production. The third fact is that 
the gifts of the multinationals may come poisoned: they may in­
hibit the adaptation and development by the host country of the 
technologies they bring with them. The rules of intellectual prop­
erty may aggravate the imported evil, adding to the seductions of 
greed the prohibitions of law. My earlier discussion of the eco­
nomic signiﬁcance of the political partition of humanity has sug­
gested, and my later discussion of the thesis of self-revision will 
further explore, a basic economic reason for prizing national in­
dependence and divergence in the forms, directions, and uses of 
innovation. 
Consider now the relation of the thesis of relative advantage to 
the traditional infant-industry argument in favor of selective pro­
tection. The thesis seeks to salvage and to rectify the element of 
distorted and truncated truth in this argument. However, it dif­
fers from the classic case for the protection of infant industries 
in two respects, one having to do with the infancy and the other 
with the industry. 
For one thing, the emphasis of this conjecture is not on the 
early steps in incipient industries; it is on innovative procedures 
within industries that may have been long established and are lo­
cated in countries that are now closing in on the trading partners 
with whom they have or contemplate free trade. This emphasis 
accords with a historical record in which countries that had al­
ready become major industrial powers, such as the United States 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, combined 
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For another thing, the focus of this proposition addresses the 
whole of a national economy rather than particular ﬁrms, indus­
tries, or sectors. The hypothesis underlying this focus is that a rel­
atively backward sector within a relatively advanced economy is 
likely to ﬁnd itself in a fundamentally different situation from a 
relatively backward sector within a relatively backward economy. 
In the former instance, if talent and insight are at hand, the rela­
tively backward sector will soon be able to draw in people, prac­
tices, technologies, and ideas from other sectors in the same, 
relatively advanced economy. It will beneﬁt from all the physical, 
educational, and social capital that makes an advanced economy 
advanced. If, under such circumstances, talent and insight fail to 
compensate for the setback by mobilizing the physical, ﬁnancial, 
human, and conceptual resources of neighboring sectors, no pro­
tectionist maneuver will rescue it from its self-inﬂicted failure. 
The standard case for free trade will apply. It is better to speak of 
outmatched economies than of infant industries. 
The thesis of relative advantage gives rise to a complication in 
the design of a world trade regime that the related infant-industry 
argument, with its emphasis on sectors of an economy rather 
than on national economies as a whole, could never produce. If 
free trade is more justiﬁed between countries that are either com­
parably developed or very unequally developed, and less justiﬁed 
when the laggard can soon close in, by identiﬁable and feasible 
steps, on the leader, how could there ever be a set of universal 
trade rules that would serve the interests of all? 
Those in the ﬁrst situation would have reason to prefer trade 
that was as free as possible (subject to the vital qualiﬁcations sug­
gested by the two theses that remain to be discussed). Those in the 
second situation would be better served (subject to the same qual­
iﬁcations) by a trading system that allowed them space to maneu­
ver. Moreover, the relative positions of the trading partners would 
be forever changing, with the result that the global regime best at 
one time would not be best at another. 
The central implication for the organization of the world trad­
ing system is that it must be designed, so far as is possible, to 
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see such an accommodation not as a constraint but as a goal. It 
must place the value of experiment where the dogma of an im­
posed uniformity now sits. 
I now take up four objections to the thesis of relative advantage. 
Discussion of them provides an opportunity to qualify the thesis 
of relative advantage in some respects while reﬁning and radical­
izing it in other ways. It is impossible to answer the objections 
without placing the thesis in the context of ideas about the world 
division of labor as well as about the method of economics. 
A ﬁrst objection is the absence of any uncontroversial metric by 
which to measure whether one national economy is within strik­
ing distance of another. Indeed, there is no such metric. The sense 
of the striking distance is pragmatic: whether there is a feasible se­
ries of steps—feasible for governments, ﬁrms, and other social 
and economic agents—that would enable workers and businesses 
to produce at comparable or lower cost the kinds of goods and 
services that a trading partner produces. 
The trading partner need not produce exactly the same goods 
and services—tractors instead of cars, for example, or data collec­
tion and analysis for insurance companies instead of customer 
services for ﬁnancial intermediaries. There will always be a large 
element of historical contingency or path dependence in any 
particular set of international economic specializations, given the 
advantages of scale, the beneﬁts of clustering, and the value of ac­
cumulating and concentrating requisite skills. However, the out­
come of the feasible convergence in capacities of production must 
be the production of goods and services that are analogous to 
those produced by the trading partner. Once again, the relevant 
test of analogy will be practical: how you can use one thing to do 
something else, or convert a particular skill into another one. 
A hallmark of economic development is the ever larger role 
that will be played in an economy by generic capabilities. Of 
these, the most important are social and mental. They have to do 
with the mastery of innovation-friendly practices of cooperation 
and the redirection of time away from repeatable operations— 
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yet know how to repeat. The more that economic life comes to be 
marked by these attributes, the greater becomes our power to use 
one thing to do something else and to convert a particular skill 
into another one. At higher levels of development, international 
specializations can therefore be expected to become more ﬂuid. 
The barriers to entry into an analogous line of production will, 
other things equal, be less daunting. 
Whether a national economy comes within striking distance of 
a trading partner will consequently depend on all the circum­
stances that may help or hinder the power of its governments and 
ﬁrms to escape the established worldwide distribution of com­
parative advantage and to build new comparative advantage. A 
country can increase this power by raising a shield over national 
heresy in its strategy of development so as to diminish its depen­
dence on the interests and prejudices of foreign capital, foreign 
power, and foreign advice. To this end, it may need to mobilize its 
natural, ﬁnancial, and human resources, up to the point of organ­
izing a war economy without a war. It may need to create capabil­
ities for the development or adaptation of technology that are not 
under the control of the dominant economic powers or of the 
multinational businesses associated with them. It may need to 
bring about a forced rise in its level of domestic saving (in con­
formity to the principle that foreign capital is the more useful the 
less it is required) and to develop new arrangements tightening 
the links between saving and investment. And it may need to sub­
ordinate the free ﬂow of capital to the imperatives of its growth 
strategy. Deﬁance will not guarantee success. However, conform­
ity, in all but the most special and transitory circumstances, is sure 
to spell failure. 
The absence of any metric by which to measure the striking 
distance among national economies is closely related to two deep 
features of our experience and knowledge of society. The ﬁrst 
such characteristic of social facts is the nonexistence of any closed 
space of possibilities. There is no antecedent list of possible states 
of affairs and no set of causal laws underwriting such a closure. 
The possible is the adjacent possible: the state of affairs that we 
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institutional and conceptual materials at hand, enlarged by our 
halting powers of invention. 
A second attribute of social facts has to do with the way in 
which they differ from natural facts. They do not exist univocally, 
as do objects in nature. They exist more or less, with greater or 
lesser degrees of entrenchment. It is to them, rather than to natu­
ral facts, that Aristotle’s doctrine of degrees of being best applies. 
To  the extent that the arrangements of society and the routines of 
culture, including our economic institutions and assumptions, 
are organized to set themselves beyond challenge, they present 
themselves falsely as natural objects. Relations among people 
appear, as Karl Marx argued in his criticism of political economy 
and of its “fetishism of commodities,” as if they were relations of 
people to things. 
We  are not condemned to naturalize social facts, or to acqui­
esce in an organization of society and culture that enables them to 
wear the deceptive halo of naturalness and necessity. Our most 
powerful material, social, and spiritual interests are engaged in a 
reorganization of society and culture that strengthens our power 
to revise arrangements and assumptions without needing crisis as 
the condition of change. 
According to a second objection, relative advantage is exceptional 
rather than commonplace. It would be a mistake, according to 
this complaint, to base our thinking about free trade on the 
anomalous rather than on the typical. 
To  understand why this objection is misguided, we should begin 
by recalling the most important implications of increasing returns 
to scale in comparative advantage. One implication is that the as­
signment of international specializations will have a large element 
of arbitrariness. Either of two trading partners at comparable 
levels of development might produce computers or airplanes. 
However, once one of the trading partners has achieved economies 
of scale and concentrations of skill in one of these lines of produc­
tion rather than in another, its position may become relatively 
entrenched. A swap of lines of production between the trading 
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Another implication is that advances in free trade may fail to be 
Pareto-improving: some participants in the trading regime may 
stand to lose. 
The result is to make the particular content of any given distri­
bution of productive specializations in the world if not arbitrary 
at least heavily dependent on particular, contingent sequences of 
events: which trading partner ﬁrst achieves economies of scale 
and concentrations of skill in any given line of work. It may seem 
at ﬁrst that this widening of the room for maneuver applies with 
full force only if the trading partners are at comparable levels of 
development. Substantial inequalities in technology and in total 
factor productivity might seem to preclude this result; businesses 
in the less technologically developed and productive economy 
may ﬁnd it hard to gain entry to the lines of production that 
ﬂourish in the relatively more advanced economy unless they 
manage to raise themselves far above the average level of techno­
logical and organizational reﬁnement prevailing in their own 
national economy. By this reasoning, the thesis of relative advan­
tage would indeed address an exceptional circumstance. 
However, it does not apply merely to an exceptional circum­
stance. It applies more broadly, at the present time, for a reason 
that may seem largely circumstantial. This circumstantial reason 
turns out to be the contemporary expression of more lasting and 
universal forces. 
The seemingly circumstantial reason is that the spread of ad­
vanced technologies and practices of production has come to co­
exist with vast disparities in the rewards of labor. As a result, many 
ﬁrms and whole sectors of production in some of the major devel­
oping countries can combine relatively low returns to labor with 
relatively high levels of labor productivity. More than any other 
fact, this combination helps widen the scope of the circumstances 
to which the thesis of relative advantage applies. 
The diffusion of technologies is spurred by many different fea­
tures of the contemporary situation. Among them are the global 
activities of multinational businesses, carrying machines and skills 
from one place to another, even when nothing but short-sighted 
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to  develop technologies not under the control of the multina­
tionals; and, above all, the power of education and emulation to 
develop and spread in ways that neither the proﬁt-maximizing im­
pulse nor the intellectual-property regime can control. 
The persistence of relatively low returns to labor, even in coun­
tries and in businesses that have made dramatic advances in the 
productivity of labor, can be attributed to a single dramatic reality, 
the release of hundreds of million Chinese and Indian workers 
into what has become a world labor pool: one shaped by the denial 
to labor of the right to cross national frontiers. No wonder China 
and India have become the chief protagonists and beneﬁciaries of 
the circumstance that the thesis of relative advantage addresses. 
We  should recognize in each of the elements of this circum­
stance a foreshadowing of forces that are likely to outlast it and to 
deepen its effects. Imagine that many major developing countries 
succeeded in raising a shield over heresy in their strategies of 
national development and in mobilizing their natural, ﬁnancial, 
and human resources. Imagine that this success allowed them to 
refuse the invitation to a slow, obedient ascent up the rungs of 
a predictable ladder of economic evolution. Imagine that the 
favored form of the division of labor, having ceased to be Adam 
Smith’s pin factory, with its stark hierarchies and rigid specializa­
tions, increasingly became one in which the contrasts among all 
specialized roles as well as between roles of supervision and of 
execution weakened in the interest of permanent innovation. 
Imagine that this shift touched ever broader parts of each major 
national economy, not just the advanced sectors of high technol­
ogy and deep knowledge. Imagine that all over the world we came 
increasingly to see production not only as the application of sci­
ence but as a species of practical scientiﬁc experimentation: we 
understand by imagining transformative variation, and turn 
some of these imagined variations into things—goods and ser­
vices for sale. Imagine persistent upward pressure on the wage to 
use machines as replacements for the operations we know how to 
repeat rather than to use people as replacements for the machines 
we do not yet ﬁnd it worthwhile to buy or to develop. Imagine 
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encouraged the radicalization of an experimentalist impulse, less­
ening the dependence of change on crisis. Imagine that the spread 
of scientiﬁc, technological, and organizational ideas and practices 
in the world continued, now inﬂamed by national commitments 
to rebel and to rise. And imagine that all these tendencies oper­
ated in a world that continued to restrict the mobility of labor 
and that, in part for that reason, continued as well to suffer vast 
inequalities among the living standards of different peoples. 
In such a world, in which the persistence of global inequality 
and national sovereignty coexisted with the worldwide advance of 
experimentalist methods, attitudes, and arrangements, relative 
advantage would be recognized as the normal situation among 
trading partners. By contrast, trade among countries at either 
very unequal or roughly comparable levels of development would 
be regarded as precarious limiting cases. Businesses in poor coun­
tries, with poorly paid labor, could excel in advanced forms 
of production. Businesses in rich countries that enjoy high pro­
ductivity of labor might suddenly falter in their success in con­
forming to the experimentalist imperative, or they might suffer 
the consequences of national failures to reorganize education and 
politics. 
These imaginary suppositions are not so imaginary after all. 
They exaggerate and project tendencies that are among the most 
powerful at work in contemporary economies. By so doing, these 
suppositions help show why relative advantage can describe a 
common rather than an exceptional situation—today and in the 
future, so long as the world continues to be both economically 
unequal and politically divided. 
A third objection is that the thesis of relative advantage reverses, 
without adequate justiﬁcation, the emphasis of where free trade is 
likely to prove most troublesome. We are today more familiar 
with debate over the trouble that free trade may cause to workers 
and ﬁrms in the richer countries. The thesis, however, focuses in 
the ﬁrst instance on the troubles that free trade may cause to the 
developing countries: those that come from below to enter the 
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Before considering the deeper reason for the reversal of empha­
sis, it helps to begin by remembering the history of this debate. In 
the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the critics of free 
trade had the same focus on the relatively backward rather than on 
the relatively advanced economies. Such was the case, for example, 
with the architects and theorists of the “American System,” in 
almost unbroken tradition from Alexander Hamilton to the New 
Deal, as well as with Friedrich List and his German school of eco­
nomic nationalism. 
The contemporary association of trouble in the wake of free 
trade with richer rather than poorer countries results from the 
contingent combination of a theoretical bias with a political fact. 
The theoretical bias is the inordinate inﬂuence that a particular 
image of world trade has had on the development of trade theory 
as well as on the course of practical policy debate ever since 
Ricardo ﬁrst proposed the doctrine of comparative advantage: the 
image of capital-rich countries trading with labor-rich countries. 
This image—I argued in the note at the end of the chapter on 
comparative advantage—does ever less justice to the reality of 
world trade. The political bias is the hold that the rich countries, 
and their journals and universities, have over the main direction 
of contests over policy. 
The thesis of relative advantage predicts trouble in the rela­
tively more advanced economy as well as in the relatively more 
backward one. That attention, however, should fall in the ﬁrst in­
stance on the latter rather than on the former is a preference jus­
tiﬁed by a crucial difference between the two situations. 
In the relatively more advanced economy it will in principle be 
possible to compensate workers and ﬁrms for the loss imposed on 
them by freer trade with the relatively more backward economy. 
To  be sure, if we take solely the analysis of static comparative ad­
vantage into account, there may be a loss to the relatively more 
advanced economy as a whole as well as to particular ﬁrms and 
workers within it. The loss to the society as a whole may result 
from the damage done by freer trade to an entrenched position 
that the relatively more advanced economy had achieved in par­
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skill. Susceptibility to such an event results from the implications 
of increasing returns to scale, in accordance with the way of 
thinking introduced by strategic trade theory. 
If such a loss from trade were the end of the story, the theoreti­
cal possibility of compensating the losers from free trade for their 
loss would be of limited signiﬁcance. The compensation would be 
unlikely to be given in fact: new slices would probably not be cut 
from a shrinking pie. In addition to being impractical, the com­
pensatory possibility is also unpromising: it fails to suggest any 
distinctive advantage that may be enjoyed by a relatively more ad­
vanced economy, in contrast to a relatively more backward one, 
when faced with loss resulting from freer trade. However, the 
story does not end here. 
Once we extend our view, from static efﬁciency to opportunities 
for development, we see that, in the circumstances characteristic of 
a relatively more advanced economy, such a trade loss can elicit a 
response, turning short-term loss into long-term gain. The erosion 
of the entrenched position may invite governmental, social, and 
private initiatives enlarging the role of the activities people do not 
yet know how to repeat, broadening access to the opportunities and 
resources of production for more economic agents on more terms, 
and forming, in the school, the ﬁrm, and the polity, the individual 
who is capable of devoting less of his time to compulsion and repe­
tition. Nothing guarantees such a creative response to trouble. Nev­
ertheless, something of the ability so to respond forms part of what 
makes an economy relatively more advanced in the ﬁrst place. 
Under the conditions of such a response, the power to compen­
sate the losers for loss inﬂicted by freer trade will no longer be idle 
speculation. Retrospectively, the society will be richer and, with an 
expanding pie, better able to compensate the losers. Prospectively, 
the development of compensatory practices will form an impor­
tant part of the struggle to prevent distributive conﬂict—the con­
ﬂict, within the relatively more advanced economy, between losers 
and winners from freer trade—from inhibiting innovation as well 
as from discouraging commerce. 
In the circumstances of the relatively more backward economy, 
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resources and opportunities to respond through compensation, 
innovation, and reconstruction. There may be losers from freer 
trade. For example, farmers in the relatively more backward econ­
omy may be unable to survive competition with the more produc­
tive farmers of the relatively more advanced economy. In principle, 
these losers might be compensated, just as in the relatively more 
advanced economy, although the more backward economy will 
have fewer resources with which to compensate them. 
However, there will not, even in principle, be a way of compen­
sating the most important form of loss, the form that is especially 
signiﬁcant for the thesis of relative advantage. This loss is the in­
hibition of a change: the entrance of ﬁrms and workers in the 
emerging economy into lines of production in which the rela­
tively more advanced economy enjoys an entrenched position. 
These losers cannot even in principle be compensated for the 
simple reason that they do not yet exist. They are potential, not 
existing, economic agents. 
This difference in the ability to compensate is the shallow 
expression of a deeper distinction. A characteristic feature of 
economic development is the facility of shifting from one line of 
economic activity to another, from one set of products to an­
other, from one set of inputs to another, from one set of ma­
chines to another. This plasticity has multiple roots. Of these 
roots, three are preeminent. 
The ﬁrst root is the development of human capital: the num­
ber of people with the educational equipment to master a core 
of generic conceptual and practical capabilities. This mastery 
prepares them to play roles in the dialectic between the repeat­
able, embodied in formulas and in machines, and the not yet 
repeatable, the concern of the forward edge of production. 
A form of education that is oriented to analysis and problem 
solving rather than to information, that is therefore more inter­
ested in selective penetration than in encyclopedic coverage, that 
advances by contrast of methods and ideas rather than by worship 
of a single canon of belief and intellectual practice, and that is co­
operative rather than individualist or authoritarian will contribute 
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citizen think and act as the context-transcending subject that he 
really is rather than as a zombie acting out someone else’s script. 
For one society to be relatively more developed than another 
means, in part, for it to have more people with such powers. 
The second root is the spread of a family of innovation-friendly 
practices of cooperation. Economic and technological progress, I 
have argued, requires both innovation and cooperation. Innova­
tion, whether technological or organizational, depends on coop­
eration: it is only by cooperating that people can introduce and 
deploy a novel technology or a new way of working together. Any 
innovation, however, threatens to disturb the vested rights and set­
tled expectations in which every cooperative regime is embedded. 
The reason is that an innovation will always seem more useful or 
more threatening to some of the groups that participate in that 
regime than to others. A mechanical invention, for example, may 
seem to threaten the employment of one group of workers in an 
industry while increasing opportunities for another group. 
Practices that moderate, although they cannot extinguish, the 
tension between cooperation and innovation play a major part in 
every aspect of the material advance of humanity, including eco­
nomic growth and technological innovation. Certain attributes of 
society and culture promote this family of practices: the avoid­
ances of rigid and entrenched rankings of class and caste that 
restrict the way in which people can work together and use ma­
chines; the society-wide grant of basic educational and economic 
endowments, made independent not only of occupying any par­
ticular station in society but also of holding any particular job in 
the production system; and the strengthening of an experimen­
talist impulse in culture. To give a larger place to the practices of 
innovation-friendly cooperation than another society does forms 
part of what makes that society more developed than another. 
One of the telling and important consequences of this advantage 
will be a greater power to reorient and reorganize production in 
the face of the opportunities and dangers presented by freer trade. 
It  is never an advantage possessed and maintained in tran­
quility. At any moment, distributive conﬂict over the costs and 
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richest economies and the most educated societies. We can mod­
erate the tension between innovation and cooperation. We cannot 
abolish it. 
A third source of this plasticity has to do with the conse­
quences of relations among productive activities in the relatively 
more advanced economy. In this economy, there will be denser 
clusters of ﬁrms and networks of production. The distinctions 
among lines of production will be less rigid, and the opportunity 
to use the skills, technologies, and practices deployed in one ﬁeld 
to produce goods or services in a neighboring ﬁeld will be more 
ample. 
These powers do not result solely from the quantity of produc­
tive activity in the relatively more advanced economy; they result 
as well from its quality. As an economy develops, conceptual op­
erations, especially conceptual operations combining repetitious 
and not yet repeatable elements, play an increasing role. So does a 
form of the division of labor very different from Adam Smith’s 
pin factory, one that softens the contrasts between the formulation 
and the execution of productive tasks as well as among specialized 
jobs in a process of production. There will be a repertory of pro­
ductive capabilities more susceptible to being extracted from their 
present uses and turned to other uses. 
Given the combination of quantitative density and qualitative 
abstraction or generality in the production system of the more 
advanced economy, it is likely to be easier than it would be, under 
conditions of less density and less generality, to turn one line of 
production into another: to move from the production of a good 
and service to some feasible next step or substitute, deploying, 
with a difference, capabilities, practices, and technologies that 
have already been acquired and mastered. 
A foreseeable effect of these features of production in the more 
advanced economy is that its entrepreneurs and businesses will 
enjoy greater ability to respond to the competitive pressure of freer 
trade by moving resources, people, and skills from one line of pro­
duction to the next. To make the existing networks of production 
and clusters of ﬁrms yet denser, thanks to analogical extensions 
or combinations, will be the predictable response of the more 130  ❍  chapter four 
developed economy to such pressure. Part of what it means for an 
economy to be more advanced is that it enjoys, in higher measure, 
this facility for substitution in the face of competition. 
The relatively less developed economy will be far more ham­
strung, with respect to this third source of plasticity as well as 
with regard to the other two sources. Its ﬁrms, entrepreneurs, and 
workers will be less able to compete with ﬁrms, entrepreneurs, 
and workers that can draw on all the powers deﬁning the circum­
stance of greater development: more people with generic capa­
bilities, more groups adept at innovation-friendly cooperation, 
more ﬁrms and government agencies able to respond to competi­
tion in trade through the analogical extension and reconstruction 
of established practices and lines of production. 
The temptation to respond to this disadvantage by maintaining 
downward pressure on the wage may then prove an ambiguous 
beneﬁt. The wage bill is likely to represent a limited and decreasing 
part of the costs of production in many sectors of a contemporary 
economy. Moreover, the absence of upward pressure on the wage 
may discourage rather than facilitate the attempt to enhance the 
productivity of labor and to arouse permanent organizational and 
technological innovation. 
No real and robust symmetry exists between the conditions in 
which the relatively more advanced and the relatively more back­
ward economy encounter the troubles of free trade when the lat­
ter is within striking distance of the former; thus the emphasis of 
the thesis of relative advantage on the backward economy as 
a potential loser rather than on potential losers within the ad­
vanced economy. 
There is what may at ﬁrst appear to be a major exception to 
the idea that, in the situation of relative advantage, the burden is 
likely to fall more heavily on the advanced economy than on the 
backward one. The exception is the relation of China to the rest 
of the world economy and especially to the rich countries at the 
time of the publication of this book. In many lines of produc­
tion, China has come within striking distance of the more 
advanced economies. It has sometimes overtaken them. Each 
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be accompanied by China’s winning of more market share in 
more of the sectors of production in which some of its trading 
partners had seemingly entrenched positions. Freer trade, under 
relative advantage, appears to have brought this most important 
contemporary developing country one success after another. 
With this China as the most visible contemporary instance 
of the relation between more advanced and more backward 
economies under a regime of free trade, the practical debate 
about free trade seems to have been turned upside down. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resistance to free trade 
was characteristic of emerging economies, like the United States. 
Enthusiastic adherence to free trade was a mark of the pioneering 
industrial and commercial power, Great Britain, or of much 
poorer economies with much less favored place in the interna­
tional division of labor, like many of the Latin American coun­
tries. Now free trade has come to be feared in some of the leading 
economic powers, and the greatest focus of this fear has been their 
trading relation to China. Consider, in the light of ideas intro­
duced earlier in this book, the meaning of this reversal and its sig­
niﬁcance for the thesis of relative advantage. 
China’s place in the world economy during this period exem­
pliﬁed a special combination of circumstances. This combination 
may (as I suggested earlier in discussing the consequences of the 
combination of sustained wage repression with greater access to 
worldwide technologies of production) lengthen the striking dis­
tance invoked by the thesis of relative advantage. In many sectors, 
an economy may, given these conditions, come within striking 
distance of another one even as it remains much poorer. 
When pushed to the hilt, as it has been in China, the same 
combination of circumstances may also reassign, for a while, the 
risks and burdens with which the thesis of relative advantage 
deals. It may allow an emerging economy to create a limited dis­
turbance for its richer trading partners. The trade that begins by 
threatening unskilled laborers may end up threatening ever more 
skilled, white-collar or blue-collar workers as the rising economy 
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The threat from abroad works by reinforcing other, more power­
ful forces internal to the economies and to the politics of the richer 
countries. These forces weaken the position of labor in relation to 
capital. They may be, in the ﬁrst instance, technological develop­
ments, but they are always, in the ﬁnal instance, political defeats. 
Technology is indeterminate in its distributive consequences; what 
matters is the institutional setting in which it operates. In many of 
the advanced Western societies, this institutional setting has be­
come increasingly unfavorable to labor. The Left has failed to rein­
vent its programmatic direction and to rebuild its social base. In the 
absence of such a reinvention and rebuilding, the vested rights of 
workers in traditional mass-production industries have often come 
to seem both unaffordable and unjust, because enjoyed at the cost 
of other, less privileged workers as well as of consumers. 
The victims of these events in the richer countries may be de­
nied the beneﬁt of policies of social insurance, of economic recon­
struction and retraining, and of the broadening of economic and 
educational opportunity that only institutional change, forged in 
the struggle over the mastery and uses of state power, can ulti­
mately achieve. This is a real, not a sham, problem. However, it is 
different in character, and more limited in scope, than the danger 
that plays the central role in the thesis of relative advantage: the in­
hibition to national development, to economic growth, especially 
as achieved by permanent revolution in productivity. 
Only if a more advanced economy were to fail dramatically in 
responding to change in the international division of labor by de­
veloping new comparative or absolute advantage to replace the 
advantages of which it had been deprived would its troubles then 
become more substantial. Only then would these troubles resem­
ble the difﬁculties on which the thesis of relative advantage fo­
cuses. Such more formidable difﬁculties are evident in China’s 
contemporary relations to a range of middle-income countries 
that have failed to sustain gains in either total factor or labor pro­
ductivity but that have continued to guarantee a much higher 
wage than Chinese ﬁrms pay their workers. 
To  appreciate the signiﬁcance of the Chinese experience for the 
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unique variation on the circumstances—common in the world 
today—that may enable an emergent economic power to extend 
its striking distance within the international division of labor. 
On the one hand, China witnessed severe and persistent con­
tainment of labor costs. This wage repression only recently began 
to weaken. Hundreds of millions of former peasants or their chil­
dren were driven from agriculture to industry—a “reserve labor 
army” if there ever was one. This was a one-time event of vast 
consequence. In the larger setting of world history, however, it 
represented less an anomaly than an extreme instance of a famil­
iar event. Such dislocations had taken place, and continued to 
occur, on a smaller scale, elsewhere. On the other hand, China 
experienced ongoing rises in productivity (especially labor pro­
ductivity, as distinguished from total factor productivity) in par­
ticular sectors of the economy, secured in the context of radical 
and growing inequality among sectors of the economy, as well as 
among regions of the country and classes of society. 
What allowed the repression of monetary and nonmonetary 
returns to labor to coexist with continued, sector-speciﬁc rises in 
productivity, resulting in low unit-labor costs, was the marriage of 
inequality with dictatorship: dictatorship in culture and social life 
as well as in politics. Not only was the nation disenfranchised and 
deprived of a voice, it was also denied the means—in politics, in 
public discourse, and in ordinary consciousness—to deﬁne alter­
native national futures, to debate them, and to implement them. 
The alliance of inequality with dictatorship shaped China’s 
spectacular if unequal growth. It shaped it, however, in combina­
tion with a strategy of national development that deﬁed the global 
economic orthodoxy of the time. That strategy disobeyed this 
orthodoxy in two respects. 
The ﬁrst respect was its insistence on raising what I earlier 
called a shield over heresy. China based its development on the 
mobilization of its own human, ﬁnancial, and natural resources 
rather than on foreign capital. It resisted deep foreign penetration 
of its economy. It avoided the initiatives—common, for example 
in Latin America at the time—that would it have put it at the 
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The second respect was the fecundity of China’s institutional 
innovations in its ways of organizing market-oriented economic 
activity and of relating governmental initiative to private enter­
prise. The failure to democratize either politics or culture, how­
ever, decisively compromised the reach and the integrity of such 
innovations. The institutional experiments were truncated rather 
than deepened. As a result, they could not help sustain continued 
gains in total factor productivity or inform a long-term strategy 
of economic growth.* 
The organization of the country resulting from these facts did 
not prevent technologies of production established in the rich 
countries from being imitated, adapted, and deployed in particular 
sectors of the Chinese economy. However, it did stiﬂe China’s col­
lective capacity for self-transformation in the workplace, the school, 
the ﬁrm, or the state and society as whole. It is a capacity as indis­
pensable to continuing economic progress as to every other form of 
social empowerment. For this reason, we should see the Chinese ex­
ception less as an omen of the future—for the world or for China it­
self—than as a limited success, bought at a terrible price. 
A fourth objection to the thesis of relative advantage is that by fo­
cusing on whole national economies rather than on particular 
businesses, the thesis of relative advantage makes the common 
mistake, anathema to the theory of international trade, that coun­
tries can compete. According to the objection, only ﬁrms or partic­
ular economic agents can compete in the sense of competition that 
is pertinent to trade theory. Refutation of this criticism provides 
an opportunity to connect the statement of the thesis of relative 
advantage with my earlier discussion of comparative advantage. So 
long as the political partition of humanity persists, countries—or 
*For a discussion of the importance of China’s arrested institutional 
innovations to an understanding of national alternatives and alterna­
tive globalizations, see my book, Democracy Realized: The Progressive 
Alternative, Verso, 1998, pp. 105–112; and, with Zhiyuan Cui, “China in 
the Russian Mirror,” New Left Review,  I/208,  November-December 
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the regional unions or empires into which they may organize 
themselves—remain the major sites for the making of compara­
tive advantage as well as for the deepening of economic diversity: 
diversity of products and forms of production, of arrangements, 
practices, and beliefs. Less diversity means less interesting stuff on 
which the mechanisms of competitive efﬁciency can operate, to 
the detriment of the whole world as well as of each of its peoples. 
In the narrow and dominant tradition of economic analysis, only 
ﬁrms can compete; the idea of competition among countries is dis­
missed as a misuse based on a misunderstanding. Even the ancient 
infant-industry argument for protection singles out particular 
businesses or sectors rather than whole national economies. In the 
broader historical study of modern economies and polities, how­
ever, capitalism has been recognized to be the brother of national­
ism; trade, the cousin of empire; and the creation of wealth, within 
and beyond national borders, the ward of political protection. 
Where, between these two perspectives, does the thesis of relative 
advantage ﬁt, with its emphasis on the inhibitions of free trade 
between countries at moderately unequal levels of development 
and productivity? 
The powers by which comparative advantage can be made or 
reshaped transcend the ﬁrm. Even when they operate through the 
ﬁrm, they do not originate in particular businesses. Among these 
powers are the three sources of facility to substitute one line of 
production or one form of production for another that I dis­
cussed in responding to the previous objection: the development 
of individuals with generic conceptual and practical capabilities, 
the diffusion of practices of innovation-friendly cooperation, and 
the facility to carry skills, practices, and technologies from one 
line of production to another, responding to competition through 
substitution or reorientation. 
Consider, for example, the third of these powers. Of the three, 
it is the one whose location beyond the level of the ﬁrm may seem 
least obvious; it is relatively more plain that the ﬁrms themselves 
cannot guarantee either education in generic capabilities or the 
conditions that I earlier described as conducive to the vigor and 
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network of ﬁrms and lines of production (quantitative rarefac­
tion) and the less advanced they are in using skills, technologies, 
and practices that can be readily disembedded from their present 
uses (qualitative embeddedness), the greater will be the need for 
some form of collective action or governmental initiative to make 
up for the relative weakness. Society and the state will have to sup­
ply the missing links: technologies that meet the next productive 
task while taking best advantage of established skills and available 
resources, forms of technical education that make up for the ab­
sence of pertinent traditions of craft, arrangements for the pool­
ing of resources that quicken and cheapen the achievement of 
economies of scale. The provision of these missing links, which 
we might describe as quasi-public goods, strengthens the power 
of ﬁrms to respond, through analogy and substitution, to com­
petitive pressure and opportunity. 
The provision of the missing links may need to be organized 
by some form of cooperative competition among ﬁrms or commu­
nities. Or it may require to be established as well by the govern­
ment, working with ﬁrms and communities to develop a distinct 
form of industrial policy: one that, instead of supporting certain 
sectors of the economy to the detriment of others, seeks to make 
up for the circumstances of relative backwardness (resulting in 
what I called rarefaction and embeddedness) that inhibit the power 
to move from one line of production and from one set of skills to 
the next. 
Such initiatives do not make one national economy more com­
petitive than another in the sense in which one ﬁrm can produce 
a good or service more efﬁciently than another. They nevertheless 
represent a second-order level of competitive vigor. They enhance 
the vigor of an economy in the defense of established comparative 
advantage and in the construction of new comparative advantage. 
Moreover, they do so at a level that no analysis of the activity of 
the ﬁrm can adequately capture. The thesis of relative advantage 
deals with this crucial second order of effects. 
The idea of second-order competitive effects deserves to be gen­
eralized. We cannot understand the realities and possibilities of 
worldwide trade by focusing solely on particular ﬁrms and produc­
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activity calculated to defy them. We should not think and speak as 
if, once having justiﬁed the distinction between trade among coun­
tries and market-oriented exchange within them, the distinctions 
among national societies then lost all further relevance to our un­
derstanding of the risks and beneﬁts of international trade. 
On the contrary, the distinct, politically organized societies in 
the world remain the most important sites of difference: differ­
ence in institutional arrangements and in forms of consciousness, 
informing difference in what is produced and in how it is pro­
duced. Difference is not only part of the problem of organizing a 
world division of labor helping lift from mankind the burdens of 
poverty, inﬁrmity, and drudgery; it is also part of the solution 
to that problem. Without the creation of more difference, the se­
lective machinery of worldwide trade, based on established or 
constructed comparative advantage, has less material on which to 
operate and less potential of beneﬁt. 
Until it is supplemented by a view of how difference is created, 
a theory of comparative efﬁciencies in production would be like 
the present-day form of Darwin’s theory of evolution, cut in half: 
natural selection unaided by genetic variation. Without the form 
of difference resulting from the political partition of the world, 
the full weight of creating difference would need to be rendered 
internal to the organization of the economy: for example, by the 
adoption of arrangements facilitating, through coexistence of al­
ternative regimes of contract and property, a radical pluralism 
and an ongoing reform of economic institutions. 
In ﬁxing on second-order competitive effects and inhibitions, 
the thesis of relative advantage looks beyond the narrow horizon 
of static comparative advantage to a world of real societies and 
economies in which people gain strength, or suffer restraint, in 
the power to create comparative advantage. Firms are not that 
world; they are only players within it and expressions of its char­
acteristic capacities and inﬁrmities. 
The extent to which a particular business bears the imprint of a 
particular national economy, and of the society and culture of 
which it forms part, is nevertheless itself variable. We must under­
stand and use this variation to develop alternatives to the present 
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On the one hand, the world economy is in the process of being 
reorganized as a network of advanced sectors of production, 
marked by the predominance of the practices of innovation-
friendly cooperation as well as by accumulations of knowledge 
and technology. The communion of these advanced sectors 
throughout the world, often only tenuously linked to other sec­
tors of their national economies, has become a commanding force 
in the international economy. A fateful question is thus presented 
to us. Shall we remain condemned to attenuate the inequalities 
and exclusions produced by the division between advanced and 
backward sectors of each national economy? And to attenuate 
them through the two traditional devices of state support for the 
diffusion of small-scale property and business and of governmen­
tal commitment to compensatory redistribution through tax or 
transfer? Or will we, instead, succeed in overcoming this division 
through governmental, social, and private initiatives that enable 
the accelerated experimentalism of the advanced sectors to ﬂour­
ish far beyond the boundaries of the limited social and economic 
terrain in which they have taken hold so far? 
On the other hand, a sign of success in the generalization and 
radicalization of the experimentalist impulse will be that the indi­
vidual and the ﬁrm will become less dependent on the limitations 
of the collective milieu in which they operate. Of all forms of in­
novation, the most fundamental is the capacity to transcend the 
context. Contexts, however, including national and international 
economic institutions, can differ in the extent to which they sup­
port and develop this capacity. Much of the dominant tradition of 
theorizing about trade speaks as if the power of the ﬁrm to tran­
scend its national setting were a matter of course. It is a program 
rather than a premise. 
The Thesis of Politics over Economics 
The efﬁcacy of restraints on trade depends on the recalcitrance of 
the state to capture by powerful interests as well as on the experi­
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the state less vulnerable to such interests over the long term is to 
make it more radically democratic. 
Restraints on free trade may be desirable in the circumstance of 
relative advantage. However, although this circumstance may be a 
necessary requirement for restraints on trade to be justiﬁed, it is not 
a sufﬁcient one. The desirability and the dangers of such restraints 
depend as well on the way that the state is organized and policy 
made and implemented. The restraints require selectivity in protec­
tion, and selectivity is an invitation to capture by powerful private 
interests as well as to the bureaucratic impulse to “pick winners” 
top down. Whether what seems best in principle—selective and 
strategic protection in the situation of relative advantage—will 
prove also to be best in practice may turn on the extent to which the 
organization of politics and of policy making escape the twin evils 
of favoritism and dogmatism. 
An authoritarian and enlightened bureaucracy able to insulate 
itself from powerful interests may in the short run defeat the ﬁrst 
evil, under special conditions and even then only for a while. It 
will never defeat the second. The solution is to deepen democracy 
rather than to limit it, and to make the formulation and imple­
mentation of policy, including trade policy, pluralistic, participa­
tory, and experimental in temper as well as in procedure. Politics 
will again be not fate but anti-fate. 
Restraints on free trade are most likely to be justiﬁed in the 
middle zone, the area of the striking distance, the situation of rel­
ative advantage. To lie within the situation of relative advantage, 
however, is not a sufﬁcient basis for such restraints. Something 
else matters decisively: politics—the form of the state, of the 
struggle over power, and of the practices for making and imple­
menting policy. The debate about free trade opens up, inescap­
ably, to the question of how best to understand the relation 
between economics and politics: its relation in the states and 
economies that we might create with instruments and ideas at 
hand as well as in the economies and states that already exist. 
Because restraints on trade embody the power of government 
intervening in economic life, they may become tools of two dif­
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organized interests and the evil of the disorientation of govern­
ment under the spell of inﬂuental, costly dogmas. To justify such 
restraints, it is not enough to appeal to the circumstance of rela­
tive advantage; it is necessary as well to show how they can be for­
mulated and implemented in such a way that the burden of the 
twin evils will not annul their value. 
The idea of the twin evils supports one of the most familiar 
lines of argument about any policy that, like restraints on trade, 
uses governmental power selectively to allocate rights and bene­
ﬁts. Every restraint on free trade will embody such selectivity. It 
will do so even in the limiting case of an all-inclusive tariff at 
a ﬂat and universal rate. Such a tariff will prefer the interests of 
producers to those of consumers. Depending on the reactions 
of a country’s trading partners, it will also prefer the interests of 
import-substituting industries to those of import-using indus­
tries. Selectivity will be the horse on which privilege and dogma 
can ride together. 
This fact lends support to a style of argument that serves as the 
stock objection to every governmental initiative that appears to 
restrict or to trump a decision made by the market. The objection 
may be pertinent even if the initiative is calculated to reshape the 
market, the better to give more people access to more markets in 
more ways. Remember the example of rules and policies that by 
distributing land, by broadening access to agricultural credit and 
technology, by supporting networks of cooperative competition 
among family farmers, and by supplying antidotes to the eco­
nomic and natural risks of agricultural production make feasible 
an agricultural economy of highly productive family farms. By 
allowing a country to avoid the model of agrarian concentration 
that Karl Marx found in the history of England and that he 
mistook for the irresistible logic of capitalism, such a regime may 
create a new type of agricultural market. Indeed, in nineteenth-
century American history it did create one—the most efﬁcient 
that had ever existed, up till then, in world history. 
What may seem, when viewed statically, as a market-trumping 
intervention may appear, when considered dynamically, as part of 
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market. Just as the way of thinking from which the argument of 
the twin evils arises acknowledges only a single, convergent insti­
tutional form of the state and of democratic politics, it sees only 
one institutional version of the market. 
Thus arises the immensely inﬂuential idea that although an in­
tervention in restraint of trade may in principle seem appealing, it 
will almost always in practice lack sufﬁcient justiﬁcation. It is the 
idea that whatever the theoretical advantages of selective eco­
nomic policy, in particular the advantages of selective policy in 
restraint of trade, such advantages will in fact be undermined by 
the twin evils accompanying governmental intervention in the 
economy: the theoretical second best of unconditional adherence 
to free trade will turn out to be the practical ﬁrst best. 
The inﬂuence of this idea was manifest in the development of 
strategic trade theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The strategic trade 
theorists of the late twentieth century questioned many of the 
assumptions of free trade doctrine. They nevertheless stepped 
back from the theoretical as well as the practical implications of 
their own views. They feared being mistaken for defenders of pro­
tectionism, and cited in defense of their caution one or another 
version of the twin evils argument. This safeguard encouraged 
timidity in theorizing. Strategic trade theorists would have done 
better to understand and to represent their own proposals as 
points of departure for a questioning of more general ideas that 
had come to be established in economics. 
They could not have worked out such implications, going far 
beyond the boundaries of trade theory, without confronting the 
assumptions and equivocations of the twin evils arguments. They 
failed to force such a confrontation. As a result, strategic trade the­
ory repeated, in its own way and on its own scale, the downward 
trajectory of the development theory of the mid-twentieth cen­
tury: by failing to exploit the subversive theoretical signiﬁcance of 
its own concerns and tenets, it reduced itself to the condition of a 
satellite to the ways of thinking it had failed to challenge. It then 
nearly ceased to matter as an independent theoretical enterprise. 
The hidden theoretical core of the twin evils argument is disbe­
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economies can relate to each other; the selective use of govern­
mental power, in trade policy as elsewhere, will inevitably sacriﬁce 
decentralized experiment to enthroned prejudice and allow the 
privileged and the inﬂuential to harness the authority of govern­
ment to their own selﬁsh interests. According to this outlook, 
markets will be markets and states will be states; we can no more 
reinvent the basic institutional forms and practical consequences 
of governmental intervention in the economy than we can re­
make the institutional form of the market economy itself. 
There is, however, a crucial asymmetry in the institutional dog­
matism on which the twin evils argument rests. Markets will be 
markets, but, insofar as they are not marred by imperfections, 
they cure their own defects; as an instrument for resource alloca­
tion and for the accommodation of competing interests, they 
amount, according to that way of thinking, to a perpetual-motion 
machine. States will be states, and insofar as they meddle in the 
procedures and outcomes of a market system that is imagined to 
have its own institutional logic and integrity, they will end up 
serving prejudice and privilege. 
We  soon discover that the twin evils argument is not merely 
about free trade, and the occasions on which trade may usefully 
be restrained; it is about two connected issues that hold great in­
terest for an understanding of economic life. The ﬁrst issue is the 
institutional form of the market and of the state and therefore 
also of the ways in which market and state can relate to each 
other. The second issue is the primacy of politics over economics: 
its primacy in shaping the institutions and the practices that de­
ﬁne the market economy, set the range of its alternative possible 
forms, and organize the process by which we can change these 
forms. 
Economic activity is social activity. Nothing is more important 
to economic growth than the relation between cooperation and 
innovation; the best cooperative regime, from the standpoint of 
growth, will be the one that is most hospitable to innovation—in 
technologies, organizations, practices, and ideas. How we move 
toward this ideal is in the ﬁrst instance an institutional question 
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suggest the central importance to economic thinking of the two 
issues described in the previous paragraph. 
I propose ﬁve conjectures in opposition to the assumptions 
of the twin evils argument. They provide elements of a way of 
thinking about free trade—and about much else—developing 
ideas introduced in the previous chapter. 
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that a market economy can take alterna­
tive institutional forms. There is no single system of contract and 
property that can rightly be said to be implicit in the idea of a mar­
ket economy. There are alternative possible regimes of contract 
and property under which decentralized economic activity—with 
many different agents bargaining on their own initiative and for 
their own account—can be carried out. 
The conception of a market economy presupposed in our ordi­
nary economic and political thinking is internally complex. It in­
cludes elements that may be in tension with one another or that 
may take different forms: for example, the decentralization of 
economic decisions and the absolute character of the control that 
each economic agent enjoys over the resources at his command. 
The classical right of private property, as imagined in nineteenth-
century legal and economic theory, afforded near absolute discre­
tion to the owner: within the domain of his ownership, he could 
do with his property almost whatever he wanted, regardless of its 
effects on others. Similarly, the classical right of contract tried to 
distinguish clearly between the articulated and reciprocal bargain 
(the bilateral executory contract) that gave rise to contractual 
obligations and the subtle interdependencies of social life. Such 
interdependencies generate forms of reliance and of expectation 
that were denied legal consequence. 
This regime of private law shielded the owner against both state 
and society. It sacriﬁced to this single, overpowering objective any 
interest in expanding the range of economic agents who could in 
fact exercise the powers of property or in changing, for the sake of 
such a broadening of access, the nature and scope of those powers. 
It subordinated the diffusion of property, and the collective and in­
dividual opportunity to experiment with the arrangements for ex­
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of ownership. This was not the market economy. It was just one way 
of understanding and organizing a market economy, although it 
was the way that acquired exemplary status for economic theory. 
We  cannot map out prospectively a closed horizon of possible 
institutional forms of the market economy, or indeed of possible 
institutional forms of any other domain of social life. Alternatives 
develop—most often by analogical extension and recombination— 
from the existing forms, under the pressure of conﬂicting interests 
and visions. At any given moment, the repertory of established or 
available institutional arrangements is relatively inelastic, in the 
imagination as well as in practice. Our assumptions and attitudes 
about abstract institutional conceptions, like the market economy 
or representative democracies, are largely shaped by the particular 
forms that these abstractions have taken in our individual and 
collective experience. 
The second hypothesis is that the same principle of the decisive 
importance of institutional variation must apply to the organiza­
tion of the state and to the ways in which government may engage 
the market. It is misleading to bring this engagement under the 
loaded label of “governmental intervention in the market”; the 
label suggests that the market has a permanent and universal 
nature, which the state must either respect or disrespect. A gov­
ernment can regulate market behavior from a distance. It can 
redistribute, through taxation and transfers, the results of eco­
nomic activity. It can also, however, act to alter the rules and prac­
tices deﬁning the market economy. According to an idea invoked 
earlier, what statically may seem to be no more than a subsidy, 
trumping an allocation of resources determined by the market as 
it is now organized, may dynamically turn out to be a move in the 
reorganization of the market economy. It may even amount to a 
move that makes more opportunities of decentralized economic 
initiative available to more people in more ways. 
The third hypothesis is that the burden of the twin evils—of 
dogmatism and favoritism—in the imposition of selective re­
straints on free trade, whether by tariff, by quota, or by other 
devices, is variable. The double burden varies according to the 
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are organized. The dangers invoked by the twin evils argument 
are not fanciful; they are real. However, they are neither universal 
nor constant, as the contrasting examples of Latin America and 
northeast Asia in the late twentieth century suggest. 
A country that avoids a top-down, secretive, and authoritarian 
approach to the formulation of trade policy will be less prone to the 
evil of dogmatism than a country that prefers to formulate policy, 
including trade policy, in a consultative, participatory, pluralistic, 
and experimental manner. The organization of politics—if by poli­
tics we mean struggle over the use as well as over the mastery of 
governmental power—will be decisive in shaping the range of op­
tions in every branch of economic policy, including trade policy. 
The fourth hypothesis is that a powerful, relatively isolated bu­
reaucracy operating in the context of limited democracy and of 
an authoritarian political culture can best be understood, in the 
setting of the controversy over free trade, as a costly and perilous 
shortcut to the route of escape from the ﬁrst of the twin evils, the 
evil of favoritism. A powerful bureaucracy, relatively free from 
entanglements with the national plutocracy and relatively immu­
nized against the surprises of political pressure and electoral 
upheaval, may succeed for a while in formulating trade policy that 
is not simply beholden to narrow cliques of special interests. Such 
is the circumstance that in recent decades we associate most read­
ily with the experience of the northeast Asian economies. 
This independence, however, will be fragile. It will also be 
bought at high cost. In an unequal society, with limited democ­
racy and little vibrant public debate, the bureaucratic apparatus 
responsible for making trade policy will ﬁnd itself, in its relation 
to the plutocratic interests, in a position similar to the relation of 
the imperial authorities to the landowning magnates in the agrar­
ian-bureaucratic empires that dominated so much of world his­
tory.T he central administration may try to contain the voracity 
of those elites, but it cannot resist them too much without mobi­
lizing as a broad-based coalition of popular interests (the peas­
antry and smallholders of the agrarian-bureaucratic empires, the 
workers and small-time or would-be entrepreneurs of today) as a 
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The bureaucrats have reason to hesitate before arousing a force 
that they may prove unable to ride. The more unequal the society, 
the more isolated the bureaucratic apparatus must become if it is 
to preserve its independence from the most powerful organized 
interests, and the sharper the dilemma it will face in choosing 
between the risks of accommodation and of confrontation with 
those interests. 
It may achieve some independence from them. However, it 
cannot achieve independence from its stake in the perpetuation 
of its own power. Moreover, the very devices through which it se­
cures itself against imprisonment by the rent-seeking interests 
may increase the likelihood of its surrender to the temptations of 
imposed and ignorant dogma, deaf to the lessons of experience 
from below. 
If the bureaucracy responsible for the making of policy oper­
ates in the setting of authoritarian politics and of a culture inimi­
cal to the radicalization of experimentalism, the shortcut will be 
even more dangerous. The danger of clinging to yesterday’s suc­
cess or of following today’s fashion will increase, and the power to 
imagine alternatives, and to try them out successively or simulta­
neously, will diminish. 
The twin evils argument has been colored and supported by the 
association of restraints on trade—and more generally of selective 
governmental interventions in the market—with these facts. How­
ever, it has drawn from them the wrong conclusions because it has 
mistakenly supposed them to be necessary and universal features 
of the relation between government and the economy. It has as­
sumed that in this relation, one of two circumstances must always 
and everywhere hold. If there is no part of the state capable of 
resisting capture at least partially (for example, the relatively inde­
pendent bureaucracies of the northeast Asian “tiger” economies 
of the second half of the twentieth century), the twin evils of 
favoritism and dogmatism will occur unabated. If there is such a 
part of the state, the ﬁrst evil may be attenuated, but only at the 
cost of aggravating the second. Society will be at greater risk of 
weakening its power to experiment—the very power that repre­
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The ﬁfth hypothesis is that the sole alternative to the burden­
some and menacing shortcut discussed by the fourth hypothesis 
is the deepening of democracy and the radicalization of experi­
mentalism. Consider the character of the institutional require­
ments for the overcoming of each of the twin evils. 
The only safe antidote to the evil of capture of government by 
privileged interests lies in the convergence of two distinct but con­
nected sets of events: the attenuation of entrenched and extreme 
inequalities, of organization and inﬂuence as well as of income, 
wealth, and power, and the development of a high-energy democ­
racy, one organized to heighten the level of sustained popular en­
gagement in politics and to diminish the dependence of transfor­
mation on crisis. The more the institutions of society, especially 
its political institutions, are organized to multiply opportunities 
and instruments for the remaking of social arrangements, piece by 
piece and step by step, the less will major change, although under­
taken in piecemeal manner, need to await trauma in the form of 
economic crisis or warfare. It would be necessary both to raise the 
temperature of politics (through arrangements that encourage an 
organized and sustained heightening of popular engagement in 
political life) and to quicken its pace (through arrangements that 
resolve impasse over policy quickly, if necessary by early elections 
or programmatic plebiscites). At the same time, this high-energy 
democracy would need to enhance the capability-supporting 
economic and educational endowments of the individual while 
making it easier for particular sectors or localities to try out coun­
termodels to the prevailing national path. We cannot produce such 
effects without innovating in the very restricted repertory of insti­
tutional arrangements that now deﬁne representative democracy.* 
*In other writings I have discussed the institutional content of 
changes in the organization of democratic politics that would make the 
state less likely to be captive to privileged interests and public policy less 
likely to serve as the handmaiden to dogma. See False Necessity: Antine­
cessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy,V e r s o , 
2001, pp. 207–221, 441–476; Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alter­
native,V erso, 1998, pp. 191–197, 212–220, 261–277; What Should the 
Left Propose ?, Verso, 2005, pp. 29–31, 156–163. 148  ❍  chapter four 
It is a route unmarked by any available institutional blueprint. 
Although it may, indeed it ordinarily must, be taken in small, 
accretive steps if it is to be taken at all, it is beset by many perils. The 
most immediate of these dangers, from the standpoint of the evil of 
capture of government by powerful special interests, is that things 
may get worse before they get better. A government that loses its 
bureaucratic and authoritarian hardness may, in the process of be­
coming more democratic, become more porous and pliant. It may 
become more susceptible to privileged interests before it recovers 
its resistance to them in the more durable forms produced by the 
raised temperature and the quickened pace of democratic politics. 
To  overcome the evil of dogmatism in turn requires an enlarge­
ment of the repertory of ways in which governments and ﬁrms 
may work together. The two institutional models for the relation 
between public authority and private enterprise now available in 
the world are the American model of the arm’s length regulation 
of business by government and the northeast Asian model of 
unitary trade and industrial policy made and imposed, top down, 
by a central bureaucracy. Solving the problem of dogmatism, in 
trade as in other areas of economic policy, requires a different 
practice and a different vision: participation—broadly based and 
with the lights of public scrutiny turned on—rather than imposi­
tion, and pluralistic experiment instead of uniform dogma. Such 
an approach to the making and implementation of policy is likely 
to ﬂourish only in the climate of deepened, high-energy democ­
racy: hence the afﬁnity between the institutional requirements for 
redressing each of the twin evils. 
Even such a democracy may represent only part of the favorable 
background, the part that has to do with institutions. No less 
important is the part that has to do with consciousness, the forms 
of culture and education that, in every department of social life, 
break down barriers between the ordinary moves we make within 
an accepted framework of conduct or belief and the exceptional 
moves by which we challenge and change pieces of that framework. 
What are the implications of these ﬁve hypotheses for our 
thinking about free trade and for our efforts to reshape the market 
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growth through political initiative? The thesis of relative advantage 
suggested that the beneﬁts of free trade are likely to be most 
pronounced, and its dangers most limited, when the trading 
partners are either at comparable or at sharply different levels of 
economic development. The case for such restraints will be great­
est in the middle zone in which, although the trading economies 
are unequally developed and productive, the relatively more back­
ward one lies within striking distance of the relatively more ad­
vanced one. 
The situation of relative advantage is a necessary but not a suf­
ﬁcient condition for the imposition of selective restraints on free 
trade. The beneﬁts of such restraints, in that situation, will not 
outweigh their costs unless a state imposes them in a manner that 
contains or moderates the twin evils of preconception and collu­
sion, of picking winners or of letting losers pick governments and 
direct their policies. The familiar way to contain or moderate 
these evils—through selective trade policy, made and imple­
mented by an independent governmental apparatus able to insu­
late itself, to some extent, from plutocratic inﬂuence—turns out 
to avoid the evil of favoritism only very imperfectly and to avoid 
the evil of dogmatism not at all. Another way to contain or mod­
erate the twin evils—by deepening democracy and enlarging the 
repertory of ways in which government and private enterprise 
can interact—is barely explored territory. 
It may seem at ﬁrst that the consequence of this line of reason­
ing is to suggest that because the means for defeating the twin 
evils are not readily at hand, except in a form that renders such 
means both limited and suspect, there will never be a good case 
for imposing restraints on free trade. The chastened votaries of 
strategic trade theory would have been right when they retreated 
from the implications of their own ideas, intimidated by the force 
of the twin evils argument. 
Such a conclusion, however, would mistake the relation be­
tween economic and political possibility and would therefore 
miss what is most signiﬁcant, both theoretically and practically, 
about the thesis we here examine. No country changes its political 
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a philosophical attachment to a different form of political life. It 
changes them when it is persuaded that it must change them, 
when it comes to see them as a straitjacket that prevents it from 
moving and even from living. 
However revolutionary it may be in its ﬁnal outcome, such 
change is almost always undertaken in stumbling, uncertain steps, 
with the bric-a-brac of the conceptual and institutional materials 
available and the inconclusiveness that is characteristic of real 
action in the real world. We make up the means as we go along. As 
we make them up, we come to see in a new light and with differ­
ent eyes the ends for the sake of which we forged them. Dissatis­
faction with the established and available ways of doing what we 
believe we need to do is no reason not to do it; it is merely a 
reason to ﬁnd better ways. 
The case for the reconstruction of our political life is made 
from a hundred different inspirations, aroused in divergent areas 
of concern. One of them is the incitement of our desire to recon­
cile the engagement of a nation in the world economy with its 
ability to act on a vision of its own future and to preserve a sense 
of its own self. 
The inference to draw from this discussion is therefore not that 
the restraints on trade that seem best in principle will never be 
best in practice. It is rather that the problem of free trade can be 
rightly understood and solved only as part of a much broader at­
tempt to reimagine and to reinvent the forms of political and eco­
nomic life. The case for the imposition of selective restraints on 
trade, at least in the situation of relative advantage, need not await 
the success of such an attempt at reimagination and reinvention. 
It need not await it because it forms part of it. 
The Thesis of Self-Revision 
A regime of international trade must be judged by the opportuni­
ties it creates for the experimental self-transformation of its par­
ticipants as well as by its effective level of openness to trade ﬂows. 
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The gains of trade among countries vary directly with the range 
of opportunities offered by the trading regime for innovation in 
the practices and institutions of the trading partners. These bene­
ﬁts cannot adequately be construed simply on the basis of estab­
lished or constructed comparative advantage in the international 
division of labor. They vary as well according to the degree of ef­
fective freedom that the trading nations enjoy to innovate in the 
ways in which they organize their productive and commercial 
practices as well as their governmental and economic institutions. 
A worldwide regime of free trade may either strengthen or weaken 
this freedom of experimental innovation. The incorporation into 
our thinking about free trade of this second level of concern re­
quires a change in some of our theoretical assumptions. It also 
suggests a direction for the development of an international trade 
regime diverging from the direction that has prevailed in recent 
history. 
This third proposition is the most general in scope and the 
most far-reaching in implication of these three theses. Its scope is 
not simply free trade understood as open commerce in goods and 
services among independent countries. It applies in the most gen­
eral sense to our thinking about market activity, conducted, as 
market activity must normally be, against the background of a di­
vision of labor. It hardly matters, from the standpoint of the ideas 
that are central to this thesis, whether the market and the division 
of labor have as their setting the whole world or some tiny frac­
tion of humanity. The thesis applies to free trade; worldwide free 
trade is, if only in its scope, the limiting case of a market-oriented 
division of labor. 
The thesis addresses the relation between the moves we make 
within a framework of trade and the evolution of the framework. 
In thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of free trade, 
it is misleading to focus solely on the degrees and forms of re­
straints on trade. We need to consider as well the extent to which 
the rules of the trading regime encourage or inhibit the self-
transformation of the trading partners. If free trade is achieved 
at the cost of heavy inhibitions on such self-transformation, it is 
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avoiding such inhibitions and encouraging self-revision, its ben­
eﬁts will be enhanced. 
A crucial premise of the thesis of self-revision is that just as 
there exist alternative ways to realize the abstract conception of a 
market economy in a set of detailed practices and institutions, so 
there are also, at a second order, alternative ways to realize, in 
detailed practices and institutions, the regime of free trade among 
market economies. A major virtue of such a regime will be to per­
mit, and even to encourage, participating countries that are par­
ties to the regime to diverge experimentally in the type of market 
economy they establish. 
The intuitive kernel of the thesis of self-revision lies therefore in 
a contrast between two hypothetical directions for the advance­
ment of a trading regime. Under the ﬁrst direction, the further the 
regime advances, the less room there is for the participants to di­
verge in their institutions and practices, at least in those deﬁning 
the organization of the market economy. The rules of the trading 
regime will gradually incorporate ever more stringent require­
ments for the way each of those parties is organized: for example, 
assumptions about the content and scope of the rights of private 
property and limits on the ways government and private ﬁrms can 
work  together, even when the public-private collaboration has 
only an indirect effect on trade. The development of the trading 
regime will therefore be associated with institutional convergence 
among the trading parties: the more fully realized the ideal of 
free trade, the greater the level of institutional convergence. The 
trading regime will be a straitjacket—according to its supporters, 
a golden straitjacket, necessary and even providential—but a 
straitjacket nevertheless. 
Under the second direction, the advancement of free trade will 
not mean more institutional convergence imposed by the rules of 
the trading regime. There may be swings between periods of con­
vergence and periods of divergence, but they will be not be driven 
by  the rules and requirements of free trade. The point of the 
regime of free trade will not be to organize trade among entities 
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but that increasingly organize their economies in the same way, 
the better to produce those different things. The point will be to 
advance openness to foreign trade in the presence of difference: 
difference in the organization of the economy and the society as 
well as in the content of what is produced. 
Those who take this second direction will refuse to regard 
the maximization of free trade as the commanding principle 
of the trading regime. Instead, if they are attached to free trade by 
the recognition of its practical advantages in the particular cir­
cumstances in which these advantages are most signiﬁcant, they 
will want to reconcile divergence of institutions with openness 
to trade. Such a reconciliation, rather than the maximization of 
free trade, will, in their minds, count as the preeminent goal of the 
trading regime. No one will then suppose it either a necessity or a 
virtue to wear the straitjacket advocated by the defenders of the 
ﬁrst direction. 
The thesis of self-revision claims that the second direction is to 
be preferred decisively to the ﬁrst. This claim may seem uncon­
troversial. In fact, it contradicts some of the assumptions that 
continue to shape the debate about free trade and protection. Its 
practical implications conﬂict with the way in which the regime 
of free trade has in fact developed. 
There are two reasons to expect that the second direction for 
understanding and advancing free trade will prove superior to the 
ﬁrst. One of these reasons is speciﬁc to the strategic requirements 
for the promotion of free trade; the other reason transcends the 
debate about free trade altogether and touches on our assump­
tions about the nature and conditions of economic growth. 
The speciﬁc and strategic reason is that the acceptance of the 
straitjacket view puts the cause of free trade at odds with all the 
interests and values that donning the straitjacket of institutional 
convergence inevitably excludes. Free trade under that dispensa­
tion imposes a powerful constraint on the development of the 
institutional arrangements in which distinctions of culture and 
vision must be embodied. Without such institutional embodi­
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cultural idiosyncrasies, over the outcome of worldwide institu­
tional convergence. 
Moreover, each country would ﬁnd in its adherence to the pro­
gram of global free trade an obstacle to its ability to experiment 
with the policies, practices, and institutions useful to the goal 
that, for now and for an indeﬁnite time in the future, enjoy the 
greatest appeal throughout the world: to organize a form of eco­
nomic growth and of technological and organizational innova­
tion that is socially inclusive and subversive of extreme and rigid 
divisions between the advanced and the backward sectors of each 
national economy. 
The other, more basic and general basis for the superiority of 
the second direction over the ﬁrst has to do with the character of 
growth and innovation and with their relation to free trade. One 
of the assumptions of the argument for the ﬁrst direction is the 
idea that a market economy has a single, natural or necessary con­
tent, manifest in its legal institutions of property, contract, and 
corporate enterprise and in the legal provisions by which it ensures 
that the market-based allocation of resources will not ordinarily 
be overturned by either government or society. This assumption 
supports a defective picture of the freedom the market economy 
requires: a freedom to combine factors of production within an in­
stitutional framework of market activity that can be taken for 
granted. According to this picture, the framework can be left un­
challenged and unchanged so long as it suffers from no instance of 
“market failure”: any inequality in power or in information that 
undermines competition and distorts the signaling role of prices. 
This view of the type of freedom central to a market economy 
depends for its authority on the prejudice of institutional fetish­
ism with respect to the market: the false idea that the market has a 
natural form, or at least a form the superiority of which has been 
determined through a long evolutionary winnowing out. Once 
we rid ourselves of this assumption, we can radicalize the idea of 
economic freedom. What we should want is not simply freedom 
to combine factors of production within an institutional setting 
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it is freedom as well to renovate the institutional ideas and 
arrangements that deﬁne this setting. Anything less represents the 
sacriﬁce of an opportunity to a superstition. 
The signiﬁcance of this opportunity becomes clear when we con­
sider its place in an account of the social requirements of eco­
nomic growth. Here are the rudiments of a view of that place. 
In the short term, economic growth depends on the relation 
between the costs of producing goods and services, as measured 
in the unit of exchange and as reﬂected in the real rate of interest, 
considered in relation to the opportunities for gain through pro­
duction and exchange. In this short term, economic growth varies 
chieﬂy with the productivity of labor. 
In the long term, economic growth requires the application of 
our causal knowledge of the world to the tasks of production. In 
this long term, what matters most is our success in producing ma­
chines that can do for us, according to formula, whatever we have 
learned how to repeat so that we can turn our energy and atten­
tion increasingly to the not yet repeatable. 
In the protracted middle term, however, economic growth re­
quires, above all, cooperation: it is a social process disguised as an 
economic one. Innovation is as indispensable as cooperation. In­
novation presupposes cooperation, whether it is innovation in 
technologies, practices, organizations, or ideas. Cooperation with­
ers without innovation. Nevertheless, innovation and cooperation 
are also at odds: every innovation threatens to break apart some 
piece of the set of claims and expectations that each collective 
participant—each segment of the labor force—has with regard to 
the other participants. The established regime of cooperation is 
embedded in this carapace of rights and expectations. Any threat 
to the carapace will be received as a threat to the regime. 
A powerful incitement to hasten the tempo and to extend the 
scope of economic growth results when we succeed in establishing 
practices and arrangements of cooperation, in the ﬁrm or in the 
economy and society at large, that moderate the tension between 
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goal of this effort is the development of an innovation-friendly 
practice of cooperation—the more hospitable to innovation, the 
better. 
We never have a self-evident route to this advance. The advance 
can occur only through laborious and contested experiments 
with the arrangements for cooperation and with the institutions 
for production and exchange. It requires repeated and sustained 
ﬁddling with the institutional forms of the market economy. 
Any approach to the understanding and development of free 
trade that inhibits or truncates such experimentation will impose 
an unacceptable cost on our practical interests, including our 
stake in growth and innovation. It will open up a wound, as oner­
ous as it is unnecessary, within our practical interests. The very 
real but conditional gains of trade on the basis of established or 
achieved comparative advantage will be set in conﬂict with our 
larger stake in growth and innovation. 
The best way to grasp the signiﬁcance of the thesis of self-
revision is to explore its implications for the reform of the world 
trading system. In fact, this thesis is incompatible with at least 
the ﬁrst two of the four organizing principles on which the pres­
ent system rests, and possibly with all four. The four principles 
are the choice of the maximization of free trade as the com­
manding goal of the trading regime; the incorporation into the 
program of free trade of the commitment to a particular type of 
market economy—the type now established in the North At­
lantic countries—mistakenly understood as the natural and nec­
essary form of such an economic order; the understanding of an 
open world economy as one in which goods and services (and, in 
an expanded view, capital as well) are free to cross national fron­
tiers but people are not; and the willingness to accept wage labor 
as the preponderant form of free work in that economy, no mat­
ter how much tainted by a degree of economic duress that turns 
the contract between employer and employee into a sham. 
To  recognize the implications of the thesis of self-revision is to 
understand why it makes no sense, even from the standpoint of 
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maximization of free trade as the commanding principle of the 
global trading system. To elevate free trade to the status of an end 
in itself, pursued without regard to the power of experimental 
self-revision the trading partners may enjoy, is not to serve free 
trade; it is to undermine it. Free trade will ﬂourish when the rules 
of the world trading system are designed to reconcile openness 
and diversity, not to suppress diversity in the name of openness. 
Stated abstractly, this principle may seem unexceptionable. 
However, to imagine what its realization requires in the circum­
stances of the contemporary world is to show how it becomes 
controversial in practice. Consider the extreme instance at the 
present time of the destruction of the power of self-revision: the 
functional equivalent to the nineteenth-century gold standard, 
widely adopted by many Latin American countries in the closing 
decades of the twentieth century. In its heyday the gold standard, 
instituted to govern the commercial and monetary relations 
among the richest countries of that time, had the intended effect 
of making the level of economic activity depend on the level of 
business conﬁdence. Tying the hands of government was not, for 
the architects of that monetary regime, its cost; it was its point. 
Today there is a functional equivalent to the gold standard. 
However,  the developing countries rather than the richest 
economies provide its chief ﬁeld of application. A particular com­
bination of policies deﬁnes the content of this equivalent: accep­
tance of a low level of domestic saving; consequent dependence 
on foreign saving to ﬁnance national development; openness of 
the capital account to facilitate the ﬂow of capital in and out of 
the national economy; priority accorded to the interests of do­
mestic and foreign rentiers over workers and producers; and 
insistence on a version of ﬁscal responsibility emphasizing re­
straint on public spending rather than enhancement of the tax 
take. This combination represents a functional equivalent to the 
gold standard because, like that standard, it treats the dependence 
of national governments on ﬁnancial conﬁdence as a solution 
rather than as a problem, an automatic antidote to populist and 
nationalist adventurism in the management of an economy. 
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tional equivalent to the gold standard; it is necessary for it to take 
measures that safeguard its ability to pursue a heretical strategy of 
development. In particular, it needs to raise a shield over initia­
tives subordinating the requirements of ﬁnancial conﬁdence— 
the religion of the capital markets as they are now organized—to 
the interests of the real economy. The generic requirement for 
success in the raising of a shield over national heresy is the mobi­
lization of national resources—physical, ﬁnancial, and human: up 
to the limit of a war economy without a war. 
Consider the most constant components of this shield. The 
shield over heresy requires a forced high level of domestic saving— 
achieved through tightening of the links between saving and pro­
duction both within and outside the existing capital markets and 
through the development of new ways of mobilizing saving for 
production—for example, the channeling of some mandatory pen­
sion saving into governmentally established but independently, 
professionally, and competitively managed venture capital funds. It 
presupposes the rejection of any management of the public debt re­
sulting in a real rate of interest that spells the euthanasia of produc­
ers and the sacriﬁce of their interests to the interests of rentiers. It 
may demand an effort to keep high reserves (while mitigating the 
cost of maintaining them), achieved by a form of export-oriented 
growth that is the counterpart to import substitution and to the 
deepening of the domestic market rather than an alternative to 
such substitution and deepening. It counsels the safeguarding of 
these reserves by strong temporary controls on capital ﬂows, with­
out any bias against a fully convertible currency as an ultimate goal. 
It needs the pursuit of a policy of ﬁscal realism and ﬁscal sacriﬁce, 
even at the cost of the ability to conduct ﬁscal policy countercycli­
cally, not to please the ﬁnancial markets but, on the contrary, to 
make governments less dependent on their approval. It implies a 
willingness to rely, for the extraction of a high tax take, on whatever 
tax will allow for the highest take with the least disruption to estab­
lished incentives to work, save, and invest, in particular the most 
neutral of all taxes, the comprehensive, ﬂat-rate value-added tax. 
There must be such a willingness even at the cost of injustice in the 
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utive effect on the revenue-raising side of the budget, may be 
gained in double on its spending side. Above all, such relatively 
minor effects of compensatory redistribution through tax-and­
transfer must be sustained and magniﬁed by a more fundamental 
broadening of economic and educational opportunity. 
The combined and cumulative effect of these different elements 
in the shield over heresy is to prevent governments from having to 
kneel down before the domestic and international ﬁnancial mar­
kets. It is to widen their room for maneuver—the very room that 
both the classical gold standard and its latter-day functional 
equivalent so strikingly narrowed. It is to achieve some of the 
effect of wartime resource mobilization without having to ﬁght. 
The ﬁrst two elements in this shield over heresy demand com­
ment. It is a truth well established that “saving transitions”— 
major increases in the level of national saving—are more the con­
sequence than the cause of economic growth. This theoretical 
proposition, however, fails to take account of the strategic value of 
high levels of forced saving and accumulated reserves (by coun­
tries that remain only imperfectly able to borrow in the currency) 
as a guarantee of independence in the early stages of a heretical 
development strategy. 
A forced heightening of the level of domestic saving will, how­
ever, prove futile or pernicious if unaccompanied by arrange­
ments ensuring that saving is channeled into production rather 
than dissipated in a ﬁnancial casino. A paradoxical legacy of the 
Keynesian intellectual innovations of the mid-twentieth century 
in economic thinking is to deny us the ideas and even the words 
with which to formulate the problem of the relation between sav­
ing and production or productive investment. Under accounting 
categories that make aggregate saving necessarily equivalent to 
aggregate investment, we cannot even pose the problem. 
Under the inﬂuence of a practice of economic analysis that 
treats the established market in capital as the incarnation of mar­
ket rationality, except insofar as it is tainted by demonstrable and 
localized forms of “market failure,” we have no reason to treat the 
relation of saving to production as a problem. Here we have an 
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tion of the abstract conception of a market economy with a par­
ticular, historically contingent set of market arrangements. This 
fetishism continues to exercise a far-reaching and unrecognized 
inﬂuence over our economic ideas, within the debate about free 
trade and far beyond it. 
The truth, however, is that institutions of production, ex­
change, and ﬁnance may be designed in ways that either tighten 
or loosen the links between saving and production. The extent to 
which the saving of society becomes available to production or 
productive investment is no mere matter of words. It cannot be 
deduced from abstractions or discovered by pure analysis. It is an 
empirical fact, varying in accordance with the arrangements by 
which we channel, or fail to channel, saving into production. 
There are signiﬁcant differences among contemporary ad­
vanced economies in the extent to which their economic institu­
tions do this work. Nevertheless, in all of them by far the major 
part of the ﬁnancing of production results from the retained 
earnings of ﬁrms. In all of them the vast pools of saving held in 
banks and in stockmarket portfolios have only an episodic or 
oblique connection to what is in theory the central role of the 
capital markets: to ﬁnance the productive activity of society. To 
tighten the link between saving and production through institu­
tional innovations in the way of connecting them is not only pos­
sible, it is also necessary if an economic shield is indeed to be 
raised over economic heresy. 
The functional equivalent to the gold standard is simply the 
extreme instance of a distinctive attitude to national develop­
ment and to the construction of an open world economy. It is an 
attitude preaching obedience instead of deﬁance, institutional 
convergence instead of institutional diversity, and the acceptance 
of established comparative advantages instead of the invention 
of new ones. This attitude should be replaced, according to the 
thesis of self-revision, by an outlook that asks of each rule pro­
posed for the governance of world trade both what it contributes 
to  the opening of the world economy and how it reinforces 
the power of self-revision enjoyed by each trading country. The 
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that is consistent with the maximum capacity for self-revision 
at home. 
The only credible restraints on internal organization that can 
be imposed in the name of an open world economy concern the 
capacity for resistance and dissent by strong, independent indi­
viduals and associations. Without such a capacity, society loses its 
power to create alternative visions of its own future and to act on 
them: the prohibition of slavery and child labor, the right to orga­
nize political parties, trade unions, and other associations; the 
right to challenge established power and to propagate subversive 
ideas. The forms of self-revision deserving of special support 
are those that enable countries to reinvent their comparative 
advantages and to shift labor from repeatable activities, under­
taken by machines, to those activities that we do not yet know 
how to repeat. 
For similar reasons, the thesis of self-revision conﬂicts with 
the second organizing principle of the established approach to 
global free trade, the incorporation of a particular version of the 
market economy into the rules of the world trading system. Once 
relieved of the burden of institutional superstition, universal free 
trade does indeed presuppose the worldwide diffusion of market 
economies. The market-oriented division of labor will be stronger 
in intensity and broader in scope if it goes all the way down, from 
the organization of the global economy to the dealings among eco­
nomic agents in each of the countries that participate in the world 
trading system. However, if the arguments offered in support of 
the thesis of self-revision are right, vigorous national experimen­
tation with the alternative institutional forms of the market is de­
sirable even from the narrow standpoint of the enhancement of 
free trade. 
Two of the implications of this principle deserve emphasis 
because of their practical signiﬁcance for the organization of 
world trade. We should resist an expansion of property rights that, 
under the label of intellectual property, turns all innovations into 
proprietary assets. Moreover, we should refuse to prohibit as “sub­
sidies” the market-trumping initiatives by which governments 
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resources for more people in more ways. A subsidy should be 
sanctioned only when its distorting effect on trade is direct and 
unequivocal. Even then, a country should be allowed to insist on 
the distortion and allowed to compensate its trading partners for 
the right to practice the proscribed subsidy if it serves aims that 
are more than merely economic (for example, the subsidization of 
a sector of the economy as support for a way of life that is valued 
as part of the national experience). 
The thesis of self-revision fails to contradict with the same clar­
ity the third organizing principle of the present regime of global 
trade: the stark contrast between its treatment of the movement 
of goods and services (to which many wish to add, by analogical 
extension, the movement of capital) and its treatment of the 
movement of people. Yet in many subtle ways this contrast is in­
compatible with the ideas and the interests underlying that thesis. 
Free trade in goods and services is not unconditionally beneﬁ­
cial; its value depends on the conditions speciﬁed by the three 
theses presented here. Free movement of labor across national 
frontiers is unfeasible as an immediate goal. Its extension arouses 
a multitude of practical problems (the rights and interests of 
labor and the ﬁnancing of social entitlements in the receiving 
countries, the loss of human capital in the receiving countries) 
that demand difﬁcult solutions. The generic form of these solu­
tions is to dispense the remedy in increasing doses: the expansion 
of the right to movement in small, cumulative steps; the layered 
grant of entitlements to foreign workers, from temporary work 
permits to full citizenship; and the development of arrangements 
to compensate countries for the formation of the skilled workers 
they lose to other countries. 
In addition to the formidable practical obstacles it would need 
to overcome, the expansion of a right to cross national frontiers 
calls for a revolution in the understanding of nationality. It re­
quires that we come to see the role of national difference in a world 
of democracies as a form of moral specialization within humanity. 
The basis for the appeal and authority of this specialization is the 
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orders. This translation of moral difference into institutional di­
vergence would pose a threat to the freedom of the individual if he 
were not free to escape the social world into which he happens to 
have been born and join another one. 
In the absence of adequate dosage, preparation, and compen­
sation, the extension of the right to cross national frontiers will 
prove self-defeating. It will dissolve, together with the sense of 
engagement in a shared national community, support for the 
sacriﬁces needed to sustain a high level of social entitlements. It 
may also help create a political reaction that ensures its own 
undoing. 
Nevertheless, despite all the practical and moral difﬁculties 
with which it must contend, the step-by-step extension of the 
right of labor to cross national frontiers has a close relation to the 
values and interests supporting an open world economy. It repre­
sents by far the most effective instrument for the attenuation of 
extreme inequalities among nations and for the quickening of the 
pace of experimentation with the arrangements, methods, and 
products of economic activity. 
That the peoples of the world should be in direct communion, 
their ideas and experiences jumbled by a trading of place as well 
as of products, that there should an endless ﬂow of strangers in 
the midst of every nation, that the walls separating humanity 
should be thus torn down in the realities of direct encounter 
among individuals—all this represents the most radical realiza­
tion of the idea of an open world economy and the most powerful 
inducement to collective self-transformation. 
This thesis of self-revision is at once the most general of these 
three theses about free trade and the one that has the most direct 
signiﬁcance for the criticism and reform of the system of world 
trade. What is its relation to the other two theses? 
The circumstance in which one economy comes within striking 
distance of another is, according to the thesis of relative advantage, 
the situation in which the case for imposing restraints on free 
trade is likely to be strongest. However, the case will not be made 
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government avoids committing the twin evils of favoritism and 
dogmatism. To enjoy the power to impose the restraints without 
succumbing to the evils, a country must trust to the deepening of 
democracy rather than to the hardening of bureaucracy—the the­
sis of politics over economics. A country’s interest in not having to 
deal with the present form of globalization and of free trade on a 
passive, take-it-or-leave-it basis will provide further encourage­
ment to the reconstruction of its political life and of its adminis­
trative practices. 
The theoretical and practical approach to free trade suggested 
by  the combination of the theses of relative advantage and of 
politics over economics turns out to be incomplete, both in the­
ory and in practice. It is incomplete in theory because it is only a 
fragment of a more general way of thinking about the market-
oriented division of labor, whether an international division of 
labor among economies governed by independent states or a do­
mestic division of labor among producers within a single national 
economy. A defect of the established way of thinking is that it fails 
to acknowledge the extent to which the beneﬁts of trade among 
specialized producers are relative. 
Such beneﬁts are relative to the consequences of the trading 
regime for the ability of the trading partners, whether national 
economies or particular ﬁrms, continuously to reorganize them­
selves. The greater the restraints the regime imposes on this power 
of experimental and circumstantial self-transformation, the more 
limited its advantages will be: they will come poisoned. This idea is 
the theoretical point of the thesis of self-revision. From the per­
spective of this thesis, the ﬁrst two theses amount to corollaries 
of a more general account of the relation between the practices of 
trade and the arrangements and assumptions on the basis of 
which they take place. 
The view suggested by the theses of relative advantage and of 
politics over economics is incomplete practically as well as concep­
tually. They suggest a reorientation of national policy. However, 
when we try to translate them into a basis for thinking about the 
organization of the global trade regime, they seem to lead us into 
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will come and go in the relations among particular economies. 
Countries will succeed or fail at the reforms that diminish the trib­
ute selective trade policy pays to the twin evils. 
No matter how ﬂexible a world trading regime may be, how­
ever, it must operate according to general rules and shared con­
ceptions. This fact underlies the practical signiﬁcance of the thesis 
of self-revision. Each state must acquire and safeguard the practi­
cal instruments for the secure practice of national heresy in the 
choice of its development strategy and of its institutional arrange­
ments. Not only must it avoid the functional equivalent to the 
gold standard, it must also ensure a mobilization of national re­
sources sufﬁcient to raise a shield over heresy. 
The thesis of self-revision suggests a basis on which to develop 
an open world economy, and a system of global trade as part of it, 
owing nothing to the illusions and the interests that the argument 
of this essay has been designed to combat. There is a way of rec­
onciling selective—and temporary—restraints on trade, in the 
situation of relative advantage, with the development of an open 
world economy. There is a way for free trade to enhance rather 
than to undermine the imperative of self-revision. No way, how­
ever, exists to achieve these ends without a redirection of the 
world trading system. I now map such a redirection. Chapter 5 
Proposals 
●❍● 
From an Analysis to a Program 
The three theses about free trade proposed in the previous chap­
ter have clear implications for the conduct of national policy. 
Their meaning for the organization of a world trading system, 
however, may seem far less evident. In fact, the ﬁrst of the three, 
the thesis of relative advantage, may at ﬁrst appear to be incom­
patible with any coherent trading regime designed on a world­
wide scale. For it suggests that the case for moving toward free or 
freer trade may depend on the level of development of each trad­
ing partner in comparison to the level of the others. Relative 
backwardness can be determined only in particular relations 
among particular economies. By its very nature, relative back­
wardness constantly changes. For these reasons, the standard for 
allowing or disallowing freer trade that we can infer from the rel­
ative advantage thesis seems capable of realization only through 
an accumulation of bilateral arrangements. How could it ever in­
form a system of global trade? 
The view of free trade for which I argue nevertheless has deﬁ­
nite implications for the reform of the world trading system. It 
guides a criticism of the principles on which the present regime is 
based, and suggests a path for its reconstruction. The effort to 
work out these implications has theoretical as well as practical 
value: the programmatic consequences of the three theses shed 
further light on the way of thinking that they illustrate and justify. 
Two precautions help clarify the character of the proposals ad­
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The ﬁrst precaution has to do with the nature of a programmatic 
argument. To be telling and useful, a program need not, indeed 
should not, be a blueprint. It should mark a direction and explore 
next steps to take, beginning from where we are here and now. Our 
understanding of transformative opportunity—of the adjacent 
possible—reveals the content of our insight into the actual. 
A second precaution follows from this ﬁrst as a corollary. In its 
particular content, a program like this one can have no lasting sig­
niﬁcance: it suggests how we can move in a certain direction, given 
the circumstance in which we ﬁnd ourselves and the conceptual 
and institutional materials available to us. The sense of the direc­
tion lasts longer than the deﬁnition of the next steps. Nevertheless, 
as we take these steps, we must revise our understanding of the di­
rection, making choices—of interests, of ideals, of forms of life 
and organization—that the steps themselves prompt or force us to 
make. What lasts longest of all—and has the most general intellec­
tual signiﬁcance—is the mode of thought developed through such 
a programmatic exercise. It is a mode of thought that seeks to 
loosen the shackles of rationalization: to show us how we can dis­
count the necessity, the naturalness, and the authority of present 
arrangements without failing to recognize either the forces that 
shape them or the constraints that they impose. 
The object to which this exercise is devoted has immense practi­
cal interest: the form and fate of globalization. The global trading 
regime is the heart of the emerging form of globalization. The larger 
idea animating this programmatic proposal for the organization of 
world trade is that we need not approach globalization on a take-it­
or-leave-it basis, resigning ourselves to have only more of it or less 
of it, or to have it happen more quickly or more slowly. We can have 
it, more of it, on different terms. We can reimagine it and remake it. 
The World Trade Regime and Its Reconstruction 
The emerging world trading system rests on four principles. If the 
argument of this book is right, we should replace each of these 
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The ﬁrst principle of the present system is to accept the maxi­
mization of free trade as the proper goal of the world trading 
regime. Free trade deserves no such role. It is a means, not an end. 
It is capable of producing very great beneﬁts to the parties that 
engage in it. However, those beneﬁts depend on certain empirical 
conditions, which may fail to be fulﬁlled. Moreover, their reality, 
even in the many circumstances in which they are there to be en­
joyed, depend for their vitality and benignity on a broader context 
of chances for experimentation. An important species of such tin­
kering is experiment with the legal and institutional form of the 
market economy itself. 
The argument for the advantages of free trade on the basis of in­
ternational specialization represents a special case of the argument 
for a market economy of specialized producers within a division of 
labor. To produce and to retain its beneﬁts, free trade must be 
implemented in a way remaining faithful to the attributes that can 
make the market economy so powerful an instrument for the cre­
ation of wealth: the ability of such an economy to make use of 
everyone’s productive energy through decentralized, self-directed 
initiative; its implicit ideal of an organized anarchy dispensing 
with hierarchy and dogma as ways to organize coexistence; its 
openness to novelty so long as someone wants the novelty badly 
enough to be willing to sacriﬁce and to pay for it; and its power to 
turn back on its own practices and arrangements the experimental 
impulse it arouses. 
To  accept the maximization of free trade as the organizing 
principle of world trade is to substitute the narrow dogma for 
the broad project and to mistake a device for a goal. Sometimes 
the expansion of free trade will promote a pluralist experimental­
ism in economic life. At other times it will not. In certain forms 
and circumstances it will unleash the most promising productive 
forces, although it may also create losers, who may then deserve 
to be compensated, and require to be retrained. In other forms 
and circumstances it may simply condemn a national economy 
to remain trapped in a position of relative backwardness from 
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been to suggest categories and standards by which to distinguish 
among such situations. 
The extent to which countries may beneﬁt from the advantages 
of free trade without being harmed by its dangers is not ﬁxed. It 
depends on exactly how the system of free trade is organized. By 
demoting free trade to the status of conditional means rather than 
unconditional end, we free ourselves to imagine and to develop 
arrangements that allow for more free trade with less suppression 
of institutional novelty and of potential for production. 
The second principle on which the emerging form of globaliza­
tion has been based is the practical identiﬁcation of universal free 
trade with the enforced propagation of a particular form of the 
market economy. The method is the incorporation into the trade 
rules (or into the requirements of membership in the World Trade 
Organization) of constraints and commitments imposing adher­
ence to a narrow institutional formula. The focus of these de­
mands may be a certain approach to deﬁning and protecting the 
content and the scope of property rights. Or it may be a particular 
attitude toward limits on governmental activism in economic 
life. An example of the former is an expansive understanding of 
rights in intellectual property. An example of the latter is an inclu­
sive prohibition of “subsidies”: all governmental allocations of 
resources overturning the market-shaped allocation, even if the 
intervention has no direct distorting effect on foreign trade and 
even if it forms part of an effort to create a new kind of market, to 
which new economic agents may have access in new ways. 
The consequence is to entangle the cause of free trade, and 
more generally of globalization, in the campaign for worldwide 
institutional convergence. This entanglement arouses the adver­
saries of the latter to oppose the former. It weakens rather than 
strengthens the connection of free trade to the stake in decentral­
ized initiative that is central to the attractions of the market. 
A third principle of the emerging system of globalization and 
free trade is its willingness to analogize freedom for the move­
ment of capital to freedom for the movement of goods and ser­
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ﬂow of labor. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that a free 
global economy has been understood to be one in which things 
but not people are free to move. Many have wanted to bestow on 
capital, the most abstract thing, the same right enjoyed by things, 
under conventional free trade, to cross national frontiers. 
Nothing in principle could be more fundamental to a project of 
globalization or to a doctrine of free trade than the extent of the 
freedom of movement each accords to things, capital, and people. 
A world in which freedom of movement is granted to one of the 
three but not to the others is radically different from one in which 
all three win freedom together. Both in turn differ greatly from a 
world in which capital wins, but people are denied, the freedom 
of movement accorded to things. There are, however, few topics 
in economic theory or in policy debate that have received less 
beneﬁt of theoretical penetration. Here special pleading rules: a 
mish-mash of blanket ideological prejudice and of ad-hoc adjust­
ment to unprincipled practical constraint. 
It has often been argued that both goods and capital move so 
that people need not move. According to this idea, capital ﬂows 
reinforce the effect of trade in goods: in addition to making all na­
tional trading partners (although not all particular ﬁrms) richer; 
they also begin to diminish inequality in the returns to labor. Just 
in case people should fail to acknowledge the bearing of this cal­
culus on their actions, they are prohibited, by the conventional 
doctrine of economic freedom, from moving. 
There is a straightforward practical objection to the line of rea­
soning that seeks to assimilate freedom for capital ﬂows to free­
dom for trade in goods: relatively little capital moves. Moreover, 
the part that does move—particularly if it is in the form of short-
term speculative ﬁnance—exercises a power of disturbance out of 
all proportion to its scale or to whatever contribution it may 
make to production. Even today, at the beginning of the twenty-
ﬁrst century, net capital ﬂows, in relation to the GDP of major na­
tional economies, remain smaller than they were in the earlier, 
nineteenth-century episode of globalization. Empirical study has 
conﬁrmed that the vast preponderance of funds available for in­
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increasing freedom of movement and legal security won by capital 
under the aegis of the present form of globalization. 
Yet the remainder of capital that does move can readily make 
governments hostage to surges of panic or greed unless those gov­
ernments have raised shields over heresy. Developing countries 
will have to mobilize their own resources rather than depend on 
foreign capital as fuel for their growth. They will need to stand 
ready to impose temporary and selective but forceful restraints on 
the movement of capital even when they want in the end com­
plete convertibility of their currency. 
Despite all these objections—of theory, prudence, and experi­
ence—to the association of the cause of free trade with the ac­
ceptance of free movement of capital, the rush to establish this 
association as a feature of the emerging form of globalization was 
halted only by two forces. The ﬁrst was the international ﬁnancial 
crisis of 1997–1999. The second was the resistance of the two 
most important developing economies: China and India. 
The alacrity with which freedom for capital ﬂows has been de­
fended contrasts with almost universal adherence to the assump­
tion that no such freedom should or can be granted to labor. Yet 
no thesis would seem to be more characteristic of conventional, 
market-oriented thinking, both within and outside economics, 
than the idea that labor should be free to work where it will ﬁnd 
its best reward. Moreover, greater allowance for the mobility of 
labor dwarfs all other initiatives in its potential to diminish in­
equalities among countries. Enhancement of the right of labor to 
cross national frontiers is the practical point at which standard ar­
guments of efﬁciency and equity most clearly and fully converge. 
A fourth principle underlying the established project of free 
trade and globalization is the acceptance of wide disparities in the 
rewards and rights of labor, among countries as well as within 
them. That labor may be better rewarded in some societies than in 
others has always been an assumption of thinking about trade 
conducted on the basis of comparative advantage. The simplest 
and most persistent model of trade has been trade between a 
capital-rich North, in which labor is more productive and better 
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worse paid. Were the freedom to trade on this basis to be compro­
mised, trade might seem to lose much of its point. 
An unqualiﬁed right to reward labor unequally is ordinarily 
distinguished from the much more controversial issue of labor 
standards: the framework of rights within which labor will be ex­
changed for a wage. The representatives of organized labor in the 
North clamor for limits on the extent to which labor can be de­
prived of rights in the trading countries of the South. They de­
mand that minimal standards for the protection of the labor and 
for the elimination of the worst abuses be imposed as a condition 
of accession to the global trading system and that these standards 
be incorporated into bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
Although some in both North and South resist this demand as 
an excuse for protectionism and criticize it as harmful to those 
whom it would beneﬁt, a growing body of opinion defends the 
linkage of free trade to labor standards. This body of opinion 
ﬁnds allies in those who seek an analogous linkage to environ­
mental standards. 
Thus, the acceptance of stark inequalities in the rewards and sta­
tus of labor as an indispensable predicate of a trading regime has 
come increasingly to be qualiﬁed. Wage inequalities among as well 
as within countries are to be allowed, no matter how extreme. Even 
within this established practice, however, the treatment of labor 
must pass a certain minimum threshold of legal protection. Wage 
labor must not cease to be free labor. The form of a free contract 
between employer and employee must have some practical reality. 
In this qualiﬁed form, the fourth principle on which the emerg­
ing world trade regime has come to rely can be summarized in a 
single idea, rarely made explicit: labor can and even should be un­
equally rewarded, according to its abundance relative to capital 
and therefore as well according to its productivity. Nevertheless, 
there should be a point at which this inequality stops. That point 
is the circumstance in which wage labor represents a continuation 
of slavery under the disguise of free contract. In such a circum­
stance, the employment contract conceals a measure of depen­
dence and oppression so extreme as to make a mockery of the 
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To  make explicit this assumption is to disclose a source of 
perplexity and trouble to which both our received beliefs and our 
established arrangements fail to do justice. The surface expression 
of the problem is that the distinction between the wage return to 
labor and the legal status of labor is no more than a matter of de­
gree. The legal privileges enjoyed, and the legal disabilities suf­
fered, by the laborer are worth money. They help set the terms on 
which the capitalist and the worker will strike the wage deal, and 
they may have a quantiﬁable economic expression for the latter as 
well as for the former. 
Moreover, the wage may be so low, and so incapable of ensuring 
the worker of the necessities of life and the material requirements 
of personal dignity, that the labor standards guaranteed to him may 
prove to be an empty promise. Indeed, the same circumstances of 
relative abundance of labor that help explain the low wage may also 
weaken the ability of the workers, even when organized, to use legal 
rights to obtain economic advantage. The point is not that legal 
rights are powerless to transform the relation between capital and 
labor. It is that minimalist labor standards, such as those that are 
the object of the present compromise, may not be enough. 
However, as soon as we consider the need to make these stan­
dards more stringent, we come up against the deeper side of the 
problem: the nature and position of economically dependent 
wage labor as a premise of the market economy and of its interna­
tional form in a regime of universal free trade. Free labor has been 
deﬁned historically, by contrast to slavery and serfdom. It assumes 
three principal forms: self-employment, association or partner­
ship, and wage labor. Self-employment and association are so 
closely connected in practice as well as in conception that they 
can barely be distinguished; partnership, broadly understood, is 
simply self-employment in cooperation. Wage labor has been by 
far the most important of the three forms: important in the num­
bers of people to which it applies and important in its inﬂuence in 
shaping our assumptions and arrangements for organizing the di­
vision of labor under a market economy. 
But can and does economically dependent wage labor in fact re­
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question, so strange to us that we have trouble taking it seriously, 
was central to the institutional and ideological controversies of the 
nineteenth century as well as to the debates in political economy 
that gave birth to the teaching of free trade and to the doctrine of 
comparative advantage. The words and the settings of those quar­
rels are too distant to be recovered. However, the issue they ad­
dressed did not vanish when they lost their force. On the contrary, 
it has now become urgent and worldwide. We must struggle with it 
in a different situation and with different words. 
The contractual form of wage labor may accommodate and 
conceal radically different realities. It may serve to transmit privi­
lege. In some of the rich North Atlantic economies of the early 
twenty-ﬁrst century, especially the American economy, wage in­
equality became the fastest growing type of inequality: many of 
the most advantaged members of society received their income in 
the form of salaries or of quasi-wage beneﬁts. 
In other parts of those same North Atlantic countries, at the 
same historical moment, as well as in the most advanced sectors of 
the major developing economies, union organization and direct 
legal regulation of the employment relation had worked together 
to improve the condition of labor. It had often improved it, how­
ever, to the beneﬁt of a class of relatively privileged insiders and at 
the cost of the unorganized and unprotected outsiders. The decline 
of mass-production industry—the old historical base of trade-
unionism, the emergence, with worldwide trade, of a global labor 
pool including hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indian work­
ers, and the failure to establish the institutions that would expand 
access to the market economy and to advanced practices of pro­
duction and learning—all these factors converged to generalize the 
experience of insecurity and weaken the value of the old arrange­
ments designed to guarantee that wage labor would be free labor. 
And in yet other parts of the world or in poorer sectors of the 
economies of the richest countries, wage labor remained subject 
to dependence and insecurity so extreme, and the wage level re­
mained so little above the return needed to keep the worker alive 
and working, that the reality of the employment relation belied its 
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The ideal of a market economy can be most directly satisﬁed 
by free labor achieved through partnership or association when 
not through individual self-employment. It is only under such a 
regime that the idea of freedom to transact, to exchange, to coop­
erate, and to experiment can be realized most fully and univer­
sally. That wage labor should be the main form of free labor and 
that the most common condition of wage labor should be a de­
gree of economic duress giving the lie to the contractual form of 
the employment relation are facts eroding the reality of the mar­
ket ideal. A vast range of only partly understood consequences, 
economic as well as social and political, result from this erosion. 
The worldwide project of the market economy, further con­
ﬁrmed and advanced through free trade, continues to rely on 
ways of organizing cooperation that are tainted by the coercive re­
alities of economically dependent wage labor. This reliance is sup­
posedly justiﬁed by unyielding practical constraints as well as by 
the unavoidable implications of a regime of private property for 
the relation between capital and labor. To reach a conclusion 
about whether the market economy and the world trading system 
should continue to rely, without complaint or qualiﬁcation, on 
the preponderance of economically dependent wage labor, it is 
necessary to understand whether these justiﬁcations are well 
founded. They are not. The truth they contain is so incomplete as 
to mislead in the most important respects. 
One class of justiﬁcations for the necessity of wage labor, de­
pendent on the job and deprived of any signiﬁcant share of own­
ership in the means of production, is purely practical: the buying 
of labor by those who represent the powers of accumulated capi­
tal would be the indispensable means to ensure both scale in pro­
duction and discipline at work. By separating the decision to 
invest from the decision to work, it becomes possible to establish 
the large pool of assets needed to fund large enterprise. Moreover, 
the buying of the labor time of the worker dispossessed of enough 
property to work usefully and proﬁtably for himself establishes a 
contractual basis for a discretionary power, the exercise of which 
cannot or should not be made fully contractual. The residue of 
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devoured or paralyzed by them, becomes the means to direct, ac­
cording to practical constraint and opportunity, the combination 
of people and machines. 
This justiﬁcation relies for its force on an assumption it fails to 
make explicit: no set of institutional arrangements for the organi­
zation of a market economy would fulﬁll these requirements 
without appealing to property-less wage labor as its characteristic 
way of marshalling cooperative effort. The argument from scale 
and discretion needs to be reinforced by an argument from prop­
erty. A regime of private property, more or less like the one that 
has come to prevail in the course of modern Western history, is 
claimed to be necessary to the operation of a market economy. 
Such a regime, according to this argument, requires that the 
owner have almost unconditional power over the resources at his 
command so long as he remains within the sharply deﬁned 
boundaries of his property right. It also presupposes that the right 
extend freely in time, through an unbroken sequence of legitimate 
transactions and, ultimately, through the hereditary transmission 
of property. The mechanisms and standards of redistribution must 
not be so far-reaching that they eviscerate the combined workings 
of contract and property. 
The strong form of this argument, in which few are able to be­
lieve today, is that a property regime designed on this model is in­
trinsic to the nature of a free economic and political order. The 
weak form of this argument, with far greater but unacknowledged 
authority, concedes that such a regime may not belong to the es­
sential nature of such an order, if only because, being historical 
constructs, institutional arrangements lack essential natures. It 
nevertheless insists that any attempt to suppress and replace the 
present regime of private property by another way of organizing 
people’s claims on one another will undermine economic and po­
litical freedom, destroying the basis of a market economy in the 
independent initiative of countless economic agents. 
In either its strong or its weak form, this argument from prop­
erty leads to the conclusion that in a market economy, based as a 
market economy supposedly must be on the familiar form of 
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society will end up very unequally distributed. Most people will 
need to sell their labor. The social rights and the private savings 
that may attenuate this need will in any event be insufﬁcient to 
ﬁnance all but small businesses. Thus, the predominance of eco­
nomically dependent wage labor in the organization of coopera­
tive activity under a market economy emerges as the consequence 
of a combination of the argument from the imperatives of scale 
and discretion with the argument from the implications of pri­
vate property. 
The combination of the argument from scale and efﬁciency 
with the weak form of the argument from property depends for 
its force on the absence of alternative ways of organizing a decen­
tralized economy on a basis that might reduce and eventually 
overcome the central role of economically coerced wage labor in 
such an economy. That it is at least possible to conceive of a mar­
ket economy without such heavy reliance on wage labor (whether 
or not such labor is sold and performed under economic duress) 
can be inferred readily from a simple exercise in analysis. 
The conventional idea of a market economy mixes together 
two notions that are not conceptually identical and that may not 
need to be practically joined. One notion is that of large numbers 
of economic agents, able to act on their own initiative and for 
their own account. This formulation emphasizes the multiplicity 
of independent economic agents. The other notion is that of the 
absoluteness of the power—absolute in scope and in time—that 
the owner enjoys over the resources under his command. 
Not only are the two sides of this idea not necessarily conjoined, 
they may be inversely related in social and economic fact. The uni­
ﬁed property right in its modern form is a relatively recent con­
struction: the several powers it unites were in many periods of the 
history of law, the West as well as outside it, decomposed and 
vested in different types of rightholders. Under a decomposed 
property right regime, such rightholders then held simultaneously 
claims to different aspects of the same productive assets. (Feudal­
ism represents an extreme instance of such a possibility.) 
By  decomposing the uniﬁed property right and vesting its 
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create forms of decentralized claims on productive resources. 
Such claims might limit, as many past and present forms of prop­
erty have, the absoluteness and the eternity of the right. At the 
same time, they might increase the number of agents with access 
to the underlying resources as well as the variety of terms on 
which the independent economic agents could make use of the 
resources. If we succeeded, we would have enhanced the ﬁrst side 
of the conventional idea of property at the cost of the second. The 
traditional property right might survive. However, it would sur­
vive as only one regime among many, suitable to those forms of 
economic activity in which there is most reason to facilitate and 
to reward initiative undertaken at the risk of the entrepreneur and 
in the teeth of collective disbelief. 
A consequence of such a change—indeed, one of its overriding 
goals—might be to make more productive resources and opportu­
nities available to more people in more ways. A further outcome 
might be to deal with the imperatives of scale and discretion in 
productive activity in ways that over time would be less likely to 
organize production on the basis of a contrast between representa­
tives of capital and sellers of labor. 
We might do all this in theory, but would we and could we do it 
in fact? All depends on our success in creating alternative regimes 
of private and social property from the conceptual and institu­
tional materials at hand. Our experiment might well eventually 
include allowing different regimes of private or social property to 
coexist experimentally within the same, now diversiﬁed market 
economy. 
It is not the task of this work to explore the substance of such al­
ternative property regimes or the ways in which they could emerge 
out of the present and historical systems of ownership.* However, 
it is a recurrent theme of this book that the same grounds we have 
for embracing a market economy and for building an open world 
*For a discussion of such alternatives, see False Necessity: Antinecessi­
tarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy Verso, 2001, 
pp. 195–206, 480–539, and Democracy Realized: the Progressive Alterna­
tive,V erso, 1998, pp. 133–212. proposals  ❍  179 
economy are also reasons to experiment, in each country and 
throughout the world, with the institutional forms of the market 
and of free trade. 
The implications of this speculative argument about alternative 
property regimes for the status of labor now become clear. The 
greatest beneﬁts of market exchange and free trade are placed in 
jeopardy to the extent that the wage labor on which the market 
and international trade systems now largely depend ceases to be 
free labor. An important attribute of a reformed world trading 
system is that it strengthen the impulses making free labor ever 
less like slavery. 
In the light of these facts and arguments, we can rephrase the 
question about free wage labor and slavery and turn it into a series 
of connected questions to which a program for the reformation of 
the world trading system must give practical answers. What should 
be the common status of labor in a market-oriented division of 
labor, made universal by the world trading regime? How much dif­
ferent from slavery does wage labor (when rendered under eco­
nomic duress) need to be for the idea of a free world economy of 
free workers to be realized in fact? What limitations on inequality 
in the wage return to labor among different societies are both fea­
sible and necessary to ensure that the development of an open 
world economy takes place on the ground of really free labor? How 
is our conception of free trade in general and of comparative ad­
vantage in particular modiﬁed by the demand that it rest on a real, 
not just a sham, foundation of free labor? 
The effort to link free trade to minimal labor standards, which 
represents the furthest horizon of the present compromise, is ad­
mittedly inadequate to the task presented by these connected 
questions. It may nevertheless represent a beginning if we recon­
sider and reanimate it in the light of these ideas. 
Free Trade Reformed: The Reconciliation of Alternatives 
This transformation in our way of thinking about free trade sug­
gests the main lines along which the present world trading regime 180  ❍  chapter five 
should be reformed. In considering these directives, it is impor­
tant to bear in mind the qualiﬁcations mentioned at the outset: 
that, like any exercise in programmatic imagination, the following 
proposal should be understood as the marking of a direction and 
the choice of next steps; that any such direction can be explored at 
points relatively close to the present or relatively remote from it 
(I choose here an arbitrary point, neither very close nor very re­
mote); and that, although the particulars of a program like this 
one are by nature circumstantial and ephemeral, the direction 
they exemplify may hold more lasting interest. 
The elements of the proposal can be grouped under the head­
ing of four counterprinciples that we should put in place of the 
four principles on the basis of which free trade is now being es­
tablished throughout most of the world. 
These considerations bring us to the counterprinciple that 
should occupy the place of the commitment to maximize free 
trade. It is to build, step by step, an open world economy in what­
ever way offers the best promise of reconciling global openness 
with room for national and regional diversity, deviation, heresy, 
experiment. The point is not to maximize free trade; it is to max­
imize the possibility of coexistence among different development 
strategies, institutional systems, and forms of social life, and then, 
on that basis, to advance freer trade. The result is not to insist on 
free trade in circumstances (such as the situation of relative ad­
vantage) in which free trade would discourage institutional diver­
gence and heretical development. 
Once this counterprinciple is established, it can develop in the 
direction of a qualiﬁed international pluralism. There must be 
limits to the national and regional experiments that the world 
trading system can accommodate if it is to remain faithful to the 
practical and moral interests animating it. Membership in the 
global trading order should not require adherence to any particu­
lar institutional version of the market economy or of political 
democracy. It may, however, proscribe extremes of disempower­
ment: the suppression within a country of opportunities for inde­
pendent economic and political agency and consequently for 
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Such denials of opportunity for decentralized enterprise and 
contrarian action undermine the value of national and regional 
experiments for humanity, not just for citizens of the country in 
which such experiments take place. They limit the development 
of an open world economy by preventing ﬁrms, groups, and indi­
viduals within a country from taking the innovative initiatives 
that can fuel distinctive national strategies and specializations. 
The formative goal of the trading regime should therefore be 
the reconciliation of alternative development strategies and alter­
native versions of economic, political and social pluralism rather 
than the maximization of free trade. A large part of the effort 
must be to moderate the tension between openness and div­
ersity—diversity of both orientation and organization. 
This commitment may at ﬁrst seem to be almost entirely nega­
tive in its consequences. It is in fact rich in practical effects. The 
world should multiply, not restrict, opportunities for countries to 
opt out of the general trading regime. Such opt-out rights must be 
explicit, and they must be exercised through multilaterally agreed 
procedures. The exercise of the opt-out will face a natural con­
straint; a country will lose access to other countries’ markets to the 
extent it closes its own market. 
The expansion of the right to opt out of the universal trading 
regime, for a while and at a price, should be distinguished from 
any arbitrary historical exemption, such as the arrangements by 
which the rich countries of the late twentieth century succeeded 
in entrenching their agricultural protection when the World 
Trade Organization was ﬁrst established. The prerogative to opt 
out should be ensured in the universal interest; it should not be 
reduced to the status of an odious privilege enjoyed by those who 
ﬁrst sat at the banquet. 
Such an approach is no novelty. It more closely resembles the 
arrangements existing under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) than it does the subsequent WTO treaties. Yet 
it should not be understood as a retreat from the cause of an open 
world economy. Its effect is to prevent any fundamental opposi­
tion between our stake in diversity and our stake in openness. By 
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from pushing the rules of world trade toward a lowest common 
denominator. The rules can then develop in detail, expressing a 
thick consensus, without suppressing national experiments, in­
cluding the experiments in novel forms of economic, political, 
and social pluralism that they are unable to countenance. 
The right to opt out has an importance within the way of 
thinking I here put forward that is brought into focus by the the­
sis of relative advantage: that the beneﬁts of free trade are likely 
to  be most limited and its dangers most pronounced among 
trading partners that are neither at comparable nor at very dif­
ferent levels of development; the relatively more backward econ­
omy lies within striking distance of the relatively more advanced 
one. Not only is it necessary for countries to be able to opt out of 
the general trading regime to be able to act in the light of this 
truth, it is also necessary for them to be able to do so in the form 
of speciﬁc bilateral arrangements rather than through a general­
ized secession from that regime. Any system sharply curtailing 
the right to opt out will make it impossible for countries to act 
on this proposition. As a result they will be condemned by the 
design constraints of the regime to suffer either more or less free 
trade than their position relative to their trading partners makes 
advisable. 
To  put the reconciliation of alternative pathways of develop­
ment within an opening world economy in the place of the maxi­
mization of free trade as the commanding principle of world 
trade may seem to be a change of little or uncertain consequence. 
Its meaning will differ sharply, however, according to the assump­
tions we bring to it. 
To  the many who believe that there are no major alternatives 
and that all the countries of the world are inevitably converging 
on the same set of best practices and institutions, the substitution 
may appear to be a bothersome and misguided distraction. To 
them, its danger will lie chieﬂy in providing a pretext to restrict 
free trade and to slow down institutional convergence. To those 
others, however, who do believe that alternative pathways of de­
velopment are both possible and necessary, the substitution will 
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where the votaries of convergence see only the marriage of costly 
illusion with shameless self-interest. 
It forms no part of the intellectual program of this book to ex­
plore in detail the alternative trajectories of national development 
open to contemporary societies. That there are such alternatives, 
that the worldwide desire to reconcile economic growth with so­
cial inclusion depends on them, and that the future of the revolu­
tionary belief in the ascent of ordinary men and women to greater 
life and power in turn depends on this reconciliation are all ideas 
central to my view. All along the way in the course of working out 
this argument I have suggested some of the basic building blocks 
and shared concerns of such alternatives and asked within what 
world economic order and under what trade regime they could 
ﬂourish. 
Consider two approaches. According to one position, attractively 
modest in its claims, the alternatives are local; it is the political-
economic orthodoxy they resist that claims a universal authority. 
Why should the alternatives mirror this imperial ambition? Coun­
tries must ﬁnd their way by combining elements of the falsely uni­
versal orthodoxy with innovations responsive to local constraint 
and opportunity. 
The trouble is that only a universalizing heresy can effectively 
combat a universal orthodoxy. One of two situations will occur. If 
the deviation from the universal orthodoxy is undertaken for 
purely practical reasons, it is likely to be abandoned at the ﬁrst 
sign of difﬁculty. The gravitational pull of the orthodoxy will 
prove irresistible. If the heresy is embraced on the basis of reli­
gious or cultural commitments transcending practical impera­
tives, it may counterbalance this pull, but only at the cost of losing 
contact with the experimentalist ideals that market economies 
and democratic polities have in common. 
According to a second position, the heresies must themselves 
have shared features, shared enough to suggest for contemporary 
democratic societies and market economies a direction different 
from the one that now prevails. The local heresies must have these 
common attributes and offer the rudiments of a universalizing 
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Remember that the classical liberalism from which the doctrine 
of free trade arose was once itself a universalizing heresy: ex­
pressed and initiated in particular countries, yet conveying, from 
the outset, a message to all mankind. 
It is, however, not only out of the requirements of successful 
opposition to the universal orthodoxy that the most successful 
and signiﬁcant local heresies dare not and cannot be so local after 
all. It is also because all contemporary societies work with a rela­
tively narrow and inelastic repertory of institutional arrange­
ments and ideas. The institutional and ideological adventures of 
the twentieth century are ﬁnished; their conclusion has left con­
temporary societies in the grip of a small list of living options for 
the organization of different areas of social experience. This re­
strictive institutional canon is the fate of the present societies. To 
overthrow this fate it is necessary to enlarge that canon. 
The struggle for such an enlargement is bound to take place 
under double sponsorship: the brutal rivalry of states, cultures, 
and classes and the potential appeal of the most powerful belief at 
work in the world—faith in the rise of ordinary men and women 
to a greater power and a higher life. This faith requires, if it is 
to advance, the radicalization of democracy, the economic and 
educational empowerment of the individual, and the construc­
tion of a form of economic growth and permanent innovation 
that is socially inclusive. 
A ﬁght to expand, under this aegis, the present repertory of 
forms of social, economic, and political organization must begin 
with the limited institutional arrangements and ideas at hand. Re­
combining and renovating these arrangements and ideas in the 
service of that creed or that rivalry, it can create greater difference, 
on the basis of democracy and experimentalism. It can do so, 
however, only by passing ﬁrst through a narrow gateway. 
This gateway is made up of the institutional and ideological in­
novations that would strengthen the collective power to create new 
and valuable difference in the world: difference in the institutional 
forms and the moral tenor of a free society. The identiﬁcation of 
such innovations is the work of the universalizing heresy that would 
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A double paradox shapes this reality. Humanity can be become 
more uniﬁed only by seeking to develop in different directions. 
Nevertheless, it can develop more forcefully in different directions 
only by sharing in some elements of a common agenda of the 
deepening of democracy, the democratization of markets, and the 
economic and educational endowment of individuals. 
This second position—of a universalizing heresy opposing the 
universal orthodoxy—rather than the ﬁrst position—of a univer­
sal orthodoxy qualiﬁed by local heresies—motivates many of the 
arguments of this book. However, the replacement of the maxi­
mization of free trade by the reconciliation of alternative develop­
ment trajectories as the organizing principle of international trade 
can ﬁnd support and guidance in either position. Each of them 
gives it a different meaning. Both of them will oppose the skepti­
cism of those who disbelieve in the existence of alternatives that 
are worth thinking about and ﬁghting for. 
Every powerful idea about society has some element of self-
fulﬁlling prophecy. Every such prophecy struggles with the stub­
born resistance of facts. To deﬁne the reconciliation of alternative 
pathways of national development within a world economy that 
becomes progressively more open as the commanding principle 
of the trading system is to establish a machine for the creation of 
collective difference. It is to support alternatives by making the 
world safer for them. 
Free Trade Reformed: Experimenting with the 

Form of the Market Economy

The second counterprinciple to place at the foundation of world 
commerce is a resistance to any attempt to entangle the cause of 
free trade in the imposition of a particular species of market 
economy. 
The trading rules must be so formulated as to presuppose and to 
foster alternative approaches to the understanding and the organi­
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may at ﬁrst seem almost entirely negative. It nevertheless has af­
ﬁrmative implications. Consider them in two areas: the scope 
and content of property rights, particularly as applied to the treat­
ment of intellectual property, and the deﬁnition and treatment of 
subsidies. 
The rules of global free trade should minimize requirements of 
institutional conformity. They should hold open the possibility 
that the adherents to the conventional doctrine of free trade im­
plicitly deny: that a market economy may assume institutional 
forms different from those that are now established—in the rich 
North Atlantic countries or anywhere else. The existing forms 
represent a subset of a larger, open-ended range of institutional 
possibilities or of directions for institutional innovation: innova­
tion in the way of organizing a market economy itself. 
This minimalism about markets creates space for the construc­
tion of comparative advantage by coordinated action between 
governments and ﬁrms. It also broadens the margin within which 
national governments can maneuver to create forms of the mar­
ket economy that are more socially inclusive and more capable of 
providing economic opportunity in more ways to more people. 
A lesson of historical experience is that it may be impossible 
radically to broaden access to the market economy, especially in 
the circumstances of very unequal societies, without changing 
the way in which that economy is organized. Once such national 
experimentation with the arrangements of the market economy 
gains strength, it may make possible an ideal that we have 
thus far nowhere seen realized: the experimental coexistence of 
different models of the market economy, including different 
regimes of private property and contract, within the same na­
tional economy. 
The advance of universal free trade will no longer be predicated 
on a narrowing of local or national alternatives. It will not prevent 
the pursuit of a goal that holds great promise for humanity: the 
radicalization of our freedom to combine factors of production 
within an unchallenged framework of market institutions into a 
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framework and to do so, without crisis or confrontation, as part 
of the normal life of an economy. 
This principled minimalism has a limit, the same limit under­
lying the idea that the goal of the world trading system should be 
to organize the coexistence of the divergent rather than to maxi­
mize the commerce of the convergent. The limit is the bias toward 
economic, social, and political pluralism, within countries as well 
as among them, that ought properly to be built into the rules 
of international trade. It should be built into those rules not only 
for the sake of the larger interests and values associated with 
such a pluralism but also for the sake of free trade itself and of its 
economic beneﬁts: specialization with experimentalism is more 
promising, economically as well as socially and politically, than 
specialization without experimentalism. The requirements of ex­
perimentalism go all the way from the political and economic or­
ganization of the whole world to the internal organization of the 
ﬁrm, the workplace, and the school. 
The rules of universal free trade must not entrench, as a re­
quirement of accession to the regime that they establish, the 
acceptance of any particular system of contract and property 
rights. They should not operate on the mistaken supposition 
that such a system inheres in the nature of a market economy. 
Their legal and institutional spirit should be one of a liberating 
open-mindedness about the range of ways in which a market 
economy can be organized. Such an agnosticism would give 
practical effect to an underexploited teaching of the legal sci­
ence of the period of 1850–1950: that there is no single natural 
and necessary legal and institutional form that a market econ­
omy need take, that diversity of such forms may require diver­
gent regimes of property and contract, and that no market econ­
omy can be made signiﬁcantly more inclusive without being 
reorganized. 
One species of this minimalism about private rights has special 
importance, the species dealing with intellectual property (a sub­
ject to which the discussion of the fourth counterprinciple 
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imentalism must not wed itself to the particular system of intel­
lectual property that has come to be established in the rich North 
Atlantic countries and that, with considerable success, those 
countries have since attempted to impose on the whole of hu­
manity. It is the peculiar character of that system of intellectual 
property to turn innovations into assets. The traditional argu­
ments in favor of that approach resemble in structure the con­
ventional case for the hereditary transmission of property: they 
combine an appeal to consequentialist arguments about incentives 
to  innovate with the deployment of deontological arguments 
about the deserved rewards of invention. The frailties of each ar­
gument are remedied by resort to the other one, and the two to­
gether pretend to an authority that neither of them alone would be 
able to enjoy.* 
The present arrangements for the protection of intellectual 
property are in no sense a natural and necessary implication of 
the commitment to establish a market economy. They are the 
contingent and extreme result of a particular way of encouraging 
innovators. They threaten to harm the very interests they are sup­
posedly designed to safeguard. 
There are alternatives. The least that can be demanded from the 
global trading regime with respect to intellectual property is that 
it not require those who join to forswear all such alternatives. For 
example, some countries could return to a road considered but 
not taken in nineteenth-century Europe: government-funded re­
wards for invention and public ﬁnancing of research in exchange 
for the immediate placement of the ﬁnanced and rewarded inven­
tions in the common property of mankind. Nothing in the rules 
of global trade should prevent such an experiment. 
Another aspect of the minimalism about market economies 
that the global trading regime should embrace is a decisive change 
in the treatment of so-called subsidies. Here the focus is not on the 
divergent paths by which a market economy may shape, through a 
regime of property, the decentralization of access to the means of 
production but on the different ways in which such an economy 
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can arrange the relations between private enterprise and govern­
mental initiative. 
There should be a heavy presumption against outlawing a 
practice on the ground that it represents a subsidy. Only when the 
government directly and immediately intervenes, and spends, in 
an effort to change the cost structure of exporting ﬁrms and to 
distort the commercial relations that would otherwise prevail, is 
there reason to prevent the intervention. Even then, the preferred 
remedy is not outright prohibition but the provision of a range of 
negotiated compensatory measures, all the way from trade favors 
accorded, in another department, to the foreign countries and 
businesses that may have been harmed to outright payment to the 
governments of such nations. 
The reasons for the reversal of the presumption against subsi­
dies that is favored by the emerging system of universal free trade 
are deep. They go to the root concerns motivating institutional 
minimalism about the organization of market economies. 
For one thing, we have seen that what statically may appear to 
be the trumping of a market-based allocation by a government-
commanded one may dynamically be something entirely differ­
ent. It may represent an early move in the reorganization of the 
market in some sector. The market may need to be reorganized to 
be made more inclusive. Radical reform of the agricultural and 
credit markets in the nineteenth-century United States provides 
classic examples. 
The problem presented by an attempt to distinguish the mere 
trumping of the present market allocation from the creation of 
another market, and therefore of another market allocation, is ag­
gravated by a conundrum of prospective and retrospective insight. 
We  may often be unable to tell beforehand which is which— 
market suppression or market reorganization: only success in re­
organizing the market, especially to the end of making it more 
inclusive, will prove the point. However, failure will not sufﬁce 
to  justify us in casting the failed initiative as a mere subsidy; 
many failures may be needed to produce one success. The point, as 
Karl Popper said of mistakes in science, will be to make them as 
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For another thing, the whole history of the economic rise of 
nations in the modern world is a history of the political construc­
tion of economic advantage, through everything from war to 
compensatory public investment. What the public investment 
compensates at the early stages of growth, in the economy as a 
whole or in one of its sectors, may be a localized market failure. It 
may also, and more commonly, be the inhibition to growth result­
ing from the relative scarcity of the resources, the facilities, the in­
citements, and the skills that would be more densely available in a 
more developed economy. 
The apparent subsidy may be the deus ex machina that makes it 
possible to go from almost nothing to something. For richer coun­
tries to proscribe such compensatory investment as outlawed sub­
sidies would indeed amount to kicking away the ladder on which 
they rose. 
As with the ﬁrst proposal—to put the reconciliation of alternative 
development trajectories within a progressively more open world 
economy in place of the maximization of free trade as the organ­
izing principle of international commerce—so this second pro­
posal will seem revolutionary or not, according to the assump­
tions with which one approaches it. 
The implicit dominant view in most established economic 
thinking is that a market economy must have a foreordained in­
stitutional content if it is to do the work of efﬁcient signaling and 
allocation that such thinking assigns to it. One part of this neces­
sary institutional content will be a regime of private property and 
contractual freedom similar to the one that emerged in the course 
of modern European history. Another part is a wall separating the 
state from the individual or the ﬁrm, and governmental action or 
public policy from private enterprise. 
It will be conceded, in this dominant view, that particular rules 
and arrangements may differ according to the prevailing legal tra­
dition. It will also be admitted that room exists for a signiﬁcant 
margin for variation, especially in the relative importance of the 
market and the state. When it regulates, redistributes, or even pro­
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conception, the power of the market to shape resource allocation 
according to its inner workings. However, such variations do noth­
ing to change the fundamental institutional content of a market 
economy. 
This view becomes explicit and is openly defended in only one 
of the major styles of economic thought: the one labeled in the 
earlier chapter on comparative advantage the strategy of preten­
sion, with its aggressive advocacy of a particular institutional 
program as the intrinsic nature of the market economy and an in­
dispensable backdrop to economic and political freedom. The 
same view, however, is left unchallenged by the other leading styles 
of economic thinking. The purists take refuge in their analytic 
agnosticism. The equivocators deploy what they refuse to defend, 
accepting, by default and without quarrel, the identiﬁcation of the 
rational—the idea of the market—with the real—the narrow 
range of varieties of market economy that came to prevail in the 
course of modern Western history. 
Any departure from the sole recognized type of market econ­
omy will fall under suspicion of representing a slide into di­
rigisme, into one or another way of meddling with the market and 
of trumping the allocation of resources at which the market 
would arrive were it able to operate perfectly. The case for regula­
tion will seem to depend on the need to redress a “market failure,” 
compensating for its consequences until its causes can be reme­
died. The idea that what is statically a subsidy—an allocation of 
resources overriding the actual or idealized market allocation— 
may dynamically amount to an early move in the reorganization 
of the market (to make the market, for example, more inclusive 
socially) will appear to be unintelligible or fallacious. Talk of 
alternative regimes of private and social property coexisting ex­
perimentally within the same economy will seem dangerous, if 
not futile. Such talk will be mistaken for an unacknowledged at­
tack on the private law categories lying at the heart of the market 
economy. 
Considered from the vantage point of this view, in any of its 
variations, an insistence that the rules of international trade not re­
quire adherence to any particular version of the market economy 192  ❍  chapter five 
may seem to offer little beneﬁt in return for real detriment. There 
seems to be little beneﬁt because there is no prospect of worth­
while and fundamental reconstruction of the market economy. 
There appears to be real detriment because the attempt to act as if 
there were alternative market economies (as distinguished from 
limited “varieties of capitalism”) will provide cover for distortions 
of trade as well as for restraints on the market. Toleration of subsi­
dies may exemplify both these evils. 
The signiﬁcance of the minimalism about markets in this sec­
ond proposal for the reformation of world trade changes entirely 
if we come to it armed with the belief that such alternatives are fea­
sible and necessary. In this contrasting view, the established forms 
of the market economy prevent the anarchic experimentalism of 
the market from being radicalized. They keep the freedom to com­
bine factors of production from turning into a more far-reaching 
power to recombine the components of the institutional setting of 
production and exchange. They frustrate the worldwide desire to 
achieve a form of economic growth that would be anchored in a 
great and irreversible expansion of economic opportunity. They 
make the goal of expanding access to the means of production 
hostage to the eternity and the absoluteness of the conventional 
property right. They represent a setting hostile to the propagation 
throughout the economy of the advanced practices of innovation-
friendly cooperation beyond the boundaries of the advantaged 
and advanced sectors in which these practices are most likely to 
ﬂourish. They are the beneﬁciaries of superstition working in the 
service of inhibition and injustice. 
International trade should not be organized either to reinforce 
these established forms of the market economy or to impose any 
particular alternative to them. It should be organized to be as 
neutral as possible in the contest about them. It should avoid 
turning their adversaries into opponents of the shared effort to 
develop an open global economy. 
Ideas and institutional innovations that would deepen democ­
racy, democratize market economies, and enhance the educa­
tional and economic endowments of individuals lend greater 
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economic order.* So, too, do ideas about alternative trajectories of 
national economic development. Both sets of ideas suggest how 
much we stand to gain by insisting that an open world economy 
be in fact open to the emergence of institutional and development 
alternatives as well as to the movement of goods and services. 
It is nevertheless vital to the integrity and the authority of such 
proposals that the case for them not depend on commitment to 
any particular set of such alternatives. Instead of lending its force 
to the contested idea that the world does and should converge on a 
single version of the market economy, and indeed of democracy 
and liberty, the global trading regime should help let the future go 
free. It should remain as neutral as possible in the contest among 
alternative visions of the social future. In the same way and for the 
same reasons, it should struggle for impartiality in the contest be­
tween the view that the universal orthodoxy should be qualiﬁed by 
local heresies and the conviction that it can and should be resisted 
by a heresy that is as universalizing as the orthodoxy it opposes. 
If there are no valuable alternatives, this liberating minimalism 
will help discredit them all the more quickly, preventing the 
ghostlike remnants of inherited ideological fantasy from distract­
ing us from the only reliable path of advance. If there are valuable 
alternatives to be identiﬁed and developed, this worldwide exper­
iment in the making of difference will not merely help reveal 
them; it will help make them. 
Free Trade Reformed: Free Movements of Things 
and Money Chastened, Free Movement of People 
and Ideas Enhanced 
The third plank in the platform of this program for the reform of 
the world trade regime is a radical change in the relations among 
*I develop such ideas in two programmatic works, Democracy Real­
ized: The Progressive Alternative,V erso, 1998, and What Should the Left 
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free trade in goods and services, free ﬂows of capital, and free 
movement of people. My earlier discussion anticipates the impli­
cations of this change as well as its justiﬁcation. 
The enhancement of opportunities for free ﬂows of capital 
should be entirely disconnected from the development of free 
trade. When a country may have reason to restrict these ﬂows as 
part of its effort to raise a shield over heresy is likely to be a matter 
of circumstance. The occasions to restrict the inward and outward 
movement of money may be far more common in the situations 
of relative advantage: those in which a country, within striking 
range of some of its major trading partners, ﬁnds itself engaged in 
the early stages of its effort to work out a rebellious and original 
strategy of national development. Thus, not by imposed rule but 
by a foreseeable concatenation of circumstance, a temporary re­
treat from free trade may coincide with an ephemeral restraint on 
the movement of money. In the long run, the cause of free ﬂows of 
capital may be better served than harmed by a regime that avoids 
requiring those who would advance that cause to wear a strait­
jacket of conformity. 
The place accorded in established dogma to sympathy for the 
movement of capital should be given instead to the movement of 
people. Such a bias should be built into the multilateral proce­
dures, arrangements, and rules in which the emerging regime of 
world trade has its life. It should be a presumption, although one 
that can be rebutted. 
The gradual strengthening of the right of labor to cross national 
frontiers is a direct inference from the ideas and assumptions 
justifying conﬁdence in the market as a way of allocating and com­
bining resources. It is also, by a long shot, the most effective contri­
bution to the diminishment of inequality among nations. 
If the enfranchisement of labor mobility were to be pursued too 
quickly or incautiously, its advantages would soon be overwhelmed 
by the vast disturbances and reactions it would trigger: the worsen­
ing of the position of relatively unskilled labor and of the rights of 
labor in general in the richer countries, the unbearable burden im­
posed on the already overburdened regimes of social security and 
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tribal loyalties and identiﬁcations that, in many smaller and com­
paratively homogenous social democracies, have helped sustain 
support for the social-democratic settlement of the recent past, and 
the loss of scarce skilled talent by the countries of emigration. 
Each of these real or potential problems, however, can yield to 
the cumulative effect of prudent dosage: for example, the se­
quencing of temporary work permits, partial social entitlements, 
and full social and political rights. Such a sequence would be ac­
companied by provisions to compensate the countries that lose 
skilled workers on whose education and training they have had to 
lavish resources they cannot easily replace. These precautionary 
and gradualist measures, when combined with the immense iner­
tial forces of attachment and habit that dissuade all but the most 
restless from foreign adventures, should sufﬁce to moderate the 
dangers of greater labor mobility while enabling the whole world 
to seize some of its beneﬁts. 
First among the formidable practical obstacles to the enhance­
ment of labor’s freedom to move are the threat to the position of 
labor and to the level of social entitlements in the receiving coun­
tries and the loss of educated talent in the sending countries. There 
are, however, solutions to these daunting problems. Immigrants 
can be admitted in slowly growing numbers. They can acquire so­
cial and political rights in successive tiers. Countries losing edu­
cated workers can be compensated for the investment in the skills 
of skilled labor by countries gaining them. 
The remedies of gradualism and compensation in turn mitigate 
a more fundamental danger: that the increasing presence of the 
stranger, weakening the sense of cultural homogeneity and na­
tional cohesion, may erode the basis of whatever, by way of practi­
cal social solidarity, the existing social democracies have achieved. 
A considerable body of evidence supports the view that an active 
sense of responsibility for other people—and for other people’s 
children—transcends only with difﬁculty the loyalties of the tribe. 
It is true that European social democracy ﬂourished during the 
twentieth century in a setting marked by national identiﬁcation 
and ethnic unity. In that setting, it proved easier than it might 
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to the question, who is my brother? Yet even the most tribal of the 
European social democracies is not, and never was, a family writ 
large: in each instance, the sense of reciprocal attachment was 
forged on the basis of shared responsibility and common pur­
pose. Democracy must multiply opportunities for such nation-
creating experiences: the richer and the deeper these experiences 
become, the more capable they are of drawing in the stranger. To 
be able to bear more strangeness is an aspect of being more open 
to the new, and greater openness to the new is one of the most im­
portant attributes of the advance of a democratic society and of 
the culture that sustains it. 
Thus, in reﬂecting on the difﬁculties that must be surmounted 
for labor to gain larger freedom of movement to cross national 
frontiers, it is not enough to deal with the threat such freedom 
poses to the workers of the North and to the societies of the 
South. It is necessary as well as to confront the challenge it pres­
ents to the established idea of nationality. The value of difference 
among nations in a world of democracies is to allow humanity to 
develop its powers by developing them in different directions: 
distinct forms of life, embodied in characteristic practices and in­
stitutions. Under democracy, prophecy must speak louder than 
memory. The distinction of nations becomes, in such a world, an 
inspiration to moral variety within humanity. 
According to one of the fundamental and false premises of lib­
eral political theory, a liberal democracy should distinguish be­
tween the impersonal right established in its institutions and its 
laws and the controversial views of the good that its individual 
citizens embrace. The truth, however, is that no such distinction 
can be sustained. It is a virtue of a democratic society to open it­
self to a broad range of human experience and possibility. Every 
institutional order, however, encourages some forms of experi­
ence and discourages others. The pursuit of a mirage of neutrality 
among different visions of the good—a tenet of classical liberal 
doctrine—gets in the way of the struggle to achieve the real goal 
of experimental openness to difference, contest, and novelty. 
The encouragement of moral specialization within humanity, 
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freedom and thus democracy itself, if it failed to ensure, as a coun­
terpart or condition, the right of the individual to escape the soci­
ety in which he happens to have been born and to join another. He 
must not be bound, by the accident of his birth, to a moral special­
ization with which he may lack sympathy. For this reason, the right 
to move is closely related to the value of the political partition of 
humanity. 
These remarks suggest why the principle granting freedom to 
things (and to capital by analogy to things) but denying it to peo­
ple should be replaced, and what should replace it. What should 
substitute for that invidious dogma is a predisposition progres­
sively to expand the right of people to cross national frontiers. It is 
a predisposition that should remain subject to the prudential care 
to achieve even large advances in small steps. It should be quali­
ﬁed by the judgment of circumstance and opportunity. 
Selective and temporary constraints on the movement of 
money may sometimes help a country take the initial steps in the 
execution of a rebellious strategy of national development. They 
may hasten rather than postpone the day when it can have a fully 
convertible currency. Because such restrictions on capital ﬂows 
may form part of the initiatives composing the shield over heresy 
in development (as discussed earlier), they may help place a devel­
oping country in a position in which it no longer needed to pay for 
a convertible currency the price of renouncing any such resistance. 
A limited and superﬁcial openness will not need to be achieved at 
the cost of a more general and fundamental freedom. Freedom of 
movement for money is an expedient, often useful and sometimes 
temporarily dangerous, its signiﬁcance and effect fully shaped by 
the context in which it is deployed. By contrast, freedom of move­
ment for people is a matter of principle, closely connected with the 
chief advantages of a market economy, subject to circumstantial 
constraint, and pregnant with immense practical consequence. 
The movement gradually to establish a universal right of labor 
to cross national frontiers depends for its force and integrity on 
the continuance of a transformation already underway through­
out much of the planet: the recasting of the differences among 
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quasi-biological succession. A world in which a devotion to the 
rights, the endowments, and the capabilities of the individual is 
combined with a vast expansion of the opportunity for difference 
and distinction in forms of collective life provides a much better 
background to the advancement of a reformed system of global 
free trade than one in which free trade depends on national con­
formity and institutional convergence. And a world in which every 
individual can, at the limit, escape his accidental birth in a social 
and cultural world he rejects, and make his sympathies triumph 
over his fate, will be more hospitable to the permanent creation of 
the new than one in which people are denied that freedom. 
Free Trade Reformed: From Wage Slavery to Free Labor 
The fourth principle on which a reformed system for universal free 
trade should rest is that its arrangements be designed to help free 
labor become free in fact. They should help diminish the extent to 
which free labor continues, because of economic duress, to resem­
ble the slavery and the serfdom that it was meant to replace. At 
stake is the status of work and of workers under the world division 
of labor and the practical content of the legal status of free labor. 
I have argued that of the three forms free labor can assume— 
wage labor, self-employment, and partnership—only the last two, 
or some combination of them, completes the break with slavery 
and realizes fully the idea of a market economy. Partnership en­
joys an advantage over self-employment as a basis for cooperation 
capable of exploiting economies of scale. Wage labor, however, re­
mains everywhere the dominant form of free labor. The question 
now before us is whether the development of an open world 
economy will be built on assumptions and arrangements that ei­
ther limit or aggravate the features of wage labor that render it an 
incomplete and suspect realization of the ideal of free work. 
It matters to every aspect of our experience and our future that 
free labor be really free. It matters to humanity’s revelation to itself 
as context-transcending spirit. It matters not least to the character 
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the relation between employers and employees to be real, and 
another thing for it be a feint. It matters to the likely forms of our fu­
ture economic and social arrangements if labor in its present expres­
sions is closer to slavery and serfdom or further away from them. 
The most immediate means to the end of making free labor re­
ally free is the linkage of trade to labor standards. By the terms of 
this linkage, the global, regional, and bilateral arrangements es­
tablishing free trade are conditioned on an acceptance of stan­
dards ensuring that free wage work will become increasingly less 
like slavery and serfdom. By the terms of the basic deal that would 
enshrine this linkage, poorer, less productive countries would 
commit themselves to uphold ever more exacting labor standards 
in exchange for access to the markets of richer countries as well as 
for an overturning of barriers to the free ﬂow of ideas throughout 
the world. Prominent among such barriers are those imposed by 
the present legal regime of intellectual property. 
There are good reasons to establish in small, successive steps 
the free movement of people throughout the world. There are, 
however, no good reasons to limit, even temporarily, the free 
movement of ideas. The movement of things should be judged 
beneﬁcial to humanity to the extent that it is based on arrange­
ments inviting the movement of ideas and people. The movement 
of ideas and people overpowers in material and moral signiﬁ­
cance the movement of things; the single most important consid­
eration in assessing the organization of the latter is its relation to 
the organization of the former. 
A deﬁnition of the labor standards that would serve as the ob­
ject of linkage should today include four elements and a horizon 
of development. This deﬁnition represents only a modest en­
hancement of ideas that have already begun to command author­
ity throughout the world. 
A ﬁrst element in the applicable labor standards is the prohibi­
tion of all forms of slavery or forced labor, overt and covert, that 
deny the freedom of the worker to sell or to refuse to sell his labor. 
The same prohibition applies to all circumstances in which the 
factual presuppositions of individual self-determination are miss­
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individual is placed in jeopardy. Thus, child labor must be forbid­
den. So must circumstances of extreme danger or exertion unless 
the worker, fully informed of them and not driven to accept them 
by fear or necessity, chooses to face them in return for extraordi­
nary compensation. 
A second element is the outlawing of all forms of arbitrary dis­
crimination in the allocation of employment and remuneration. 
Workers must not be placed and paid according to prejudices 
without reasonable relation to the value of the tasks they accom­
plish. The acceptance of arbitrary classiﬁcations among workers 
creates a situation antagonistic to recognition of the context-
transcendent personality of the individual worker. It diminishes 
the distance of free labor from slavery or serfdom by treating in­
dividuals as destined to a type of work or compensation by virtue 
of membership in a social category from which they are powerless 
to escape regardless of the worth of what they can do or learn. 
A third element is a living wage. The worker must receive a 
wage that enables him to sustain his own life and the lives of his 
dependents with the minimum degree of personal dignity that is 
recognized and required in the circumstances of his time, his 
community, and his society. Suppose, exceptionally, that his 
country is too poor and unproductive to assure him of such a 
wage. Suppose that it cannot do so even when its adherence to 
labor standards is rewarded by greater access to the markets of 
rich countries as well as to their ideas, practices, and inventions. 
In such a circumstance, the supplementary remuneration of the 
worker or the enhancement of the productivity of his labor be­
comes the responsibility of the entire world. Failure to obtain a 
living wage amounts once again to a shortening of the distance 
between free labor and slavery: extreme economic necessity 
threatens to make a travesty of the contractual form of the em­
ployment relation and to rob the worker of the practical require­
ments of independent economic and moral agency. 
The fourth element is a way of organizing the relations be­
tween capital and labor and, more broadly, the political life of the 
people that allows there to be a peaceful contest over the terms on 
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that dependent wage labor is itself a defective form of free labor 
and one that represents an unﬁnished break from slavery. The 
right of association—the right to organize and to strike—is the 
most immediate and familiar expression of this requirement. 
Just as there should be experimentation with the forms of the 
market economy, so too there should be experimentation with 
the forms of association. The most effective type of union organi­
zation may, for example, be one combining the corporatist princi­
ple of automatic unionization of all workers in an economy with 
the contractualist principle of complete freedom to stake out dif­
ferent positions within the union structure that is established. 
Rival labor movements, connected or not with political parties, 
would compete for position in this structure just as political par­
ties compete for a place in the structure of government. Auto­
matic unionization would shift the focus of energy away from 
whether to associate and toward how to use the power resulting 
from association, to the beneﬁt of the economically weakest seg­
ments of a national labor force. It would give a solidaristic and 
inclusive tilt to negotiation between employers and employees, 
inhibiting the entrenchment of stark divisions between privileged 
insiders, holding well-paid jobs in the more capital-intensive, 
productive sectors of the economy, and disenfranchised outsiders, 
with unstable and poorly paid jobs in the capital-starved sectors 
of the economy. And, by its inclusiveness of membership and 
robustness, it would make it more likely for the concerns of the 
membership to go beyond economic claims and to focus on 
rights and institutions. 
The advantages of association can be realized most completely 
only in the context of democracy, and indeed of an effort to com­
bine traits of representative and direct democracy. The more 
organized and participatory a society, the greater is its power to 
envisage alternative futures and to work them out, and the greater 
the likelihood that the effort to make free labor really free will 
come to the center of social concern. 
What the enfranchisement of labor cannot have as a measure of 
its sufﬁciency is success in obtaining any particular share in na­
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advance of the real wage must be tied to increases in the produc­
tivity of labor is, I have claimed, false, despite its widespread 
acceptance. The course of politics and the institutions of the 
economy and the polity will powerfully inﬂuence the part of na­
tional income accruing to labor. However, a persistent lag of the 
real wage behind productivity gains establishes a presumption of 
danger as well as of unfairness. Absence or weakness of an upward 
tilt to the wage means diminished pressure, in a sector of the 
economy or in an economy as whole, to climb the ladder of forms 
of economic life that are increasingly productive because they use 
repetitious machines to help people spend more time doing what 
they do not yet know how to repeat. 
These four components of the labor standards that should be 
incorporated into the conditions of trade among nations are uni­
ﬁed by the horizon toward which they advance. This horizon is 
the alleviation of the economic duress weighing on wage labor 
and the gradual replacement of wage labor, as the standard status 
of work, by self-employment or partnership. The substitution of 
self-employment and partnership for wage labor can be recon­
ciled with imperatives of scale and discretion in production only 
through a vast enlargement of the range of forms of private and 
social property. 
The immediate occasion for this linkage of trade to labor standards 
is the need to address two major problems in the contemporary 
world. The ﬁrst problem is the threat to the situation of workers in 
the rich countries represented by the formation of a universal labor 
pool, most especially by the arrival of vast masses of poor but in­
creasingly skilled workers in China and India. The second problem 
is the constraint on which labor is placed in the developing coun­
tries to compensate for low total factor productivity by continuing 
repression of the wage take from national income. This repression 
passes, at the limit, into forms of oppression and subjugation that 
diminish the difference between wage labor and slavery. 
A partial response to these two problems at once is to incorpo­
rate into the legal conditions of free trade the labor standards I 
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labor to self-employment and partnership. The poorer countries 
would agree to such standards, according to this response, in re­
turn for greater access to the markets of the rich countries and to 
the ideas and inventions that emanate from them. (I later con­
sider what this greater access to ideas and inventions requires.) 
The case for the incorporation, however, transcends its immedi­
ate justiﬁcations: the interest and the ideal on which it rests is the 
building of an open world economy on the basis of free labor and 
the completion of the struggle to expunge from free work the 
remnants of slavery that continue to taint it. 
Past experience suggests that the deal of labor standards for 
market access and for accessibility to ideas and inventions may 
have two opposite sets of practical effects. 
On the one hand, it may impose an upward pressure on the re­
turns to labor, providing an incitement to climb more quickly in 
the scale of the dialectic between our repetitious and our not yet 
repeatable activities. It would then be as if the whole of humanity 
had been lifted into a higher key of productivity and ambition. 
On the other hand, however, it may also help throw some 
economies into a trap of high unit-labor costs. The effective cost of 
labor may increase while productivity fails to rise accordingly. The 
Mexican situation, cited earlier, exempliﬁes such an outcome: 
labor costs that can never be as low as those of the major econo­
mies in which work is cheapest but without the productivity gains 
that even some of those cheap-labor countries (China, India) have 
achieved—gains in total factor productivity as well as in labor pro­
ductivity. This productivity trap has been set without any linkage 
of labor standards to trade having been established. The increase 
of wage costs resulting from the linkage might, however, worsen it; 
the enhancement of the status of labor may fail to result in an en­
hancement of either labor or total factor productivity. 
Two sets of inﬂuences, one distinguishing paths of national de­
velopment, the other characterizing the arrangements of the 
world economic order, make it more likely for the benign outcome 
to prevail—the ascent rather than the trap. These internal and ex­
ternal inﬂuences may help perpetuate a permanent revolution in 
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The internal inﬂuences can in turn be divided into three cate­
gories of initiatives. Each of them has been explored in earlier 
parts of this book. 
One set of inﬂuences has to do with the shield raised over 
heresy in the choice of strategies of national development. A gov­
ernment must reject the latter-day functional equivalent to the 
late nineteenth-century gold standard: the syndrome of low do­
mestic saving; heavy dependence on foreign capital; uncondi­
tional freedom for capital to come and go; weak links between 
saving and production; management of the public debt in the in­
terest of rentiers to the detriment of the interests of workers and 
entrepreneurs; ﬁscal discipline achieved by cuts in public spend­
ing and investment rather than by sustained increases in the tax 
take; and, in general, abdication of any national strategy. These 
ideas and arrangements have the effect of tying the hands of the 
government and subjecting it to the whims and vetoes of the do­
mestic and global capital markets. They amount to a self-inﬂicted 
emasculation. Instead, the government should mobilize the natu­
ral, ﬁnancial, and human resources of the nation, reversing each 
of the elements of this syndrome of surrender. At the limit, it 
should organize a war economy without a war. 
A second series of attributes of the national direction that can 
increase the likelihood of the benign result is that it be marked by 
a commitment to make the market economy more inclusive by 
reorganizing it. The commanding goal must be the expansion of 
economic and educational opportunity. The broadening of eco­
nomic opportunity will repeatedly require innovations in the 
terms by which people acquire claims to productive resources, 
and thus ultimately in the regimes of contract and property. 
Such innovations will include changes in the ways in which pri­
vate enterprise can coexist with governmental policy. They cannot 
rest content with the choice presented by the American model of 
arm’s length regulation of business by government and the impo­
sition of uniﬁed industrial policy by a central bureaucracy. The 
innovations should also make it easier for private producers to 
pool resources at the same time that they compete, developing 
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Public initiative should be used to counteract the inhibitions of 
relative backwardness and to make up for the difﬁculty in that cir­
cumstance of using one line of production to open up another. 
However, this help, intended to arouse a fever of entrepreneurial 
activity, should be accompanied by the selective mechanisms of 
competition, winnowing out its better and worse results. If for­
eign competition is limited by the qualiﬁcations that apply to the 
introduction of free trade, domestic competition should be made 
all the more vigorous. 
The widening of educational opportunity requires a school 
that rescues the child from the family as well as from the state and 
that assures him mastery of a core of generic practical and con­
ceptual capabilities. It calls for an education faithful to the exper­
imentalist ideal in its focus on problem solving and analysis 
rather than information, its cooperative rather than authoritarian 
and individualistic setting, its preference for selective deepening 
over encyclopedic scope, and its devotion to dialectic over all 
dogma. 
A third group of incitements to a continued rise in total factor 
productivity is the opening of the gateways of access to the ad­
vanced sectors of production: those that are characterized less by 
the accumulation of capital and technology than by the propaga­
tion of the practices of innovation-friendly cooperation. The 
turning of production into permanent innovation, the mixture of 
cooperation and competition and the attenuation of rigid divi­
sions between conception and implementation, as well as among 
implementing roles, must not be allowed to ﬂourish solely in the 
favored conditions of advanced sectors only weakly linked to the 
rest of the economy. These practices must be spread beyond their 
expected place—the vanguards of production. They must be in­
troduced before their expected time—the achievement of devel­
oped country status. They must advance and spread without a 
blueprint—by the organized contagion of decentralized inspira­
tion rather than the contrived scheming of an all-knowing power. 
None of this can occur except by making it happen, through 
forms of governmental initiative and social action. Such initia­
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countries or in the more backward sectors of the most advanced 
economies, of the conditions favoring this productive van­
guardism: exacting education and high trust. 
The chief international condition that would help turn the ele­
vation of labor standards into an incitement to a continuing rise 
in total factor productivity rather than a productivity trap is the 
free ﬂow of ideas and inventions throughout the world. (Mechan­
ical inventions are no more than ideas embodied in things, the 
rule-like formulas in which we can express repetitious labor and 
the physical contraptions in which we can embody such formu­
las.) The result of this freedom would be to diminish the reality of 
one of the assumptions on which Ricardo based the doctrine of 
comparative advantage: the distinction among the technologies 
of production available to different countries. 
What was said of the scientiﬁc ambitions of the members of the 
Royal Society in seventeenth-century England should be repeated 
of every member of the world trading system: “[they] ought to 
have their eyes in all parts, and to receive information from every 
quarter of the earth, they ought to have a constant universal intel­
ligence; all discoveries should be brought to them. . .”* 
The effective availability of the ideas and inventions of the 
whole world in every part of the world would not automatically 
cause a worldwide revolution in productivity; there are many 
steps between even an idea that has already been housed in a ma­
chine and its effective use of that mechanical invention. Neverthe­
less, it would vastly increase the prospect for such a revolution 
and for its efﬁcacy as a continuing force rather than as a one-time 
event. 
The most burdensome obstacle to this outcome is the estab­
lished legal regime of intellectual property. Today the richest 
countries seek to extend and to enforce this regime throughout 
the planet as a condition of world free trade and an inherent fea­
ture of the type of market economy they seek to make universal. 
*Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society,e dited by Jackson I. 
Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
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They insist on seeing this regime incorporated into all multilat­
eral, regional, and bilateral arrangements. The development of an 
open world economy should instead be accompanied by radical 
revision of this regime. 
The structure of the argument for the established way of pro­
tecting intellectual property parallels the structure of the defense 
of the hereditary transmission of property. The difference lies 
only in the outcome: in one instance, a loss to equality of oppor­
tunity; in the other, a harm to the common interest of mankind in 
rendering work throughout the world less repetitious and more 
productive. 
In both controversies, two distinct arguments are deployed and 
combined: one from natural right, the other from indispensable 
incentives. The ﬁrst argument is from prepolitical or natural right: 
the legitimacy of the right, whether to inherit or to charge a rent 
for the use of an invention, would result from an unbroken succes­
sion of entitlements. Nothing but the legitimate origin of the right 
and the legitimate chain of transactions marking its life could, in 
this view, ground the entitlement of the present rightholder. 
All such argument from natural right shares in the character of 
an enslaving superstition: it naturalizes the arrangements of soci­
ety by denying or radically underestimating the contingent and 
constructed character of the property right and the variety of 
ways, each of them with very different consequences for society, 
in which effort can be rewarded. It also misplaces the source of 
concern for the empowerment of the individual and for his pro­
tection against all forms of governmental and private oppression 
in privileges that become themselves devices of exclusion and 
subjugation. What is crucial is that the individual be secure in a 
haven of vital safeguards and economic and educational endow­
ments not dependent on holding any particular job or place in so­
ciety. Such safeguards and endowments are the sole reliable basis 
for his ability to resist, change, and transcend the settings within 
which he acts. 
If the argument from natural right is fallacious, the argument 
from incentives is incomplete and inconclusive. The right of in­
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The exclusionary protection of intellectual property through the 
patent system, with its establishment of a legal monopoly, would 
be required to remunerate the large risks and investments, of 
money and time, needed to ﬁnance invention in the long process 
from speculative conjecture to practical realization. 
It is a real, not a sham, argument. However, its weight depends 
on the nature of the accessible alternative ways to achieve the 
same incentive with less collateral harm. Can the allowance of 
only modest family inheritance preserve the major part of the in­
centive effects of the hereditary transmission of property, given 
that the accumulation of wealth is attended by a host of advan­
tages, of power and preeminence, that do not depend for their 
force on a right to enrich one’s heirs? Can a system of public re­
wards and subsidies—like the ones tried out and suppressed in 
the nineteenth century—provide much of what is needed by 
means of encouragement to invention? Or can nonexclusive and 
limited claims to the returns, such as a venture capitalist might 
enjoy in enterprises he helps ﬁnance, ensure the desired effect 
when rewards and subsidies prove insufﬁcient? 
The bad argument from natural right and the inconclusive ar­
gument from incentives are not turned into a good and conclusive 
argument by being, as they in practice are, indistinctly combined, 
the weakness of each one disguised by the appeal to the other. 
We  have a large stake in ﬁnding practical alternatives to a legal 
regime that inhibits people around the world from sharing more 
fully in the products of human ingenuity and that threatens to di­
minish the value of free labor as an incitement to permanent rev­
olution in both total factor and labor productivity. 
Consider now, in the light of the previous three counterprinci­
ples, this fourth counterprinciple to the principles governing the 
regime of world trade. The overt subject of this book has been the 
movement of things across national boundaries. One of its covert 
subjects has been the movement of people and ideas across those 
same frontiers. The most that we can hope of the movement of 
things is that it be sometimes useful, although we must recognize 
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The movement of people and ideas is vastly more useful than 
the movement of things as a source of greater equality, as well as 
of greater wealth and power, for all mankind. Both the movement 
of people and the movement of ideas have the potential to make a 
contribution to economic growth as well as to economic or tech­
nological innovation, that overpowers any contribution we have 
received, or can ever expect, from the worldwide movement of 
things. Both the movement of people and the movement of ideas 
have built into them an irresistible equalizing force: through the 
workings of each of them, economic growth and social equality 
can be allied rather than opposed. 
The movement of people and ideas is, however, more than use­
ful; it is sacrosanct. It forms part of the process by which the 
whole human race becomes both one and diverse, and makes it­
self more godlike, by afﬁrming in the individual as well as in the 
species, its preeminence over the particular social and cultural 
worlds that it builds and inhabits. Both the movement of people 
and the movement of ideas can unsettle and frighten us, driving 
us back into ourselves. They can also inspire us to reimagine and 
to remake our interests, our ideals, and even our identities by be­
ginning to detach them from the settings with which we habitu­
ally associate them. Each of them is therefore an invitation to 
open ourselves to the new, in a world in which every man and 
woman has a better chance to become the original that he imag­
ines himself to be. 
It follows from this line of reasoning that one of the most im­
portant standards by which to judge when the movement of 
things is either useful or harmful is to determine when it either 
advances the movement of people and ideas or sets it back. To at­
tribute to the movement of things the sanctity that properly 
belongs to the movement of people and ideas is more than an 
economic and political mistake; it is a spiritual perversion, tainted 
by idolatry, the confusion of living, transcendent, and embodied 
spirit with lifeless objects. 
The same way of thinking exempliﬁed by this linkage between 
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connection between trade and standards for the protection of na­
ture. The distinctive character of the problem, however, requires 
that the linkage have features that are absent from the linkage to 
labor standards. 
Some of the reasons to incorporate environmental standards 
into trade agreements are familiar. They work to prevent the 
spread of unsustainable forms of economic growth. They have the 
potential to unite humanity in the defense of a universal interest, 
including the avoidance of destructive climate change. They are a 
requirement of justice among generations, preventing the enrich­
ment of the living from being achieved at the cost of depriving the 
unborn of the spiritual as well as the material advantages of na­
ture less spoiled. There are, however, further reasons to link trade 
to environmental standards. 
One such reason is that the pressure to produce and to grow 
under the restraint of protection of nature may also encourage 
technological and organizational innovation and contribute to a 
permanent revolution in productivity. The depredation of nature 
is not only a wrong that we do to ourselves and to our descendants; 
it is also an easy escape from the pressure to do more with less, as if 
we were to pillage nature to avoid taxing our own ingenuity. 
Once again, however, the increased pressure may have two op­
posite outcomes: a strengthened impulse toward a sustained rise in 
total factor as well as labor productivity or a further descent into a 
low-productivity trap. The burden and the danger are likely to fall 
most heavily on the developing countries, which are least able to 
bear them. Once again, this likelihood requires that these coun­
tries be compensated for their adherence to environmental stan­
dards by enhanced access to the markets of the rich economies as 
well as to the ideas and inventions of the whole world. Such com­
pensations, however, may well prove inadequate. They need to be 
supplemented in two ways. 
A ﬁrst supplement is the use of an increasing scale. The stan­
dards should be related to gross categories of development and 
productivity, beginning low and becoming more demanding 
as the country rises in this ranking. If the world, especially the 
rich world, wants a faster schedule, it should pay to obtain it, with proposals  ❍  211 
outright cash transfers as well as with enhanced market access. 
Moreover, it will have no basis on which to propose a sliding scale 
of environmental standards to the developing countries if, within 
itself, it contains powers that resist the application of such a slid­
ing scale to themselves (the case of the United States today). 
A second supplement addresses the issue presented when there 
is interest in restricting, for the beneﬁt of humanity, the form of 
development of an entire region located within an individual 
country. It is the extreme form of a pervasive problem; an un­
equal sacriﬁce to secure a universal beneﬁt. A similar difﬁculty 
may arise more obliquely when the environmental restraints fall 
on a range of technologies or businesses for which a particular 
country may be especially well suited by established comparative 
advantage. In all such instances, the same generic solution may be 
appropriate: the world should pay with increased market access 
or straightforward cash transfers. 
The usefulness of such a solution lies in its promise of extend­
ing the opportunity to safeguard common interests of the part­
ners in a global trading system while minimizing the restraints on 
experimental diversity among the partners. Both the aim and the 
method can apply to matters far beyond the scope of environ­
mental concerns. 
A ﬁnal justiﬁcation of the linkage between trade and environ­
mental standards remains. It goes to the heart of the view of 
humanity animating the argument of this book. The central idea in 
this view is that we are greater, individually as well as collectively, 
than the social and cultural worlds we build and inhabit. For us, 
there can be no ﬁnal frame of reference, an institutional or concep­
tual context that could serve as our deﬁnitive home and accommo­
date the varieties of experience that we have power to create and 
reason to value. The impossibility of such a deﬁnitive frame of ref­
erence has two large implications. 
The ﬁrst implication is that we have an interest in creating in­
stitutional and conceptual structures that, by facilitating their 
own revision, enable us to split the difference between being in­
side them and being outside them. This change in the relation of 
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thing to the all-inclusive and insuperable frame of reference for 
which we cannot and should not hope. 
The second implication is that we must make ourselves differ­
ent from one another, both as collectivities and as individuals, if 
we are to make ourselves greater. Humanity can develop its pow­
ers only by developing them in different directions and by hous­
ing contrasting forms of life in distinct institutional orders. 
To  complicate our relation to nature is to ﬁnd yet another en­
couragement to this indispensable and transformative diversiﬁca­
tion. If our relation to nature is restricted to a choice between 
depredation and delight, between nature as fuel, to be pillaged 
and used, and nature as garden, to succor and distract, our deal­
ings with the natural setting of our lives in society will provide lit­
tle occasion to reinvent ourselves. 
Suppose, however, that we arrange our economic life, in the sep­
arate states in which humanity remains divided and in the world 
as a whole, to favor a multiplication of ways of dealing with nature 
that escape the contrast between instrumental use and noninstru­
mental engagement. These mixed forms will inspire, indeed they 
will demand, new forms of social and economic organization. The 
protection of nature will then have supported diversity as well as 
efﬁciency; it will have helped inspire the reinvention of society. The Troubles of Free Trade and 
the Possibilities of Economics 
●❍● 
This book may be misread as a polemic against free trade. It is 
not. Its immediate concern is to propose a change in how we 
understand the beneﬁts and dangers of trade among countries. 
The understanding I put forward results in a view of how to build 
an open world economy without harming some of our most 
important material and moral interests. If my proximate goal here 
is to reimagine free trade, my ulterior motive is to argue for a 
change in the way we think about markets, the division of labor, 
and the relation of production and exchange to the rest of our 
social experience. 
It is impossible to develop and to state this view of interna­
tional commerce without expanding—even radically—the scope 
of the traditional analysis, not just of trade but of economic life in 
general, and casting off some of the assumptions on which this 
analysis has rested. 
One of these assumptions has to do with insight into the rela­
tion between the abstract idea of a market, whether domestic 
or global, and the detailed legal and institutional arrangements 
through which this idea must be realized. There is simply no 
straightforward passage from one to the other. A national market 
economy may be organized in an open-ended number of very dif­
ferent ways, with very different consequences for the economic as 
well as the noneconomic aspects of social life. The same consider­
ation applies as well to the conception of an open world economy. 
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in principle while disregarding it in our analytic and argumenta­
tive practice, our explanatory and programmatic ideas about free 
trade will remain in the shadow of unacknowledged and unwar­
ranted preconceptions. 
A second assumption deals with the political setting of eco­
nomic decisions. No premise of the conventional way of thinking 
is more fateful for our approach to the identiﬁcation of economic 
alternatives and therefore to the understanding of economic reali­
ties than a lack of imagination about the consequences of political 
institutions for economic alternatives. Because there is no single, 
natural form of a market economy and because no market econ­
omy can deﬁne its own institutional and ideological presupposi­
tions, there can be no escape from political choice, not even in the 
organization and correction of the market, whether in a particular 
country or in the whole world. 
But who is to be the agent capable of formulating a collective 
interest that transcends the self-interest of particular factions and 
classes in society? Who can choose the presuppositions without 
serving as the instrument for the specious and predatory imposi­
tion of factional and class interest on the whole of society through 
the power of the state? To say that this question has no answer is 
to abdicate the future of society not to the forces of the market— 
a phantasm of our superstitions—but rather to the interests pre­
dominant in the particular type of market order that happens to 
be established. To say that the answer to this question lies in the 
appeal to an enlightened despotism or despotic bureaucracy ca­
pable of lifting itself above the particular interests in contest is 
to make the future of society hostage to the ambitions and the 
prejudices of the would-be savior. It is to sacriﬁce collective 
discovery to dogma armed with power. To look for the answer to 
this question in a preestablished formula of democratic politics, 
such as the varieties of representative democracy now established 
in the rich North Atlantic countries, is to make about democracy 
the same mistake that the conventional thinking makes about 
markets, identifying the incomplete political ideal with its contin­
gent and ﬂawed institutional forms.  Because these forms con­
tinue to inhibit the transformation of society through politics and troubles and opportunities  ❍  215 
to make change await crisis, they also allow some interests to con­
tinue ruling over others in the society and the economy. 
There is only one acceptable answer to the question of who is to 
speak in economic policy and elsewhere for the public interest. It 
is to deepen democracy through institutions that raise the level of 
organized popular participation in politics, combining features 
of representative and direct democracy; favor the rapid resolution 
of impasse in government and policy; create procedures for dis­
rupting and reorganizing the particular practices and organiza­
tions that give rise to entrenched social exclusion or disadvantage; 
enhance the capability-sustaining educational and economic en­
dowments of individuals without making access to such endow­
ments depend on holding any particular job; enable a society to 
hedge its bets by trying out, in particular sectors or localities, 
countermodels to its main line of evolution; and, in all these ways, 
diminish the dependence of change on calamity and weaken the 
power of the past over the future. 
Such a radicalization of the principle of democratic experimen­
talism can be achieved only through renovation of the narrow 
repertory of institutional arrangements to which contemporary 
societies remain bound. One of its many beneﬁts is to save us from 
having to deny ourselves recourse to policies requiring unequal 
treatment of different economic activities. It gives us practical 
means with which to answer the complaint that although such 
policies may be justiﬁed in theory, they will always be corrupt in 
practice. They will allow the powers of government to be usurped 
by self-serving interests. 
The alternative to the fake perpetual-motion machine of a 
market order that never needs to be reimagined and remade, but 
only to beneﬁt from localized corrections and compensations, is 
democracy, reimagined and remade. In this sense, some of the 
theoretical conundra of economics have only practical solutions. 
Such solutions, however, are not economic; they are political. 
A third assumption concerns the character and virtues of the 
division of labor. International free trade, on the basis of estab­
lished or constructed comparative advantage, is nothing but a 
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pin factory, with its regimen of hierarchical specialization, and of 
Karl Marx’s reign of scarcity, in which the coercive extraction 
of the surplus remains the indispensable condition of practical 
progress, continue to shape our economic ideas. They penetrate, 
in countless unsuspected ways, the ideas of free traders and pro­
tectionists alike. 
However, they have become ever less useful guides to under­
standing our situation. Not the pin factory, but the treadmill of 
perpetual innovation; not the coercive extraction of a surplus, 
but success in diffusing throughout social and economic life a 
revolutionary set of innovation-friendly practices of cooperation, 
have become the gateways to wealth. The future lies in using 
repeatable labor, expressed in formulas that are in turn embodied 
in machines, to save more of our most important resource, time, 
for the activities we have not yet learned to repeat. What seemed 
to be the main road in the history of specialization in production, 
exempliﬁed by Smith’s pin factory, has turned out to be only an 
early byway. Our view of the international division of labor 
must necessarily reﬂect our insight into the division of labor in 
general. 
A fourth assumption has to do with the relation between the 
efﬁcient allocation of resources at a static moment in time, on the 
basis of arrangements for the organization of the market and of 
the division of labor that we can take for granted, and the ability 
to continue experimenting with new institutions and practices as 
well as with new ways to do things within the current practices 
and institutions. The familiar contrast of static and dynamic efﬁ­
ciencies fails to do justice to the scope and depth of the problem. 
The point is to escape being arrested within approaches to the 
organization of both the market economy and the division of 
labor that limit, unnecessarily and unjustiﬁably, what Karl Marx 
called the development of the productive forces of society. The 
goal is to avoid surrendering to the necessitarian assumptions 
that tainted Marx’s own theory of the relation between produc­
tive forces and economic institutions, with its conception of a 
foreordained sequence of modes of production, each of them an 
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forward by inexorable laws of transformation. The aim is to de­
velop the power to innovate in the forms of the market economy 
and of the division of labor themselves, without requiring crisis 
and calamity as conditions of change. 
Our ideas about every national or worldwide regime for market-
based exchange must always operate at two levels. At one level— 
the one at which economic analysis has traditionally worked—we 
consider only the freedom to trade goods and services and to com­
bine, in their production, people, ideas, and things. At another 
level—the one at which a less superstitious way of thinking must 
learn to move—we look to the freedom to revise, piece by piece 
and step by step, the framework of institutional arrangements and 
assumptions within which we trade and combine. Our reasoning 
at the ﬁrst level should be informed by our thinking at the second. 
A set of arrangements, for a country or for the whole world, 
that seems fully to enact an ideal of free exchange, when viewed 
only at the ﬁrst level, may appear intolerably and unnecessarily 
wanting when reconsidered at the second level. That is what hap­
pens with the plan now underway to establish a selective, invidi­
ous, and antiexperimentalist version of free trade as the capstone 
of a world economy. It is also what happens with the forms of the 
market economy that are now established in the most successful 
economies of the world and that are identiﬁed by all but the 
purest—and the emptiest—forms of economic analysis as the in­
dispensable institutional instruments of efﬁcient resource alloca­
tion. Pushed to the hilt, an insistence on thinking simultaneously 
at both these levels has the potential to revolutionize our attitudes 
to the established organization of market economies and to the 
present course of globalization. 
It would be paradoxical and self-defeating for faith in a world 
market, developed under the banner of free trade, to result in a 
dogmatic constraint on our powers of decentralized and diver­
gent experimentation. It is not good enough to experiment in 
production; we need to experiment as well with the forms of ex­
perimentation, globally as well as locally. Otherwise we betray the 
practical reasons that lead us to prefer economic decentralization 
to economic centralism in the ﬁrst place. 218  ❍  troubles and opportunities 
A ﬁfth assumption goes to the relation between efﬁciency and 
diversity. The dominant tradition of economic thought focuses 
on mechanisms for selecting the most efﬁcient solutions to the 
problems of production and exchange. It takes for granted the di­
versiﬁcation of the material—all the way from different goods 
and services to different technologies, practices, arrangements, 
and ideas—to which these selective mechanisms of efﬁciency 
apply. The inherited institutional framework of the market, occa­
sionally adjusted, is treated as sufﬁcient to ensure the requisite 
wealth of experiments in economic life. 
We  cannot, however, take the creation of diversity for granted. 
It is at least half of the work of economic progress. It is a task, not 
a given. In economic development it is necessary to arouse a fever 
of constructive entrepreneurial activity and to counteract the in­
hibitions and deﬁciencies of relative backwardness, and then to 
subject the results of this feverish activity to remorseless compet­
itive selection. So, more generally, in the workings of an economy 
it is vital to ask at every turn both what will select and what will 
diversify: the imperatives efﬁciency and diversity have to be met, 
each in relation to the other. 
This seemingly innocuous proposition requires us to reconsider 
many of our most cherished economic assumptions, including our 
assumptions about the beneﬁts and dangers of international trade 
and the desirable route to the construction of an open world econ­
omy. It underlines the reasons for wanting alternative regimes of 
property and contract, and varied relations between government 
and private enterprise, to coexist experimentally within the same 
market economy. It also reveals the distinctly economic value of the 
political partition of mankind, the very premise of international 
trade and, at the same time, a subject about which trade theory, and 
economics as a whole, have strangely had little or nothing to say. 
These considerations may seem unobjectionable when stated 
as abstractions. We cannot, however, take them seriously without 
changing both the way we think about world trade and the way 
we organize it. 
In reimagining free trade, revision of the assumptions of our 
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of these ideas. The value of institutional difference, the require­
ments of institutional innovation, the nature of the way in which 
we can renovate and enlarge the restricted repertory of institu­
tional arrangements by which contemporary societies remain 
gripped, now that the calamitous ideological adventures of the 
twentieth century are spent—all these topics turn out to be vital 
to any effort to rise above the traditional terms of debate between 
free traders and protectionists. 
Here we touch on the nature, the limits, and the agenda of eco­
nomic theory as well as of the related social sciences. Ever since 
the rise of marginalism in the late nineteenth century, the pre­
ponderant orientation of economics has been to seek immunity 
from causal and normative controversy. Causal claims and nor­
mative assumptions alike must, on this formal, austere model of 
thought, be imported from outside the analytic apparatus. They 
form part of the boundary conditions or of the stipulations with 
which economic analysis must work. 
The result is a method of thought that achieves explanatory 
and argumentative power only with the help of ideas that it is it­
self powerless to generate or to justify. It must borrow these ideas, 
as the conventional doctrine of free trade borrowed ideas about 
the division of labor that have turned out to be false. Its immunity 
is bought at the risk of vacuity. It will not even enjoy the power of 
pure mathematics—of Kant’s synthetic a priori—to establish re­
lations that are at once formal and surprising. Denied the capacity 
to understand the actual by understanding what, under the pres­
sure of different initiatives and circumstances, the actual might 
become, such a practice of economic analysis will forever remain 
the somber discipline of constraints and trade-offs. 
The intellectual alternative is not to dissolve rigorous analysis 
into an unbounded exploration of the subject matter of all the 
other social sciences. It is to return to the path that economics 
abandoned when it embraced the strategy of immunizing itself 
from controversial causal and prescriptive claims: to rediscover 
and redirect the road that it had traveled in the period from Smith 
to Marx.I n that earlier way of thinking, economics had offered 
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struggled to relate the production of things, the structures of soci­
ety, and the powers of the mind. 
We can no longer work on the premises of those premarginalist 
economists. Their thought suffered from an early form of the 
superstitions that continue to threaten ours: a radical understate­
ment of the plurality of alternative institutional trajectories that 
the development of our productive powers can follow, an exag­
geration, inimical to experimentalism as well as to democracy, of 
the need for hierarchy and specialization, a willingness to give the 
last word to history rather than to keep it for ourselves. Neverthe­
less, the effort to work in a vein less inclusive and ambitious than 
theirs has brought us to a dead end. 
Our solution cannot resemble theirs in content. It should never­
theless resemble theirs in at least one trait of spirit. It should reject 
the strategy of immunization from causal and normative contro­
versy and yet resist the danger of dissolution in the speciﬁcities of 
social science as well as in the generalities of political argument. It 
should seek to develop explanatory claims and prescriptive ideas 
relating different forms of production and exchange to different 
ways of organizing those who exchange and produce. It should 
connect the transformation of nature with the transformation of 
society, the making of things with the reorganization of people. It 
should represent the actual under the aegis of the possible, given 
that, in social study as in natural science, to understand a phenom­
enon or a state of affairs is to grasp what it can become under vary­
ing interventions or conditions of pressure. 
The possible that matters is not the rationalistic idea of a closed 
horizon of possible worlds—possible forms of the market econ­
omy or of production and exchange under scarcity or of special­
ization and trade among trading partners. The possible that 
counts is the pragmatic conception of the adjacent possible: the 
next steps that we can take, the there that we can get to from here. 
These remarks about method may seem too abstract to be use­
ful, but the ideas of this book offer an applied example of what 
they mean. 
Free trade—how to think about it and what to do about it— 
is far from being the largest problem now facing mankind. No troubles and opportunities  ❍  221 
contemporary issue, however, more strikingly combines theo­
retical interest with practical urgency. As fact, free trade gives 
voice to the two impulses that exercise the widest inﬂuence in the 
world today: the turn to markets and the advance of globaliza­
tion. As doctrine, it supports the belief that we should rejoice in 
the workings of these twin impulses as well as resign ourselves to 
their triumph. 
The established practice of international trade gives us cause to 
rebel until we reshape both market economies and globalization, 
not to reject the ideas of free exchange and of free labor but to 
radicalize them as bases for an open world economy. A changed 
theory of international trade gives us reason to reimagine until we 
see with new eyes the relation between constraint and possibility 
in the national and the world economies, and recover as transfor­
mative opportunity what we had mistaken for unyielding fate. We 
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